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FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING 
“ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
he need to consolidate and streamline the stock of legislation and reduce the 
unnecessary costs associated with legal rules has been increasingly felt by regulated 
stakeholders and governments in many developed and emerging economies. In 
many OECD countries, including many EU Member States and Canada, Korea, Mexico, 
the United States, this has led governments of various political orientations to introduce 
forms of regulatory budgeting, in which administrations are asked to identify, whenever 
new provisions introduce regulatory costs, existing provisions that could be repealed or 
revised, thereby offsetting the cost increase. In some countries these rules have implied a 
one-to-one offset, whereas in other countries the provisions imposed also a reduction, as in 
the case of UK’s one-in-two-out and one-in-three-out rules, and the US one-in-two-out rule. 
This is why we generically refer to these rules as “One-In-X-Out”, or OIXO. Moreover, many 
countries have also experimented with a complementary strategy, which implies the setting 
of ad hoc burden reduction targets, either for all legislation or for specific sectors. In fact, 
OIXO-rules are just a specific from of burden reduction targets – with the level of the target 
“Out” being linked to the flow of new regulations “In”. 
Based on our data collection, there are ten EU member states in which an OIXO rule is 
in place: Austria, Finland (pilot), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain 
and Sweden; two countries where the rule has been in place and was currently 
discontinued (Denmark and the UK); and one country in which the rule was formally 
announced, but was not implemented (Portugal). Four other countries are reportedly 
considering the introduction of such rule: Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Altogether these countries represent more than 86% of the EU28 GDP and 86% of the 
EU28 population. Even considering only the ten countries with an OIXO rule currently 
in place, they account for 62% of the EU GDP and 58% of the EU population.  
Figure A below maps the diffusion of the OIXO rule in the EU28, with an indication of 
those countries in which an OIXO rule is currently in place (deep blue); countries in which 
the introduction of the rule is currently being planned (blue); and countries in which the 
rule used to be in place, but was recently discontinued (light yellow); countries in which 
the OIXO rule formally exists, but is not being implemented (yellow). Countries where no 
such rule is in place are marked in brown. 
 
T 
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Figure A – The experience of EU Member States with OIXO rules 
  
 
Table A below summarises the experience in EU countries with both OIXO rules and 
burden reduction targets.  
 
Table A – Overview of the experience with OIXO rules and burden reduction targets in EU Member States 
 
Burden reduction targets OIXO 
Rule 
OIXO 
Scope (costs) 
OIXO 
Scope (regulated 
entities) 
Austria Currently no target in place.  
Launched the Standards Cost Model (SCM) in 
2006, achieving a reduction of administrative 
burdens of 25% by 2012.  
One In, One Out 
(OIOO)  
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses and 
citizens 
Belgium KAFKA (similar to SCM) launched in 2004. 
Measurement in 2002-2006 and 2007-2012 with 
25% reduction targets.  
The SME plan in 2015 set the goal of 30% savings 
for companies. 
No Administrative 
Burdens  
Businesses (SMEs) 
Bulgaria Currently no target. Since 2009, there have been 
three plans to reduce administrative burdens: The. 
20% reduction targets were achieved by the first 
and second Action Plan for ABR on businesses 
(2010-2012 and 2012-2014). 26% of the planned 
30% reduction target was achieved under the third 
Action Plan by the end of 2018. 
No Administrative 
Burdens  
Businesses 
Croatia Reduce administrative burdens by 21% in 2021.  No Administrative 
burdens  
Businesses  
Cyprus Currently no target. 
Had a goal to achieve 20% reduction in admin 
burdens by end 2012. 19% was achieved. Since 
then, sectoral targets were introduced – e.g. in 
Tourism. 25% target set in 2015.  
No Administrative 
burdens  
Businesses  
Czech 
Republic 
Currently no target. No Administrative 
burdens   
Businesses  
OIXO is in place
OIXO is planned
OIXO recently discontinued
OIXO exists but not implemented
OIXO not in place
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Applied the SCM since 2005. In 2016, a 31.49% 
reduction was found compared to 2005. Then new 
long-term goals were set to reduce the burden by 
2020 and carry out another measurement in 2021.
  
Denmark During 2004-2010, the application of the SCM led 
to a 24.6% decrease in administrative burdens. 
The previous government’s reduction target of 4 
billion DKK in 2020 and additionally 2 billion 
DKK in 2025 compared to 2015 has been 
discontinued by the new government appointed 
this summer.   
OIOO 
(discontinued by 
the new 
government in 
the summer of 
2019) 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses 
Greece 25% reduction of administrative burdens: results 
presented in 2014. 
No  Administrative 
burdens    
Businesses  
Estonia No current target, but rather a zero-bureaucracy 
plan. 
The SCM was applied since 2009, focused on four 
areas. 
No   Businesses and 
citizens 
Finland No current target. 
Measured administrative burdens in 2008-2012, 
aiming at a 25% reduction. 
Pilot test still 
ongoing in the 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
and 
Employment. 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses 
France No current target. 
Attempted to apply the SCM since 2004, then 
moved to life events surveys. 
OI2O  Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses, local 
administration 
and services, 
citizens 
Germany Since 2006 there was a net target, achieved in 2012,  
leading to a 25% reduction. Since then a 
Bureaucracy Cost Index is maintained. Since 2015 
a OIOO rule is in place. 
OIOO  Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs  
Businesses 
Hungary Cutting Red Tape Programme for Businesses 
(2011) and additional measures helped to achieve 
the target of 25% administrative burden reduction. 
“Programme for a more competitive Hungary” 
(2018) affects several areas, with altogether 42 
actions. Results were achieved also by Good 
Governance – Magyary Programme (2010-2014) 
and the Public Administration and Public Service 
Development Strategy (2014-2020).  
Currently no target (%) in place. Cutting red tape is 
still a priority for Hungary. The focus is on the 
most burdensome areas. 
OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs   
Businesses, 
citizens and 
public 
administration 
Ireland No current target.  
Applied the SCM in 2008-2012, aiming at a 25% 
reduction. By November 2012 an estimated 18.6% 
had been achieved. 
No     
Italy No current target. 
Applied the SCM in 2007-2012, aiming at a 25% 
reduction.  
OIOO  Administrative 
burdens 
Citizens and 
businesses 
Latvia No current target. 
Had a reduction plan in 2009-2015 (but no precise 
methodology). 
OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses  
Lithuania No current target. 
Had a plan that aimed at 30% reduction in 
particular areas, but the goal was not reached. 
OIOO  Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
Luxembourg No current target. 
The 2009-14 plan set a national target for reducing 
administrative burdens by 15% by 2012 in four 
priority areas. 
No      
Malta No current target. 
In 2008 committed to reduce administrative 
burden on businesses by 15% by 2012 using the 
SCM methodology. In 2018, committed to reduce 
No  Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
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bureaucracy by a further 30% during this 
legislature. 
Netherlands No current target. 
In the past it was a pioneer with MISTRAL in 
1994, SCM in 2003-2007, and then second 
baseline measurement. Set a structural net 
reduction target of 2.5 billion Euros for businesses, 
professionals and citizens by 2017 compared to 
2012 levels.  
No  Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs  
Businesses and 
citizens  
Poland No current target.  
Had a target for 2008-2010, aimed at a 25% 
reduction. Then a new Strategy in 2012, with new 
targets to achieve a reduction equivalent to 1% 
GDP by 2015 and 1.5% by 2020.  
Currently 
planned 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses  
Portugal No current target. . 
Launched a reduction programme in 2007 with 
25% target until 2012. 
OIOO  Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
Romania No current target. Planned     
Slovakia Two plans, in 2009 and in 2015. In March 2015 66 
new measures related to seven ministries aimed at 
an estimated reduction goal of about 55 million 
Euros. 
Planned Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
Slovenia In 2007 Slovenia adopted the Standard Cost  
Model (SCM). In 2009 objectives were set for  
administrative burden reduction and elimination of  
administrative barriers by 25 % by the end of 2015 
(365 mio EUR or 27% realized). After 2015 there 
has been objective to reduce administratitive burden 
by minimum of 5 MIO EUR per year.  
Planned     
Spain No. Had a plan in 2007-2012, and a net reduction 
target of 30%, which was achieved.  
OIOO Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
Sweden Administrative costs for businesses should be lower 
in 2020 compared to 2012.  
In the past it applied the SCM in 2006-2012, with 
25% target (but only 7% was achieved). 
OIOO Administrative 
burdens 
Businesses 
The UK* 10bn pound savings set in 2015, current BIT at 9bn 
pound.  
OIOO in 2011; 
OI2O in 2013; 
OI3O in 2016 
and 2017. OIXO 
not in force since 
2017. 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Businesses 
* At the moment of drafting this report, the UK is still a Member of the European Union. 
 
Overall, national experiences with OIXO rules have led to positive results: hence, many 
EU Member States have started to advocate the adoption of a similar strategy also at the 
EU level. These calls are reflected in various Conclusions of the Council of the EU 
(December 2014, May 2016, March 2018, November 2018 and May 2019). The European 
Commission acknowledged the requests formulated by the Council over the years and also 
recalled that paragraph 48 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making calls 
for an assessment of the feasibility of establishing objectives for burden reduction. While 
acknowledging these requests, the Juncker Commission had stated its intention to 
maintain a case-by-case approach to the reduction of regulatory burdens. In its 
Communication on “Completing the Better Regulation Agenda”1, adopted in October 
2017, and in the more recent Staff Working Paper and Communication on “Taking Stock 
 
1 COM(2017) 651: Completing the Better Regulation Agenda: Better solutions for better results. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/completing-the-better-regulation-agenda-better-solutions-for-better-
results_en.pdf. 
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of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda”2, published in April 2019, the Juncker 
Commission argued that “upfront targets” would not offer certain fundamental guarantees: 
in particular, they would adversely affect underlying policy objectives and the need to 
ensure democratic accountability and transparency, which requires “a political decision on 
which costs are legitimate to achieve policy goals and which instead should be eliminated”. 
Such decision, the Commission explained, should be “based on evidence from a case-to-
case assessment that responds to the concerns of stakeholders and people”. However, 
empirical evidence collected by the Commission has revealed that stakeholders are 
prevalently unsatisfied about the Commission’s previous efforts to simplify legislation.  
 
TOWARDS AN EU OIXO RULE 
Most recently, the new President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, 
announced that the Commission will apply the “‘One-In, One-Out’ (OIOO) principle 
“to cut red tape”3. In her mission letters to the designated members of the College of 
Commissioners, the new President stated that “the Commission will develop a new 
instrument to deliver on a ‘One In, One Out’ principle”, adding that “every legislative 
proposal creating new burdens should relieve people and businesses of an equivalent 
existing burden at EU level in the same policy area”; and that the Commission “will also 
work with Member States to ensure that, when transposing EU legislation, they do not add 
unnecessary administrative burdens”4. The OIOO principle is already specified in the 
newly adopted document on the “Main principles of the working methods”, where the 
Commission further specified that it will adopt a “whole-of-government” approach, and 
consequently introduced the OIOO principle without limiting it to specific sectors or 
policy areas. The document mentions that the principle is being introduced in order to 
send “a clear and credible signal to citizens that its policies and proposals deliver and make 
life easier”5.  
The OIOO principle is thus now officially part of the better regulation agenda in the 
European Commission: however, its contours and modus operandi must still be defined. 
This Feasibility Study responds to this need by taking stock of the largely positive experience 
of EU and non-EU OECD countries with OIXO rules and burden reduction targets, and 
at the same time considering the concerns expressed by the Juncker Commission (and by a 
small group of Member States) on the risk that the new system causes delays, jeopardises 
the achievement of the Commission’s agenda, and leads to inefficient incentives for 
Commission officials. Apart from available literature at the international level, we have 
collected information through a survey, which retrieved 21 useful results (see table below).  
 
2 COM(2019) 156: Taking Stock of the Commission's Better Regulation Agenda 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-taking-stock-swd_en.pdf. 
3 https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-5542_en.htm 
4 See, for example https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-maros-sefcovic-2019_en.pdf 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/working-methods-principles_en.pdf 
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Table B – Replies to our survey 
Location Name of the institution 
Belgium Federal Government 
Belgium Region of Flanders-Belgium 
Bulgaria Ministry of Economy 
Croatia  Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts 
Czech Republic Office of the Government of the Czech Republic 
Denmark The Danish Business Authority (Ministry of Business, Industry and Financial Affairs) 
Estonia Ministry of Justice of Estonia 
Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Federal Chancellery 
Greece Better Regulation Office 
Hungary Government Office of the Prime Minister 
Ireland Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation 
Italy Presidency of the Council of Ministers – Department for Public Administration 
Latvia Ministry of Economy and the State Chancellery of Latvia 
Malta The Ministry for European Affairs and Equality 
Lithuania  Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania 
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs & Climate 
Portugal JurisAPP 
Slovakia Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic 
Slovenia Ministry of Public Administration 
Spain Regulatory Coordination and Quality office. Ministry for presidency, Parliamentary Relations 
and Equality 
The UK Better Regulation Executive (telephone interview) 
 
Based on the results of our analysis, we developed a proposed system, which would be 
likely to achieve the positive results observed in Member States and other OECD 
countries, while at the same time mitigating or fully addressing the concerns expressed 
by the “old” Commission, which are tackled one by one in Section 3 below. We also set 
key preconditions that a future OIOO rule should satisfy. They include a firm political 
commitment, strong multi-level governance, greater re-use and sharing of data and 
information on existing and upcoming regulations, and emphasis on communication, 
rather than a mechanistic, algebraic approach to “ins” and “outs”. We have built a system 
that is rooted in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making and respects the 
peculiarities of the EU better regulation agenda, to ensure that in line with what is 
happening in many European countries, the implementation of these tools does not 
jeopardise the achievement of EU’s policy agenda.  
 
 
FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED EU OIOO RULE  
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• We propose that the rule takes the form of an OIOO rule (thus, X = 1), in a way that 
mirrors most of the national experience we have surveyed. The choice of an OIOO rule 
is also motivated by the need to avoid that the rule introduced places excessive pressure 
on the EU administration to identify and reduce costs generated by the acquis; as a 
matter of fact, the proposed rule is aimed at enabling gradual awareness of existing 
unnecessary costs, and a gradual improvement of the quality of the regulatory stock 
through the introduction of necessary “ins” and the removal of unnecessary “outs”.  
• The OIOO rule would cover all direct compliance costs, thus including administrative 
burdens, substantive compliance costs, and charges where existing. As a matter of fact, 
in the systems, which have adopted this wider approach and not only focused on 
administrative burdens, the most significant positive results have been observed. This 
can be explained by the fact that substantive compliance costs are, in most cases, more 
significant than administrative burdens.  
• Within the proposed system, all newly introduced costs count as “ins”. While “ins” 
ideally always correspond to necessary costs, “outs” can only be costs that were found 
to be unnecessary. Again, we define “unnecessary burdens” as corresponding to 
unnecessary administrative costs, unnecessary substantive compliance costs, and 
unnecessary charges. These are the cost categories that will be included in our proposed 
“burden reduction plans”.  
• The proposed OIOO rule would apply to businesses and citizens, in order to ensure 
that both can benefit from an improvement of the EU acquis, and the elimination of 
unnecessary costs. This would also be important to build ownership of the new system 
among all stakeholders, and avoid that reduction measures are exclusively focused on 
one category. Over time, also public administrations could be covered by the rule, but 
this would require a high degree of coordination between the European Commission 
and Member States.  
• The proposed system would allow for banking of cost reductions achieved, subject to 
the achievement of the overall cost reduction plan.6 Banking, however, works both 
ways: in case of failure to achieve the planned reductions during a given year, the 
reductions to be achieved would then be passed onto the following year.  
• The proposed system will cover recurrent costs, not one-off costs. The overall aim of 
the system is to reduce or, where possible, eliminate the unnecessary costs generated by 
existing EU rules: the one-off costs that emerge as a result of the introduction of a new 
rule are typically not “actionable” once they have been faced by regulated entities, no 
matter whether the administration seeks to simplify, consolidate legislation or seek 
digital solutions.  
• The system would in principle not allow for trading burden reductions, since this 
would lead to a possible confusion of regulatory costs and benefits, with potentially 
 
6 For an explanation of “banking” see Box 2 at page 17. 
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significant distributional consequences. Only in exceptional circumstances, and 
following a formal political decision (e.g. at the College level), trading could be 
admitted, if the area in which “ins” are being introduced does not feature unnecessary 
costs, and other areas can be identified, in which measures could be adopted without 
affecting regulatory objectives or creating undesirable distributional impacts. The 
proposal should be assessed with a view to demonstrating that the new costs are justified 
by the achievement of superior regulatory benefits. 
• As the proposed OIOO-system is not a strict, mechanistic rule, complete exemptions 
from the system are not necessary. This holds especially true as in the proposed OIOO-
system banking and, in exceptional circumstances, also trading provide sufficient 
flexibility. Outright exemptions would threat to undermine the effectiveness of the 
system. 
• The proposed OIOO rule would require oversight, preferably by the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board7, who would be asked to oversee the correct implementation of the 
rule, and ensure in particular: that ex ante impact assessments contain a section on the 
application of the OIOO rule, and that “ins” correspond to necessary costs; that “ins 
and “outs” are correctly measured using the same agreed methodology ;and that ex post 
evaluations report on possible unnecessary cost.  
• The proposed rule would require supervision and coordination by the Secretariat-
General of the European Commission, in particular for what concerns the procedural 
steps that will be described in the next Section (i.e., the development and update of a 
“heat map”, the adoption and update of burden reduction plans); and for the 
transparent reporting of the “ins” and “outs”, in particular in the Annual Burden 
Survey. 
Table C below shows the main characteristics of the proposed system.  
Table C – The proposed OIOO system at the EU level8 
Country Rule Type of costs 
covered 
Scope 
(law) 
Regulated 
entities 
Timing 
of 
offsets 
Banking Trading Exemptions 
EU  OIOO  Direct 
compliance 
costs (charges, 
administrative 
burdens, 
compliance 
costs) 
All EU 
legislation  
Citizens and 
businesses (and 
over time, 
possibly also 
public 
administrations) 
By year 
end 
Yes Only in 
exceptional 
circumstances 
No 
 
 
7 For more information on the Regulatory Scrutiny Board see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/regulatory-scrutiny-board_en. 
8 For the taxonomy see Boxes 1 and 2 in the introduction. 
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IMPLEMENTING THE OIOO RULE 
Figure B below shows our proposal for a possible step-by-step implementation of an OIOO 
system at the EU level in combination with burden reduction plans, that should help to 
systematically identify possible “outs”. Two distinct phases are distinguished: a one-off set-
up phase, and a yearly cycle.  
• In the set-up phase, the Commission launches the preliminary study and a “life 
events” survey. Results are processed and presented with the presentation of a “heat 
map”, aimed at enabling the identification of the policy areas in which unnecessary 
costs (which we define as “unnecessary burdens”, and encompass unnecessary charges, 
unnecessary administrative burdens and unnecessary substantive compliance costs) 
were identified, and could be reduced or eliminated. The heat map is subject to 
consultation of the REFIT Platform9, and then converted into “burden reduction 
plans” for each policy area (for each Directorate General). This will be a relatively 
“loose” OIOO system, meaning that, as explained in the previous section, it would not 
require that for every Euro of regulatory costs introduced, a Euro of regulatory costs is 
contextually removed; and would not require the repeal of legislation, but contemplates 
also the revision of legislation. The system, together with the description of the OIOO 
rule would be officially launched when the Commission’s yearly Work Programme is 
presented.  
• In the yearly cycle, new measures proposed, with ad hoc changes in the stakeholder 
consultation and in the ex ante impact assessment10. Impact assessments feature an 
indication of the “ins” and a specification of where the “outs” will be achieved, and by 
when. The stakeholder consultations foreseen during the policy cycle carry a specific 
mention of direct compliance costs, and the REFIT Platform groups are involved in 
the finalization of the Annual Burden Survey. The heat map is updated annually. The 
Annual Burden Survey also takes stock on what has been achieved for each policy 
domain, through which measures (simplification, consolidation, digitalisation), and 
what could be banked (or added to the expected target) during the following year.  
 
9 For more information on the REFIT Platform, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-
improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly/refit-platform_en. 
10 Ex post evaluations of existing legislation may also be required to highlight the existence of unnecessarily high or 
redundant regulatory costs. 
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Figure B – Step-by-step implementation of the new system 
 
 
Figure C shows how the yearly OIOO cycle can be integrated with the EU policy cycle. The 
figure is based on the representation of the policy cycle offered by the European 
Commission in its latest stocktaking Communication on better regulation. As shown in 
the figure, compared to the existing policy cycle, the new OIOO rule would entail a 
number of additions to the current policy cycle, including:  
• A specific module on costs in the 12-week consultation on the Inception Impact 
Assessments and in the 8-week consultation on the finalised Commission proposal. 
• A new section dedicated to the OIOO rule in the ex ante impact assessment, in which 
new “necessary” costs (“ins”) are estimated, and unnecessary costs to be eliminated 
(“outs”) are identified from the heat map. 
• The possibility for the Commission to warn co-legislators whenever proposed 
amendments risk violating the OIOO rule, since they introduce new costs not 
accounted for in the original proposal or fail to achieve the planned reduction of 
unnecessary costs. 
• During the implementation phase, the collection of feedback from stakeholders 
(through “Lighten the Load-Have your Say”)11 and from the REFIT platform on the 
effective reduction of unnecessary costs. 
• In the ex post evaluation, the identification of the need for new regulatory measures 
(and possible new “ins”); or the existence of unnecessary costs, which could be reduced 
through measures such as simplification, consolidation or digitalisation (“outs”). This 
 
11 Lighten the Load- Have Your Say is a platform that enables stakeholders to propose reforms that improve laws and 
reduce regulatory burdens. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/lighten-load_en. 
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will lead to an update of the heat map, as well as the inclusion of new possible measures 
in the following Commission yearly Work Programme. 
  
Figure C – Additions to the existing policy cycle 
  
 
The Table below shows how the proposed OIOO system would address the main concerns 
expressed by the Juncker Commission.   
 
Table D – How the proposed OIOO system addresses the Juncker Commission’s concerns 
Concern of the Juncker Commission Features of the proposed system 
Baseline measurements are not cost-
effective ways to achieve meaningful cost 
reductions  
The proposed system does not require a baseline measurement, but 
rather evidence-based burden reduction plans. 
Politically set burden reduction objectives 
create a significant risk of deregulatory 
pressure and complicate the ability to 
adopt new legislation that is objectively 
needed.  
The proposed system focuses on unnecessary costs, and does not create 
an immediate pressure to identify, contextually, offsetting measures.  
By promoting the offsetting of new costs and incentivising more 
retrospective reviews on the regulatory stock, the system can even 
make ambitious regulation easier to justify.  
Burden reduction objectives set without a 
significant involvement of stakeholders, 
are likely to lead to a lack of legitimacy 
and acceptance by the stakeholders.  
In the proposed system, stakeholders are constantly involved: in the 
definition of the Work Programme (through Lighten the Load-Have 
Your Say and the REFIT Platform), through special modules in the 
12-week consultation on Inception Impact Assessments and in the 8-
week consultation on completed Commission proposals; and in the 
definition of the Annual Burden Survey.  
Burden reduction targets face a 
methodological challenge: the need to 
ensure that all Commission proposals are 
The system requires quantification of costs from EU legislation, 
something that the Commission and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 
Identification of new costs, explanation 
of offsets identified in the “Heat Map”Identification of existing unnecessary costs (“Heat 
Map”) and possible measures to reduce them
8-week stakeholder consultation with 
specific module on costs
Specific module on costs in the 
consultation on the inception IA
Inclusion of possible new “ins” and 
“outs” and update of the Heat Map
Feedback from stakeholders on the impact of 
cost reductions on the ground
Involvement of REFIT platform to assess the 
impact of cost reductions on the ground
Warning by the Commission 
whenever amendments violate the 
OIOO rule
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accompanied with reliable quantitative 
estimates of new costs and/or savings. 
This is particularly complex at EU level. 
have advocated for more than a decade. Quantification of costs and 
savings is normally possible.  
It is difficult to calibrate the ambition of 
any ex ante objective.  
Our system does not allow for arbitrarily set burden reduction 
targets: evidence is collected to back the adoption of burden reduction 
plans through a preliminary and on-going fact-finding study, coupled 
with a life events survey. The exercise is repeated annually to account 
for the operation of the OIOO rule.  
Burden reduction targets critically fail to 
consider “necessary costs”, and the 
benefits of legislation.  
The proposed system clearly differentiates between necessary costs 
that are those intrinsically linked to the achievement of a policy goal 
and unnecessary costs (“unnecessary burdens”) that can be reduced 
without preventing the accomplishment of the objectives of 
legislation. The proposed OIOO rule is focused on unnecessary costs, 
and the reduction measures are classified in three different baskets: 
simplification, consolidation, digitalisation.  
There can be undesirable behavioural 
impacts from the adoption of burden 
reduction targets: necessary and beneficial 
regulation will be set aside simply to meet 
the burden target 
The proposed system does not compromise on the achievement of 
regulatory objectives. Complying with the  OIOO rule would remain 
a component of a broader strategy to improve the quality of 
regulation. In some cases, greater incentives to perform retrospective 
reviews may create even more space for ambitious regulations.  
Politically set burden reduction targets 
would “impair the ability of the 
Commission to assume its political 
responsibility.  
The proposed system operates well within the Commission’s 
ambitious regulatory agenda. This is possible and is confirmed by the 
majority of national experiences.  
An OIOO rule would create delays, due 
to the need to find cost savings to finance 
any increase in costs  
The delays would be unlikely in the proposed system. The regulatory 
offset does not need to be contextual or simultaneous to the new 
proposals, but needs to be identified in the Work Programme, and 
then assessed in practice by the end of the year. The “heat map” 
developed continuously as part of the system should offer sufficient 
information to enable the identification of “candidates” for repeal or 
revision, without significant delays in the process. 
An OIOO rule would cause even bigger 
delays at the EU level, since “finding 
consensus among EU institutions over 
which legislation should be withdrawn or 
modified” would “delay even further the 
process”. 
The proposed system builds on a shared commitment to reduce 
unnecessary costs, in line with the procedures included in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. It chiefly 
requires strong political commitment in all three institutions (like all 
regulatory reform processes). 
Repealing or withdrawing a piece of 
legislation at the EU level would not 
guarantee cost reduction  
Agreement between all EU institutions within the joint programming 
introduced by the Interinstitutional Agreement, as well as the heavy 
involvement of the REFIT Platform in the process, would mitigate 
this risk by ensuring constant follow-up of simplification initiatives. 
Stakeholder consultation on the Annual Burden Survey would lead 
to feedback of the impact of simplification measures on the ground.  
An OIOO rule would not be effective since 
unnecessary regulatory costs often do not stem 
from EU regulation but from inadequate 
implementation at Member State level. 
The proposed system starts with the building of a “heat map”, which 
then attributes the origin of unnecessary costs to different levels of 
government. The unnecessary costs that cannot be reduced at the EU 
level and require action at the national level could be addressed 
within the European Semester and through the many existing 
national burden reduction programmes. 
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FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING 
“ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Introduction 
The need to consolidate and streamline the stock of legislation and reduce the costs 
associated with legal rules has been increasingly felt by regulated stakeholders and 
governments in many developed and emerging economies. The underlying assumption in 
most cases is that regulation, while providing benefits to society, can also generate 
significant, unnecessary costs on businesses and citizens (see Box 1 below for our definition 
and taxonomy of regulatory costs). Achieving a reduction of the latter costs can provide 
substantial benefits to the economy of a country, by liberating resources that can be 
allocated to more productive uses, and without jeopardizing regulatory benefits: as a matter 
of fact, as will be illustrated throughout this report, pursuing more discipline in the 
administration for what concerns the control of regulatory costs does not necessarily imply 
a de-regulatory agenda; rather, it aims at maximising both benefits stemming from 
innovation and sustainability, and benefits obtained in terms of cost savings.  
 
Box 1 - A taxonomy of regulatory costs, and the definition of unnecessary costs 
This Report follows the official definition of regulatory costs provided by the European 
Commission in its Better Regulation Guidelines. Figure 1 below shows a general map of 
the impacts generated by legal rules, developed in Renda et al. (2013c) and included in the 
EU Better Regulation Toolbox. As shown in the figure, regulation normally produces both 
direct and indirect impacts, which in turn can generate second-order effects (“ultimate 
impacts”). The tools described in this report mostly deal with “Area 1”, which includes so-
called “Direct Regulatory Costs”, which encompass both direct compliance costs and, as a 
residual category, irritation costs (or hassle costs), which are typically more difficult to 
quantify or monetize. These costs are located in the left part of Figure 1 below, which 
provides a comprehensive map of the costs and benefits of regulation12.  
Direct compliance costs include the following sub-categories: 
 
12 The map of costs and benefits of regulation was originally developed in Renda et al. (2013c), where all other types of 
costs and benefits are given a detailed description. We therefore refer the reader to that study for a complete 
description of Figure 1.  
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• Charges, which include fees, levies, taxes, royalties, etc. These are often easy to calculate, 
as their extent is by definition known. What is sometimes more difficult to assess is 
who will bear those costs, as this might depend on the extent to which these costs are 
passed-on to entities other than those targeted by the legal rule. For example, emissions 
allowances might be passed-on downstream on end consumers in the form of higher 
prices for certain products, or in the electricity bill. 
• Substantive compliance costs, which encompass those investments and expenses that are 
faced by businesses and citizens in order to comply with substantive obligations or 
requirements contained in a legal rule. These costs can be further broken down into 
one-off costs (faced by regulated actors to adjust and adapt to the changed legal rule; and 
recurrent costs (substantive compliance costs that are borne on a regular basis as a result 
of the existence of a legal rule that imposes specific periodic behaviours).These costs 
are calculated as a sum of capital costs, financial costs and operating costs.  
• Administrative burdens are those costs borne by businesses, citizens, civil society 
organizations and public authorities as a result of administrative activities performed 
to comply with information obligations included in legal rules.  
 
Figure 1 – A map of regulatory costs and benefits 
 
Source: Renda et al. (2013c) 
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Direct costs are most often generated by regulation in order to achieve specific benefits. 
For example, investments related to compliance with health or environmental standards, 
such as the purchase of new equipment or the training of personnel, are needed to ensure 
that the policy objective to improve healthcare or protect the environment is met. However, 
in some circumstances the existence of overlaps between regulatory provisions, as well as 
inconsistencies or redundancies between regulatory provisions, can generate “unnecessary” 
(or “unnecessarily high”) costs. Some costs can also become unnecessarily high after the 
entry into force of a given rule: for example, the diffusion of digital technologies can make 
it possible for regulators to introduce new forms of electronic compliance verification, 
which can lead to a reduction of administrative burdens. This is the case of so-called 
RegTech or SupTech solutions, which apply digital technology to monitoring, supervision 
and compliance verification in a growing number of sectors. Accordingly, direct costs from 
regulation have to be approached in a dynamic way, rather than as a static concept.  
In the remainder of this report, we therefore define as unnecessary (or unnecessarily high) 
costs all those direct regulatory costs that could be reduced or eliminated by policymakers 
without negative repercussions on the benefits sought by the regulatory intervention. 
We will also refer to unnecessary costs as “unnecessary burdens”, to signify that they are 
weighing on stakeholders without being necessary for the achievement of regulatory 
objectives13.  
Unnecessary costs can be further divided into two categories:  
(i) Completely unnecessary and redundant costs, associated with regulatory provisions that 
can be repealed since they do not contribute to the achievement of the policy goals; 
and  
(ii) Exceedingly high costs, which may be reduced if the policymakers rely on more cost-
effective solutions (including simplification, consolidation of legislation and 
implementation of digital technologies), without compromising on policy 
objectives. 
Importantly, the definition of this terminology does not imply the introduction of a new 
category of costs in Figure 1 above. The taxonomy (included also in the EU Better 
Regulation Toolbox) remains valid: within each category (charges, administrative burdens, 
substantive compliance costs), there may be costs that are considered as necessary, and costs 
that could be reduced or eliminated.  
 
All those countries that have established themselves as leaders in the field of regulatory 
governance have decided to adopt, in addition to other instruments such as public 
consultation and regulatory impact analysis, comprehensive programmes for the 
measurement and reduction of direct costs from regulation. These programmes feature 
important similarities, but also a number of important differences. In particular, some 
 
13 Burdens thus correspond to unnecessary direct compliance costs (including unnecessary charges, unnecessary 
administrative burdens, unnecessary substantive compliance costs). 
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countries focus only on administrative burdens, rather than taking a broader view of 
substantive compliance costs; some countries have undergone a comprehensive baseline 
measurement of the stock of regulatory cost, whereas others have decided to focus directly 
on the flow of new regulation; and some countries have adopted a net reduction target 
expressed in absolute or percentage terms, and some countries operate a “One In, X Out” 
(OIXO) rule to control the flow of new regulations (see box below for a definition); finally, 
some countries have coupled these systems with a fully fledged cost-benefit analysis of new 
legislative and regulatory proposals, whereas others have not. 
 
Box 2: our Definition of OIXO rules and their relationship with burden reduction targets 
By OIXO we refer to a rule according to which, whenever proposing a new regulation or 
legislative intervention that entails an increase in regulatory costs, authorities commit to 
look at the stock of existing regulatory provisions to offset the cost increase. Depending on 
the circumstances, the OIXO rule may explicitly refer to the number of regulations, and 
thus require that for every regulation introduced, one or more existing regulations are 
eliminated; or to the corresponding volume of regulatory costs, and hence require that 
when a new regulation is introduced, one or more regulations are modified or repealed, 
such that the overall change in regulatory costs is zero or negative. Most advanced countries 
indeed adopt the latter version, based on cost offsetting rather than on avoiding increases 
in the number of regulatory provisions.  
The OIXO rule changes across jurisdictions, in particular according to:  
• the scope (e.g., whether it is limited to secondary legislation, or also covers primary 
legislation brought to Parliament for approval);  
• the type of costs covered (e.g., only administrative burdens, or also substantive 
compliance costs, and/or enforcement costs);  
• whether the system requires one or more regulations to be eliminated, or also 
modified;  
• whether the amount of costs to be eliminated equals the amount of costs introduced, 
or is greater (e.g., in the US the rule is currently one-in-two-out, but in terms of cost 
volumes it is effectively a One-In-One-Out or OIOO rule);  
• the timing of offsets (whether the rules to be repealed must be eliminated contextually 
with the approval of the new rule, or within a given timeframe, e.g., in the US and 
Germany they should be eliminated by the end of the fiscal year);  
• whether an impact assessment is required, covering the costs and the benefits of 
eliminating one or more rules;  
• whether any exemption is foreseen (e.g., for implementation of EU legislation, home 
affairs and security regulation or emergency legislation);  
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• whether the system adopted allows for “banking” of burden savings over time or “trading” 
of burden savings across agencies/ministries, etc. In the case of banking, one administration 
that achieved extra savings compared to the target can carry forward the extra savings 
to the following year: this measure provides incentives to the administration to 
implement reduction measures as quickly as possible, in order to be relieved from the 
responsibility of achieving additional savings in the future. In the case of trading, the 
government can decide to take the “outs” from a different policy areas compared to 
where the “ins” are introduced, for example whenever a measure is deemed to be 
necessary but there are no costs to be reduced or eliminated in the same policy area in 
which new ones are being introduced.  
Importantly, OIXO rules can be seen as a special case of burden reduction targets. While 
the latter tend to be specified in absolute terms (e.g. reducing 10bn Euros of administrative 
burdens within a five-year timeframe), OIXO rules link the introduction of new costs to 
the achievement of a cost reduction: in their most common form of “One-In-One-Out”, 
these rules amount to a commitment not to increase the estimated level of burdens 
unaltered over the chosen timeframe. The OECD refers to this commitment as “regulatory 
offsetting” (Trnka and Thuerer 2019). 
 
This Study follows the repeated calls for a consolidated, comprehensive plan to reduce 
direct compliance costs in the European Union by concrete reduction plans whilst 
upholding a high level of protection standards which are reflected in various Conclusions 
of the Council of the EU (December 2014, May 2016, March 2018, November 2018 and 
May 2019)14; and a comprehensive study carried out for RegWatchEurope (Renda 2017), 
which concluded in favour of a series of EU actions to set reduction targets for regulatory 
costs15.  
 
14 Council conclusions of December 2014 (Doc 16000/14): ‘…call on the Commission to develop and put in place - on 
the basis of input from Member States and stakeholders - reduction targets in particularly burdensome areas, especially 
for SMEs, within the REFIT Programme, which would not require baseline measurement and should consider at the 
same time the costs and benefits of regulation.’ Council conclusions of 26 May 2016 on better regulation to 
strengthen competitiveness which ‘urge the Commission to rapidly proceed on [..] the introduction of reduction 
targets in 2017, whilst always taking into account a high level of protection of consumers, health, the environment 
and employees and the importance of a fully functioning Single Market.’ Council conclusions of 12 November 2018 
((Doc.  14137/18) on the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 16/2018 “Ex-post review of EU legislation: 
a well-established system, but incomplete”. ‘…RECALLS the Council Conclusions of March 2018, which underline 
the importance of concrete targets for the reduction of unnecessary regulatory burdens, whilst respecting existing 
protection standards and without undermining the underlying objectives of the legislation. Finally, see the 
Commission Staff Working Document, “Taking Stock of the Commission's Better Regulation Agenda”, SWD(2019) 
156 final, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Better regulation: taking stock and 
sustaining our commitment”, {COM(2019) 178 final}, 15 April 2019. 
15 RegWatch Europe is a network of independent external advisory bodies that play a significant role in scrutinising the 
impacts of new legislation. These bodies challenge and advise respective governments on various aspects of better 
regulation and on the overall regulatory burden of legislation. The network consists of the following bodies: the 
‘Advisory Board on Regulatory Burden’ (ATR – the Netherlands); the ‘Finnish Council of Regulatory Impact 
Analysis’ (FCRIA, Finland); the ‘Nationaler Normenkontrollrat’ (NKR – Germany); the ‘Norwegian Better 
Regulation Council’ (NBRC/Regelrådet – Norway); the ‘Swedish Better Regulation Council’ (SBRC/Regelrådet – 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 23 of 143 
In its Communications of October 2017 and April 2019, the European Commission 
acknowledged the requests formulated by the Council over the years and also recalled that 
paragraph 48 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making calls for an 
assessment of the feasibility of establishing objectives for burden reduction. While 
acknowledging these requests, the Juncker Commission had not committed to any specific 
action, if not the intention to maintain a case-by-case approach to the reduction of direct 
compliance costs. In its Communication on “Completing the Better Regulation Agenda”16 
adopted in October 2017, and in the more recent Staff Working Paper and 
Communication on “Taking Stock of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda”17, 
published in April 2019, the setting of reduction targets was explicitly discarded, and the 
Commission announced its intention to approach the simplification of legislation “on a 
case-by case basis, using evidence gathered from evaluations and impact assessments and 
including consultation of stakeholders”. The Juncker Commission’s argument was that 
“upfront targets” would not offer certain fundamental guarantees: in particular, they would 
adversely affect underlying policy objectives and the need to ensure democratic 
accountability and transparency, which requires “a political decision on which costs are 
legitimate to achieve policy goals and which instead should be eliminated”. Such decision, 
the Commission explained, should be “based on evidence from a case-to-case assessment 
that responds to the concerns of stakeholders and people”. The Commission added that 
whenever possible, it seeks to quantify the cost reduction implied by new measures; 
however, it added that “this is not always possible due to data and methodological 
challenges”18. Most importantly, setting cost reduction targets was discarded as it focuses 
“only on cost reduction without consideration of regulatory benefits”, and this “may lead 
to undue deregulation because 'necessary costs' to achieve regulatory benefits are not 
distinguished from 'unnecessary costs'. Therefore, such policy “will not have the necessary 
legitimacy among stakeholders”. 
However, this position must also reflect existing empirical evidence that stakeholders are 
prevalently unsatisfied about the Commission’s previous efforts to simplify legislation19. 
Recently, the German Normenkontrollrat criticized the Juncker Commission’s views as 
failing to reflect the positive experience of many Member States in their implementation 
(on which, See Sections 1 and 2 below)20. These views (both the one of the Juncker 
 
Sweden); the ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment Board’ (RIAB – The Czech Republic); and the ‘Regulatory Policy 
Committee’ (RPC – the United Kingdom). See https://www.regwatcheurope.eu/.  
16 COM(2017) 651: Completing the Better Regulation Agenda: Better solutions for better results. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/completing-the-better-regulation-agenda-better-solutions-for-better-
results_en.pdf. 
17 COM(2019) 156: Taking Stock of the Commission's Better Regulation Agenda. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-taking-stock-swd_en.pdf. 
18 See footnotes 16, 17..  
19 “Nearly a third of all respondents to the public consultation on better regulation indicated their satisfaction with the 
Commission’s efforts to simplify existing EU laws and reduce costs where possible. However, some 40% were not 
satisfied”. 
20 See NKR comment to the 2018 Annual Report on Better Regulation of the Federal Government (on page 6 of this 
comment it is written: „Die Argumente, die seitens der EU-Kommission bisher gegen die Einführung einer ‚One in 
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Commission and that of Member States) will be extensively considered in this Report, 
which aims to propose a viable approach to OIXO and burden reduction plans at the EU 
level. In order to complete our analysis, we relied extensively on desk research, based on 
recent reports on both burden reduction targets (Renda 2017a) and so-called “Regulatory 
Offsetting” (Trnka and Thuerer 2019). In addition, the study is based on in-person 
interviews with national government representatives, as well as a survey that was distributed 
to all EU member states during the month of March 2019, retrieving 21 useful replies (see 
below, Table 1). The text of the survey is available as annex 1 to this Report. 
This report is structured as follows. Section 1 presents information on the experience in 
EU and non-EU OECD countries with OIXO rules, and also describes the position of 
surveyed countries that have no current experience with such rules. Section 2 describes the 
experience of EU and non-EU OECD countries with burden reduction targets. Section 3 
summarises the opinions collected so far on the possibility of introducing an OIXO rule at 
the EU level, in particular clarifying a number of aspects related to the opportunities 
offered by the digital transformation of legislation, as well as the compatibility of an OIXO 
approach with an ambitious better regulation agenda focused on benefits.  
 
Table 1 – Replies to our survey (including telephone interviews) 
Location Name of the institution 
Belgium Federal Government 
Belgium Region of Flanders-Belgium 
Bulgaria Ministry of Economy 
Croatia  Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts 
Czech Republic Office of the Government of the Czech Republic 
Denmark The Danish Business Authority (Ministry of Business, Industry and Financial Affairs) 
Estonia Ministry of Justice of Estonia 
Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Federal Chancellery 
Greece Better Regulation Office 
Hungary Government Office of the Prime Minister 
Ireland Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation 
Italy Presidency of the Council of Ministers – Department for Public Administration 
Latvia Ministry of Economy and the State Chancellery of Latvia 
Malta The Ministry for European Affairs and Equality 
Lithuania  Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania 
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs & Climate 
Portugal JurisAPP 
Slovakia Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic 
Slovenia Ministry of Public Administration 
Spain Regulatory Coordination and Quality office. Ministry for presidency, Parliamentary Relations 
and Equality 
The UK Better Regulation Executive (telephone interview) 
 
one out‘-Regel vorgetragen werden, lassen die in Mitgliedsländern gemachten Erfahrungen außer acht und tragen 
aus NKR-Sicht nicht.“) 
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1 The experience with One-In-X-Out rules in EU and OECD 
countries 
1.1 Experience in the EU Member states 
Based on our data collection, there are ten EU member states in which an OIXO rule is 
in place: Austria, Finland (pilot), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain 
and Sweden; two countries where the rule has been in place and was recently discontinued 
(Denmark and the UK); and one country in which the rule formally exists but is not 
currently being implemented in practice (Portugal). Four other countries are reportedly 
considering the introduction of such rule: Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Altogether 
these countries represent more than 86% of the EU28 GDP and 86% of the EU28 
population.21 Considering only the ten countries with an OIXO rule currently in place, 
they account for 62% of the EU GDP and 58% of the EU population.22 
Below, we describe these national experiences and also report the motivations mentioned 
by those respondents that represent countries that have not adopted OIXO rules. 
1.1.1 Austria 
To strengthen Austria as a business location and to create a more flexible environment for 
entrepreneurs, the Federal Government promotes the reduction of bureaucracy. In 
November 2016, measures were approved to improve services for citizens, to reduce the 
burden on companies, to increase efficiency within the administration, and to extend e-
government. The Federal Government has to comply with principle of OIOO23, as stated 
in the Deregulation Act (Deregulierungsgrundsätzegesetz) of 2017 (to 2020), Section 1(2): “It 
has to be ensured that the bureaucratic burden resulting from the enactment of federal 
legislation and the financial implications for citizens and businesses are justified and 
adequate. In order to avoid further burdens, any new regulation that results in additional 
bureaucracy or additional financial consequences is needed, where feasible, to be 
compensated for by removing a similarly costly regulation”24.  
 
21 Post-Brexit, these percentages would reach 84% in terms of GDP and 84% in terms of population. 
22 Post-Brexit, these percentages would reach 74% in terms of GDP and 66% in terms of population. 
23 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-stability-programme-austria-en.pdf 
24 Es ist sicherzustellen, dass der aus der Erlassung von Bundesgesetzen resultierende bürokratische Aufwand sowie die 
finanziellen Auswirkungen für Bürgerinnen und Bürger sowie für Unternehmen gerechtfertigt und adäquat sind. Zur 
Vermeidung weiterer Belastungen wird jede Neuregelung, aus der zusätzlicher bürokratischer Aufwand oder 
zusätzliche finanzielle Auswirkungen erwachsen, nach Tunlichkeit durch Außerkraftsetzung einer vergleichbar 
intensiven Regulierung kompensiert. 
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This, in turn, implies that the rule applies to both citizens and businesses, and both to 
Administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs. The objective is to contain the 
number of new regulations as well as the corresponding costs25. In particular, the work 
programme of the Federal Government for 2017/2018 included concrete measures to 
reduce the number of regulations, which were expected to lead to a sustainable relief for 
citizens and companies.  
1.1.2 Denmark 
In Denmark, a systematic reduction of administrative burdens for business using the SCM 
was carried out between 200426 and 2010. This activity implied extensive use of the 
Standard Cost Model and led to a large number of proposals for simplifications, which 
ultimately reduced burdens for businesses by a total of 24.6%. In 2012, a Business Forum 
for Simplification was established, with the goal of singling out suggestions for further 
simplification of legislation.  
Denmark has had an OIOO rule until recently. The previous Government had set a target 
of reducing burdens by 2 billion DKK by 2020 compared to 2015 and later additional 2 
billion DKK compared to 2015, and this target required new burdens to be compensated 
through reductions elsewhere. As reported by Trnka and Thuerer (2019), this system was 
in place since 2015 as part of the burden-stop on business regulation programme. The 
OIOO rule applied to all regulations relevant to businesses and was overseen by the Danish 
Business Authority. It applied to both primary and secondary legislation, but not to 
independent agencies. The rule did not require that for every new regulation introduced, 
x existing regulations are removed; rather, it required that for every new cost introduced, 
the same amount of cost to be removed elsewhere (it was, in other words, a cost-based 
OIOO). The rule applied to new national regulation with burdens above specified 
thresholds for Administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs. The OIOO rule 
allowed for offsetting both by repealing existing regulations, or also by simplifying parts of 
existing regulations. In principle, the OIOO rule had to be applied simultaneously, and 
the repealed rules had to be identified in the same policy area as the ones that are 
introduced. Overall, the previous government reported a positive experience with the 
OIOO rule: the most positive impact reported by our survey respondent was that the 
administration became more attentive to costs.  
The OIOO rule was however discontinued by the new government in the summer of 2019; 
accordingly, after having continuously stepped up efforts to reap the remaining burden 
reduction potential, today Denmark does not any longer have a specific OIOO-rule. Focus 
have shifted to achieving simplification and better solutions for businesses and citizens 
 
25 Other measures were enacted in addition to OIOO. As far as possible, all new regulations will only be enacted for a 
certain amount of time (“sunset legislation”). When transposing EU legislation into national law, any higher level of 
regulation than foreseen at the EU level has to be duly justified (to avoid “gold-plating”). The respective law was 
approved by Parliament at the end of March 2017. 
26 http://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/file/239619/redegorelse_erhvervslivet_reguleringen_20092010_juni2011.pdf 
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through the promotion of digital-by-default and future-proof regulation as well as 
intensifying the efforts for simplification of existing regulation in areas and sectors 
stakeholders find the most relevant and burdensome, e.g. through the strengthened and 
widened mandate of the Danish Business Regulation Forum.  
1.1.3 Finland 
The previous Finnish government (2015-2019) started a new programme to reduce and 
simplify regulation. The current government (since June 2019) has stated in its government 
programme, that the OIOO principle will be expanded gradually, and the emphasis will be 
on making legislation “fit for purpose”, instead of on any quantitative goals. 
Finland has carried out numerous studies on administrative burdens for businesses in the 
period 2008-201227. The previous government (from June 2015 to May 2019) started a new 
programme to reduce and simplify regulation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) pilot-tested the 
application of a OIOO rule in 2017. The objective was to create a measurement system 
for the Finnish Government’s Key project “Streamlined legal provisions”. In the MEAE, 
the principle was applied to all primary legislation being prepared during 2017 and in the 
MAF, the principle was tested with the preparation of the Food Act reform (Finnish 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2017). Document analysis, personal 
interviews and surveys were the key methods for obtaining data. Based on the results of the 
pilot, the OIOO is suitable to the Finnish context, thereby Finland continued and 
currently plans to expand the pilot testing. When developing the model further, however, 
it will be important to support the model with guidelines and capacity building; to deploy 
more processes, resources and tools; and ensure coordination across the administration28.  
The pilot model tested in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment from 2017 
until the present day aims to include all regulatory burdens, meaning both administrative 
and compliance costs, as well as regulatory fees. However, it has been realised during the 
pilot testing that not all compliance costs can be fully assessed using existing assessment 
tools (Regulatory Burden Calculator). Therefore, the actual scope has been somewhat more 
limited. The pilot model includes both one-off costs and recurrent costs using Annual 
Equivalent Net Present Value to discount the comparable value of costs.29 
The pilot project so far excluded taxation (with the exception of administrative burdens 
generated by tax laws); fines and penalties; emergency legislation resulting from exceptional 
circumstances or for the purpose of averting danger; regulations with the purpose to open 
markets to competition; to promote competition and to prevent the abuse of monopoly 
 
27https://www.tem.fi/en/enterprises/reduction_of_the_administrative_burden_on_businesses/initial_level_of_admini
strative_burden_on_businesses/studies_of_the_administrative_costs_and_administrative_burden_on_businesses 
28https://tietokayttoon.fi/documents/1927382/2116852/10-2018-
Decreasing+administrative+burdens+and+deregulation+in+Finland/8b64c0ce-edfe-4dbd-9589-56fca874f538/10-
2018-Decreasing+administrative+burdens+and+deregulation+in+Finland.pdf?version=1.0 
29 https://tem.fi/en/one-for-one-principle; Annual pilot Report 2018 
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power. (Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2017). As shown in Table 
2, an empirical survey of civil servants showed positive appreciation of the OIOO model 
inside the administration. In Finland, as a result of the pilot in 2017, the net annual 
regulatory burden resulting from national regulation was estimated to decrease by 
approximately EUR 150,000. Meanwhile, government proposals drafted in the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment in 2018 increased the burden by about EUR 500,000 
per year. 
 
Table 2 - Key findings in an empirical survey of civil servants including law drafters 
 
Source: Ahonen (2016) 
 
The Finnish Council of Regulatory Impact Analysis considers the pilot project worth 
continuing and expanding (2018). According to the Council’s opinion, the testing should 
focus more on the offsetting processes rather than just expanding the monitoring of 
regulatory burden development.30 
1.1.4 France 
In France, after a first application of the Standard Cost Model in 2004, the government 
decided to rely on simpler method to continue monitoring the evolution of administrative 
 
30 https://valtioneuvosto.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/10616/arviointineuvosto-nakee-perusteita-yksi-yhdesta-kokeilun-
jatkamiselle 
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burdens31. In 2013, the government introduced a gel de la réglementation that involved the 
creation of a Business Simplification Council (January 2014) and the appointment of a 
Minister of State for State Reform and Simplification attached to the Prime Minister (June 
2014). Since 2015 the government has considered the adoption of an OIXO approach 
to regulation. Initially, departments were required to follow an OIOO rule by both 
offsetting the increase in costs to businesses and removing (or, if not possible, simplifying) 
an existing regulation when a new one was enacted. The system includes also costs to local 
governments and citizens. The rule was then transformed into a one in, two out (OI2O) 
rule with the introduction of the maîtrise du flux des textes réglementaires by the Macron 
government in 201732. The French model was formally introduced by a “circular” adopted 
on 26 July 2017 on the control of regulatory texts and their impact, which aims at controlling 
normative production so as to limit the negative effects on business (competitiveness); local 
authorities (administration); local services (operation); and citizens (daily life). To this end, 
“any new regulation must be offset by the elimination or, if impossible, the 
simplification of at least two existing regulations”. The General Secretariat of the 
Government (SGG) must ensure compliance with the application of this circular to 
ministries and arbitrates in case of difficulty.  
The SGG ensures compliance with the two necessary prerequisites of the effective 
application of the OI2O rule: that the “two” repealed or simplified regulations belong to 
the same departmental field or fall within the framework of the same public policy, as 
the regulatory measure that is being introduced; and that the rules appear qualitatively 
of equivalent level. The rule also implies the establishment of an inventory of rules for 
each department according to its public policy field, overseen by the SGG.  
 
 
31 The Oscar database was developed in order to take account of the administrative burden of new regulations, which 
implies a “net” target. As such it is interesting for the purposes of this project, even if it is not used in support of a 
comprehensive baseline measurement of regulatory burdens or costs.  Oscar uses reference data collected from 
DGAFP (Direction générale de l’administration et de la fonction publique), the INSEE statistics office and the Budget 
Directorate on the hourly costs of civil servants and the cost of company employees for each socio-professional 
category and sector of activity. Furthermore, the database resulting from the work of the MRCA (Measure to reduce 
the Administrative Burden) provides preliminary information on the default values in Oscar for the “initial 
deployment “ phase and the additional learning cost and indicates reference values for the recurrent application 
phase to the user. 
32 The offsetting obligation was doubled with the intent to impose greater control of the flow of regulatory texts on the 
different ministerial departments, because the original approach had not achieved the desired results. (Gouvernement 
de la République Française, 2017, 2013). 
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Figure 2 – OIOO in the French System 
 
Source: French SGG (2018) 
 
The OI2O rule applies to all national regulations, decrees and circulars. Not included in 
this framework are draft decrees that are by nature without impact on the administrative 
burden of civil society (eg. Statutory provisions applicable to state employees and provisions 
of a budgetary nature) as well as the decrees issued to accompany a new law or regulation 
in order to condition their entry into force (See Figure 2). The General Secretariat of the 
Government is responsible for ensuring department’s and agencies’ compliance with the 
OITO rule, and is in charge of centralizing the elements of costing, quality control (via the 
impact sheets that are systematically addressed to it), and reports on a half-yearly basis the 
evolution of the costs and the savings obtained. The Secretariat submits the draft decrees 
containing the new rule and the proposed simplification measures to the arbitration of the 
presidential cabinet. The cabinet then decides whether to continue, modify or abandon 
the draft regulation (Gouvernement de la République Française, 2017). 
The French system stands out from other systems adopted in the EU, due to the fact that 
it requires regulatory offsetting by means of the repeal or simplification of two, rather than 
one rule. It is therefore an OIOO rule in terms of volume of costs, and an OI2O rule in 
terms of number of regulations.  
1.1.5 Germany 
Germany has adopted a strategic approach to regulatory cost reduction since 2006. Between 
2006 and 2013 it successfully implemented a reduction target of 25% regarding 
administrative burdens for businesses. The decision of the council of ministers on 27 
January 2010 reinforced the reduction target. In 2006 a National Regulatory Control 
Council (NKR) was introduced to provide independent oversight regarding the respective 
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numbers and figures in the Impact Assessments and to support the Government’s efforts 
to achieve the target. The net reduction target was subsequently achieved in 2013, and 
since then a Bureaucracy Cost Index has been maintained, which keeps track of new 
additions and reduction in regulatory costs.  
The German experience has shown that bureaucracy costs ensuing from information 
obligations account for only a small part of the follow-up costs incurred by Federal 
regulations, and this led to an expansion of the scope of the reduction efforts to cover also 
compliance costs. The “Bureaucracy Reduction and Better Regulation” programme has 
thus been significantly expanded, as has been the mandate of the NKR. In December 2014 
the Federal Government decided on key points for further reducing the bureaucratic 
burden on SMEs: one of these key points is the introduction of the OIOO rule, with the 
aim to “restrict the proliferation of red tape in the long term without hindering political 
projects”, and specifically those measures outlined in the coalition agreement must not be 
obstructed or delayed.  
The “one in, one out” rule generally applies to all regulatory proposals from the Federal 
Government which impact on the business community’s annually recurrent compliance 
costs. Exemptions apply to proposals which:  
• constitute an exact (1:1) implementation of EU legislation, international agreements 
or rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court and Court of Justice of the European 
Union  
• serve to combat substantial security threats, or  
• have impacts that are time-limited (up to one year). 
All measures were based on a common methodology (regarding administrative burdens, 
the Standard Cost Model, regarding compliance costs: a common methodology, which was 
developed based on the SCM)33. In 2015-2018, an “in” (burden) of round EUR 1 billion 
has been counterbalanced by an “out” (relief) round EUR 3 billion, which means that on 
balance there has been a relief for companies of round EUR 2 billion34.  
• Compensation is specific to the target sector. Any increase in recurrent compliance costs for 
businesses can only be compensated for by a reduction in recurrent compliance costs 
for businesses.  
• Possibility of exemptions. If there is a political will to regulate, but no prospects of 
identifying the offset within the competent ministry's portfolio, a ministry can ask the 
steering group of state secretaries (representing all ministries) for an exemption, but it 
needs to secure the approval of the NKR. None of the ministries has used this option 
so far. Moreover, the State Secretaries Committee on Bureaucracy Reduction can cap 
 
33  See also Renda et al. (2013c), for a description.  
34 See Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung Bürokratieabbau und Bessere Rechtsetzung, page 13f 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975232/1638896/100d34950150332b04201f46b3fe9693/2019-
0619-bericht-buerokratieabbau-data.pdf?download=1. The National Statistical Office (StBA) has a well elaborated 
system to support the ministries with data and for banking of cost reduction. See https://www-
skm.destatis.de/webskm/online.  
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the amount of compensation required if the new increase in compliance costs 
demonstrably exceeds the capacity of the relevant ministry to offset the burden or if the 
compliance costs as presented do not adequately reflect direct cost reductions that 
could be expected, or if or the regulatory proposal will otherwise benefit the business 
community. Before the State Secretaries Committee takes a decision on any plan to cap 
compensation, the NKR must be consulted as to whether the planned compensation, 
particularly the compliance costs, has been presented reasonably and plausibly. 
• Ministry-specific compensation. The lead ministry for the respective individual provision 
is responsible for the compensation. If that department cannot identify any possible 
way of balancing out the increase or demonstrate that it has achieved a suitably 
significant reduction with previous proposals, then it may – either bilaterally or in the 
State Secretaries Committee on Bureaucracy Reduction – ask other government 
departments to take on the task (interdepartmental compensation). 
• Temporal dimension. Where a proposal increasing the bureaucratic burden cannot be 
balanced out with immediate effect, the plan or prospects for compensation will be 
explained either in the explanatory or covering note or by some other suitable means. 
The usual time limit for compensatory measures to be presented is one year. The aim 
is to limit the rise in compliance costs within the legislative term. 
• Quantitative compensation options. Any increase in the bureaucratic burden must trigger 
a decrease of the same amount elsewhere. 
Government departments report to the State Secretaries Committee on Bureaucracy 
Reduction every six months on progress made and difficulties encountered with regard to 
the planned reduction measures and any imminent failure to meet targets. The Federal 
Government must then report annually to the German Bundestag, and in liaison with the 
NKR reviews and (if necessary) revises the procedure for identifying and expressing 
compliance costs. The relief achieved as a result of national legislation shows that the 
OIOO rule has had a tangible effect so far, as it has resulted in a net relief for businesses 
since its introduction in 2015. However, the German government argued that EU 
legislation, which is currently not subject to the OIOO rule, added regulatory costs for an 
additional annual “in” of 0.5bn (2015-2018) to this equation. Figure 3 below shows that 
the burdening (marked in dark grey) and the relieving impact (marked in light grey) of the 
implementation of EU directives on businesses has not been taken into account in the 
OIOO records. Furthermore, the current relief arising from national legislation can be 
partially or completely offset by burdens that are currently exempt from the OIOO rule.  
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Figure 3 – One in one out in Germany: results year by year 
 
Source: Normenkontrollrat (2018)35 
 
Importantly, the German OIOO rule includes only ongoing compliance costs, excluding 
so-called “one-off costs”. The process is coordinated by the State Secretary Committee for 
Bureaucracy Reduction led by the Minister of State with the Federal Chancellor; and the 
NKR verifies the quality of cost estimations provided by ministries, therefore provides an 
independent oversight.  
Trnka and Thuerer (2019) report that in Germany the rule is meant to raise regulators’ 
awareness of the issue of compliance costs by linking the responsibility of calculating costs 
and finding offsets to the “owner” of the regulation. This implies that the prospect of 
complying with the OIOO rule provides incentives to the administration to control 
regulatory costs while adopting socially and economically beneficial regulation. 
1.1.6 Hungary 
The Hungarian Government implemented several measures to decrease the impacts of 
bureaucracy concerning business environment. One of the first milestones of establishing 
a competitive regulatory environment was the Cutting Red Tape in November 2011. 
Beyond the Cutting Red Tape programme, additional administrative burden reductions 
measures were implemented between 2010 and 2014. As a result, the target of 25% 
administrative burden reduction was achieved. Based on the National Competitiveness 
Council’s recommendations, a number of regulatory amendments were passed in the 
 
35 
https://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/resource/blob/300864/1548198/a53ca395512296087f96a45d0b839d4
4/2018-11-09-jahresbericht-englisch-data.pdf?download=1 
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summer of 2017 in the areas of starting business, construction permits, utility connection 
procedures and corporate insolvency. As a result of the National Competitiveness 
Council’s work, in late autumn 2018 the Council adopted the “Programme for a more 
competitive Hungary”.  
The Hungarian state administration’s impact assessment guidelines – based on the SCM 
method – enable to analyse the administrative costs and burdens related to small and 
medium-sized enterprises as well as citizens. The portal, featuring the abovementioned tools 
and useful information about the Hungarian RIA system has been available online since 
2011.36 More recently, the objective of the Good Governance – Magyary Programme (2010-
2014) was to create a simple, efficient and customer-friendly public administration. The 
aim of The Public Administration and Public Service Development Strategy (2014-2020) is 
to build a Service-provider State. The latter document defines the goals to be achieved. 
According to these goals, a Service-provider State has to be organised, cost-efficient, 
professional and through different measures it has to implement integration, bureaucracy 
reduction and strengthening of the managers.  
In Hungary in order to keep the balance in the public administration and make the 
regulation easier for citizens and businesses an OIOO principle was introduced by a 
government decision in March 2019. The decision focuses on different types of costs, 
including administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs. According to the 
decision, the Government Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Justice are in 
charge for the monitoring of the principle”.37  
1.1.7 Italy 
The Italian Government applies a OIOO rule since 2011. In particular, Law 11 November 
2011, n. 180 “Statuto delle Imprese” (article n. 8) provided a stock-flow control mechanism 
of administrative burdens, introducing the OIOO rule (annual regulatory budget)38. To foster 
the implementation of the rule, in 2013 the Department of public administration 
published Guidelines on administrative burdens helping public administrations in 
identifying costs and defining the regulatory budget39. 
The OIOO rule applies to both primary and secondary legislation and does not apply to 
independent agencies. It applies to administrative burdens. It applies also to both citizens 
and businesses, despite the fact that it was introduced by a law dedicated to businesses.  
The rule is cost-based: it does not require that for every new regulation introduced, x 
existing regulations are removed, but it requires that the total amount of new 
 
36 See http://hatasvizsgalat.kormany.hu 
37 Additional information available at: http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=213269.365786. 
38 https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01044562.pdf 
39 DPCM 25 January 2013 - 
http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/sites/funzionepubblica.gov.it/files/documenti/Semplificazione/Misurazione-
Oneri/Linee%20guida%20oneri%20introdotti-eliminati.pdf 
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administrative burdens introduced every year be offset by an equivalent amount of costs 
to be removed in the same sector. It applies to administrative burdens. The OIXO rule 
does not take into account the benefits introduced by new regulation nor those of the 
regulations that are repealed. 
The Italian OIOO rule allows for offsetting to take place also by modifying (thus, not 
necessarily repealing) existing regulations. The rule does not allow for banking of 
regulatory costs40. Each Ministry chooses the regulations to be repealed or simplified, and 
there are no specific provisions about the qualitative criteria that must be used to offset 
new costs. The repealed rules must fall in the same policy area as the ones that are 
introduced. Fiscal, tax and public games and lotteries regulations are exempted. 
According to the Statuto delle imprese, each Ministry is required - by January 31 of each 
year - to submit to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Dipartimento per gli affari 
giuridici e legislativi – DAGL) a report on the total amount of the newly introduced or 
eliminated administrative burdens on citizens and businesses by the regulatory acts 
approved during the previous year41. The Department of public administration (DFP - 
Presidency of Council of Ministers) prepares, both on the basis of these reports and 
considering the results of ad hoc stakeholders consultations, a comprehensive report 
(“Relazione complessiva contenente il bilancio annuale degli oneri amministrativi 
introdotti ed eliminati”) containing the annual budget of the newly introduced or reduced 
administrative burdens, by each Ministry. The report is published on the Government's 
institutional website by March 31 of each year.  If the administrative burdens introduced 
are higher than those reduced, the Government is allowed to provide for the corresponding 
offsetting, adopting, within ninety days after the publication of the report, one or more 
regulations for removing an equal amount of administrative burden costs from the existing 
stock of regulations. Regulatory offsetting measures have to undergo an impact assessment. 
1.1.8 Latvia 
In Latvia, an OIOO rule was introduced very recently. From 1st November 2019 the “zero 
bureaucracy” (OIOO) principle entered into force, which aims to stop growth of 
Administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs for entrepreneurs. Practically this 
 
40 Se gli oneri introdotti sono superiori a quelli eliminati, la disposizione in esame prevede le seguenti modalità per 
operarne la riduzione: per la riduzione di oneri amministrativi di competenza statale previsti da leggi, il Governo 
adotta, entro 90 giorni dalla pubblicazione della relazione, regolamenti di delegificazione ai sensi dell'articolo 17, 
comma 2, della legge 23 agosto 1988, n. 40023; per la riduzione di oneri amministrativi previsti da regolamenti, si 
procede con regolamenti governativi, adottati ai sensi dell'articolo 17, comma 1, della medesima legge n. 400 del 
1988; per la riduzione di oneri amministrativi previsti da regolamenti ministeriali, si procede con decreti del 
Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, adottati ai sensi dell'articolo 17, comma 3, della legge n. 400 del 1988. 
41 Paragraph 2, Article 8 of the Statuto delle Imprese, as modified by decree-law n. 5 of 2012, provides that “entro il 31 
gennaio di ogni anno, le amministrazioni statali devono trasmettere alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri una 
relazione sul bilancio complessivo degli oneri amministrativi, a carico di cittadini e imprese, introdotti e eliminati 
con gli atti normativi approvati nel corso dell'anno precedente, ivi compresi quelli introdotti con atti di 
recepimento di direttive dell'Unione europea che determinano livelli di regolazione superiori a quelli minimi 
richiesti dalle direttive medesime, come valutati nelle relative AIR (il c.d. regulatory budget)”. 
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means that when submitting a draft legal act to the Cabinet of Ministers, which potentially 
increases the administrative burden or creates new compliance costs, the applicant 
(respective Ministry) must simultaneously submit a draft legal act aimed to offset the 
administrative burden or existing costs for the same target group. Ministries are obliged to 
involve representatives of the target group into the early stages of the legal act drafting in 
order to ensure the most effective and propitious outcome. The estimated increase and 
reduction of the burden as well as the engagement of the target audience should be 
included in the initial impact assessment of the draft legislation. The new Latvian system 
thus is focused on businesses, and covers both Administrative burdens and substantive 
compliance costs.  
1.1.9 Lithuania 
Lithuania introduced a cap on administrative burdens in 2014. This takes the form of a 
zero-growth policy on administrative/regulatory costs (OECD, 2015), which de facto 
amounts to a cost-based OIOO rule since it requires that for new costs introduced, 
corresponding cost items are identified for repeal. It is also important to mention that there 
are no exceptions provided for the OIOO rule in Lithuania – it is obligatory for the 
reduction of the administrative burden for national legal acts, as well as for the 
implementation of EU law. 
Administrative burden reduction is one of the better regulation key tools adopted in 
Lithuania to improve the business environment. Public authorities are required to 
calculate new administrative burden and introduce reports to the Ministry of the Economy 
and Innovation, and then perform a stabilization of the general level of administrative 
burden in compliance with the zero-growth (OIOO) rule. The Ministry of the Economy 
and Innovation coordinates the process. Authorities that introduce new burdensome 
regulation must repeal an existing regulation in their area of competence: in doing this,  
authorities are required to calculate new administrative burdens originating from new draft 
legislation, and ensure that they are offset within one calendar year. The overall level of 
administrative burden is assessed by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation and reported 
to the Government twice a year. The Ministry of Economy and Innovation provides a 
comprehensive report including assessment of the administrative burden, the amount of 
“ins” and “outs” in euros by institutions, analysis and review of burden reduction trends. 
In case a specific institution introduces new administrative burdens and takes no action to 
balance them, the Ministry of Economy and Innovation can take a number of actions, 
including the organisation of trainings for the authority to strengthen the institution’s 
ability to assess administrative burdens; or raising the problem at the highest political level. 
In 2018, the application of the rule led to a decrease of administrative burdens of 103,9 
million euros42. In the first half of 2019 the administrative burden decreased by 11,7 
million euros. The overall experience was positive and helped raising awareness of the 
 
42 http://eimin.lrv.lt/en/sector-activities/business-environment/better-regulation-in-lithuania 
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need to reduce administrative burdens. This is considered to be important for preparing 
authorities for the next step, which entails the evaluation of both Administrative burdens 
and substantive compliance costs. 
1.1.10 Portugal 
In Portugal, since 2006 the Government launched a series of ongoing reforms known as 
the annual Simplex programme, with the aim to make everyday life easier for individual 
citizens and businesses by reducing bureaucratic red tape, cutting costs, and extending the 
use of information and Communication Technologies to a wide range of public services. 
Portugal launched a strategy in 2008 to reduce 25% of administrative burdens for 
businesses until 2012 (RCM 196/2008). Later, Parliament Resolution 31/2014, in 
introducing Simplificar, a comprehensive programme of administrative modernisation and 
simplification, also contained a mention to the OIOO principle as part of the system for 
administrative burden control.  
After ten years of annual Simplex’s, a new Simplex+ Programme was launched and is now 
under implementation, with 255 projects to deal with both administrative and legislative 
simplification. Within the new programme, a Technical Unit for Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (UTAIL) has been recently created (RCM 44/2017) within the Legal Centre of 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (CEJUR) to implement a specific project named 
“How much does it cost?” (focused on primary legislation). UTAIL is responsible for the 
impact assessment of proposed new legislative acts: notably, since the beginning of 2017 
UTAIL is assessing, besides the administrative burdens that may result from legislative acts 
proposals, also other compliance costs for firms: direct costs (with fees and other public 
charges); specific costs with equipment, implementation, external services, material and 
other that may be directed related to the obligation that is being imposed; and non-specific 
costs, as overheads. 
The OIOO rule originally mentioned in 2014 in Portugal has thus never been 
implemented in practice. That said, the UTAIL provided extensive guidance on the 
classification and attribution of costs, including a dedicated SME test, for officials in charge 
of ex ante impact assessment43.   
1.1.11 Spain 
In Spain, regulatory offsetting was introduced by Law 14/2013, of 27th September, of 
support for entrepreneurs and its internationalization (article 37)44. The Council of 
 
43 See UTAIL / JurisAPP, Avaliação Prévia de Impacto Legislativo, Guia de apoio à estimação de encargos para cidadãos 
e empresas, avaliação qualitativa de benefícios, teste PME e avaliação de impacto concorrencial, June 2018, Available 
at https://www.jurisapp.gov.pt/media/1027/guia_ail_06_2018.pdf.  
44 Art. 37: “Las Administraciones Públicas que en el ejercicio de sus respectivas competencias creen nuevas cargas 
administrativas para las empresas eliminarán al menos una carga existente de coste equivalente”. 
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Ministers Agreement of 30th January 2015 lays down measures to strengthen monitoring 
of the principle of compensation of administrative burdens, precise actions in this sense. 
No modification has been put in force since then. Law 14/2013 on the support for 
entrepreneurs and their internationalization introduced a OIOO principle for 
administrative burdens for businesses: “When public administrations create new 
administrative burdens for companies, at least one existing burden of equivalent cost will 
be eliminated”. This rule is limited to administrative burdens on businesses. 
Some regulations are exempted from the mechanism. These include: 
• Regulations transposing EU legislation or international agreements into national law;  
• Regulations concerning civil emergencies;  
• Regulations containing measures to prevent financial risk, contain inflation, regulate 
taxes and fees, fines and penalties and social security contributions;  
• Regulations with temporary validity (especially those with an annual term). 
Spain uses direct administrative burdens on businesses as a metric for regulatory 
offsetting. These costs are measured as part of the RIA process using a modified version of 
the Standard Cost Model called “Simplified Method”. According to the Council of 
Ministers Agreement of 30th January 2015, the annual global increment of administrative 
burdens in each ministry at 31st December should be compensated by the same ministry 
during next year so past/future rules are considered. Each ministry chooses the rules to be 
repealed considering the exceptions of the Council of Ministers. 
Offsetting rules do not necessarily have to fall in the same area. Ministries make a global 
analysis in burdens considering the whole of their competences. The offsetting is explicitly 
announced in the Impact Assessment of the new regulation that adds burdens: such 
offsetting is not, per se, subject to an IA. However, if the repealed regulation for approval, 
was accompanied by an impact assessment, the compensatory regulation that replaces it, 
should also be accompanied with an impact assessment for approval45.  
The overall experience of the Spanish government with OIOO is reportedly positive 
since the administration became more attentive to burdens and also increased the quality 
of ex ante impact assessments, for instance the level of quantification, to capture the 
amount of burdens to be reduced. This also led to an increase in the quality of regulation.   
1.1.12 Sweden 
Sweden does not have an explicit OIXO rule. However, is has adopted a net target, based 
on the goal that the administrative costs for businesses be lower in the year 2020 
 
45 Moreover, according to article 26.9 of Law 50/1997, of November 27, on the Government, the Ministry of Presidency, 
Parliamentary Relations and Equality assess the need to include an expressed derogation, as well as the need to 
consolidate another texts in the same field.  These functions are currently developed by the Office for Regulatory 
Coordination and Quality according to the Royal Decree 1081/2017, of December 29, which establishes its operating 
regime. 
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compared to 2012. This goal configures a “loose” OIOO rule, since the overall result has 
to be achieved by the end of the overall period and, therefore, new costs need to be balanced 
by new savings, but there seems to be no strict framework for compensating measures.  
1.1.13 The United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom features one of the most well-established experiences and traditions 
in the field of better regulation, which enables it to reach a greater degree of sophistication 
in the analysis of the costs and benefits of regulation. After a partly successful experience 
with the baseline measurement of administrative burdens in 2005-2006 (Beheim et al. 
2006), initiatives aimed at monitoring and reducing regulatory costs have proliferated, 
including the introduction, in 2010, of an independent body, the Regulatory Policy 
Committee (RPC), to validate the costs and benefits of all new regulatory and de-regulatory 
proposals. In 2011, an OIOO rule was introduced. Over the 2011-12 period, government 
departments not only met the target but exceeded OIOO, removing around £963 million 
more in business burdens than they introduced46. Since 2013, the UK has operated a 'One-
in, Two-out' (OI2O) regulatory management system. The premise is that for every net £1 
in regulatory cost introduced by domestic regulation, departments must find twice the 
amount of savings. The OI2O rule required an even stronger performance from 
departments compared to the previous rule.  
The May 2015 General Election saw the Conservatives returned to power without (as they 
saw it) being constrained any longer by the Liberal Democrats. The Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEE) required the Government to publish a 
Business Impact Target (BIT) for the duration of each Parliamentary term; obtain 
independent verification of the economic impact of new regulation; and report regularly 
on progress against the target. The Cameron government extended the scope of the BIT in 
the Enterprise Act 2016 to include the activities of statutory regulators that have an 
impact on business47. In March 2016 the Government announced new measures to cut a 
further GBP10 billion of red tape, including moving to a OI3O rule to be achieved by 
departments in order for them to deliver the BIT48. In addition, the “Cutting Red Tape” 
initiative led to the creation of an online website dedicated to interaction with stakeholders 
on areas that should be prioritized in this respect.  
As observed by Gayer et al. 2017, the offsets identified in the UK system “often do not 
actually remove any regulatory requirements, but rather make regulatory compliance less 
costly, for instance by streamlining paperwork processes so that businesses could make 
 
46 This figure is based on independent validation by the Regulatory Policy Committee. 
47 See the Enterprise Bill: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/enterprise.html. 
48 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-the-impact-of-regulation-on-business/supporting-
pages/operating-a-one-in-two-out-rule-for-business-regulation.  The independent Regulatory Policy Committee 
publishes its Opinion on all ex ante assessments, including whether it has validated 'One-in, Two-out' measures from 
departments. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/regulatory-policy-committee-opinions-on-impact-
assessments. 
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some filings without the need of a lawyer”49. Notably, European Union regulations and 
directives have been exempted from this requirement. The U.K. government reports that 
its regulatory offset polices have reduced both the number of regulations and the associated 
costs to businesses (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2014).  
However, after the Brexit referendum the popularity of the OI3O rule has decreased in the 
UK. The rule is now being given lower priority compared to other better regulation 
initiatives of the government, including the Business Impact Target and the promotion of 
innovation through smart regulation. According to our interviewee from the UK 
administration, this is also due to the fact that simplification initiatives have been underway 
for several years, whereas other instruments have been less strongly pursued by the 
government, and deserve now priority. 
1.2 EU countries considering the introduction of an OIXO rule 
According to our analysis and the results of our survey, there are four countries currently 
planning the adoption of an OIOO rule.  
In Poland, the coalition government of Civic Platform and Polish Peasant Party (2007-
2015) had already considered the introduction of a new instrument in order to improve a 
legislative process - a regulatory test as a new stage of law making before a bill will be 
submitted to the Parliament. The project was implemented as a pilot, to ascertain whether 
there would be sufficient acceptance in the administration: the rule was never officially 
launched, and the “regulatory test” was eventually replaced by a fully fledged regulatory 
impact assessment system. The new government is reportedly considering the introduction 
of an OIOO rule, which featured in the programme of a party which won the last 
parliamentary election. 
Romania is reportedly planning to introduce a One-In-One-Out rule. The rule is not yet 
fully in place, as reported by the European Commission in its Small Business Act Factsheet 
on Romania50.  
The Slovak Republic plans to introduce the OIOO principle, which will be part of the ex-
post evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency of regulation as one of the better regulation 
principles in Slovakia. The OIOO principle is part of the RIA 2020 - Strategy of Better 
Regulation approved in January 2018, which aims i.a. to reduce regulatory costs and 
administrative burdens. The methodology will be completed by the end of 2020: the 
introduction of the OIOO principle in the Slovak regulatory system will be considered 
during the creation and completion of the ex post methodology.  
 
49  Quoting Kohli (2017), Kohli, Jitinder. 2017. “What President Trump Can Learn from the UK about Reducing 
Regulations.” Forbes, January 27.  
50 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/32581/attachments/24/translations/en/renditions/native.  
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Moreover, Slovenia has reportedly been considering the implementation of this rule for 
some time, primarily because the government is aware of the unsustainability of 
continuously growing number of regulations. Primarily, the government wishes to focus on 
improving existing regulation rather than introducing new rules. 
1.3 EU Member States with no experience with OIXO rules: the reasons stated 
by the survey respondents 
Nine EU countries have responded to our survey indicating that they do not have 
experience with OIXO rules and are currently not considering introducing such rule. 
Among these countries, two groups can be identified.  
A first group includes four countries that are not opposed to the rule, but observed that 
lack of resources or political will have so far prevented the introduction of the rule. One 
of these governments welcomed OIXO as a regulatory offsetting approach in general, but 
the respondents think that for implementation of this ambitious approach, governments 
have to have adequate analytical capacity and skills: this is why this country plans to 
consider the adoption of an OIOO rule in the future. A similar situation, of lack of political 
commitment, was reported for all other countries in this first group. 
A second group of countries featured a clearer opposition to the adoption of the OIOO 
rule. For example, one government reported that at the federal level, in view of the 
competences shared with the sub-national level of government, it would be very 
complicated to set up this system; and that problems would also arise since the current 
system is based on a coalition government, rather than an evidence based-system. Likewise, 
in the opinion of another respondent, OIXO is a very technical and too political tool that 
does not always corresponds with the spirit of the law. Another respondent observed that 
despite the county’s focus on lessening the burden on businesses, the setting of concrete 
mathematical deduction rules regarding legal acts has not been a mainstream idea so far. 
Another respondent observed that systems such as OIXO require a strong information base 
as well as their own methodological ‘accounting system’ so as to set realistic offsetting, and 
it is thought that applying such rules when designing new regulations will further slow 
down achievement of desired burden relief as well as unnecessarily delay the adoption of 
new regulation. Finally, one respondent does not consider an OIXO rule to be the best 
approach to reduce regulatory burdens. The respondents think that this approach is too 
much focused on figures, driven by the need to compensate the “in”. This, according to 
the respondents, can take up all the energy of government officials and it could influence 
negatively the quality of the measures taken to reduce burdens. This could possibly lead to 
“solutions” that look good on paper in terms of reducing regulatory costs but are not 
considered as important by businesses. This government believes more in a system focused 
on taking the right, concrete measures tackling problems that have been put forward by 
business and that really make a noticeable difference in the life of businesses.  
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1.4 OIXO rules in non-EU OECD countries 
Over the past few years, a number of large non-UE OECD countries have introduced 
OIXO rules, which are worthy of investigation for the purposes of this report. Trnka and 
Thuerer (2019) report that “Canada was the first country to actually legislate regulatory 
offsetting” and that “more recently, Korea, USA and Mexico introduced their versions of 
regulatory offsetting”. On the other hand, Australia has experimented with the rule, but 
has later abandoned it.  
1.4.1 Canada 
In Canada, administrative burden is a key area of focus since the 2011 Red Tape Reduction 
Commission formulated its far-reaching recommendations. The Recommendations Report 
was released in January 2012 and detailed 15 systemic changes and 90 department-specific 
solutions to reduce or remove “regulatory irritants”. The Government of Canada has taken 
specific actions in response to the Recommendations Report, including the introduction 
of a OIOO51. The Canadian one-for-one rule is highly formalized and accompanied by 
policies and guidance by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. In terms of 
formalization, the rule was rooted in the Red Tape Reduction Act introduced in January 
2014 in Parliament to control the administrative burden that regulations impose on 
business. The Act received Royal Assent on April 23, 2015. The Red Tape Reduction 
Regulations were registered on July 23, 2015 to operationalize the rule. This fulfilled a 
commitment made in the Government's October 2012 Red Tape Reduction Action Plan 
and reaffirmed in the October 2013 Speech from the Throne.  
In September 2018, the Cabinet Directive on Regulation was introduced, replacing the 
2012 Cabinet Directive on Regulatory Management as the Government of Canada’s policy 
for the regulation-making process. Subsection 5.2.4 of the 2018 Cabinet Directive on 
Regulation states that regulators must comply with the one-for-one rule and must identify 
and estimate the cost of administrative burden impacts of regulatory proposals on 
Canadian businesses, as set out in the Red Tape Reduction Act and the Red Tape 
Reduction Regulations52.  
Figure 4 below shows the step-by-step description of how the system works in Canada, for 
the case of Governor in Council regulatory changes.  
 
 
51 See http://www.reduceredtape.gc.ca/heard-entendu/rr/rrtb-eng.asp.  
52 Further detailed information can be found in Section 7 of the Policy on Limiting Regulatory Burden on Business. 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 43 of 143 
Figure 4 – The Mechanics of the One-for-one rule in Canada 
 
As shown in figure 4 above, the rule applies to all regulatory changes that impose new 
administrative burden costs on business53. All federal regulations are generally included, 
but primary legislation issued by the legislative branch of the government (i.e., Parliament) 
is not included. When a department intends to seek approval for a new regulation or to 
amend an existing one, it must engage the Regulatory Affairs Sector of the Treasury Board 
of Canada Secretariat at the earliest stages of regulatory development so that its level of 
impact can be determined. At this “triage” stage, the Regulatory Affairs Sector will provide 
an early indication as to whether the rule applies.  
The rule has two elements. Under Element A of the rule, if a new regulation or an 
amendment to an existing regulation imposes new administrative burden costs on business, 
departments are required to monetize and offset those costs with equal administrative 
burden reductions within 24 months of approval (i.e., registration of the regulatory 
change). In particular, departments are required to monetize burden in and out using a 
Regulatory Cost Calculator; and to consult on their estimates with affected stakeholders. 
Element B of the rule requires that all new regulatory titles that impose administrative 
burden on business be offset by removing an existing regulatory title within 24 months. 
The Red Tape Reduction Regulations authorize the Treasury Board to exempt regulations 
from the requirement to offset burden or titles. The three categories of exemption are:  
 
53 The Red Tape Reduction Act defines administrative burden as "anything that is necessary to demonstrate compliance 
with a regulation, including the collecting, processing, reporting and retaining of information and the completing of 
forms". 
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• Regulations related to tax or tax administration. 
• Regulations that implement non-discretionary obligations: This exemption applies to 
regulations that implement obligations for which there is no discretion with regard to 
the manner in which they can be designed and administered. 
• Emergencies and crisis situations or other unique, exceptional circumstances. 
Following stakeholder consultation on the estimates of new administrative burden costs, 
departments prepare their regulatory submissions for Treasury Board (Part B) approval to 
pre-publish the proposed regulatory change in the Canada Gazette, Part I. Not all 
regulations are pre-published, however, as Treasury Board can exempt regulatory proposals 
from pre-publication.  When considering approval to pre-publish, Treasury Board (Part B) 
makes a determination as to the application of the rule and whether to exempt the proposal 
from the requirement to offset based on the categories above.  
At the pre-publication stage, regulators receive public comments on the proposed 
regulatory text and make adjustments as necessary; this provides a final opportunity for 
refinements before the proposal is finalized and is not considered to be a substitute for 
thorough stakeholder consultation.  
Once adjustments are made (if required) to address public comments, the proposed 
regulation is submitted to Treasury Board (Part B) for final approval. If approved, it is 
registered and published in the Canada Gazette, Part II. The requirement to offset titles 
and burden under the one-for-one rule is required within 24 months of the registration 
date.  
1.4.2 Korea 
In Korea a “Cost-in, Cost-out” (CICO) system has formally entered into full force in July 
2016 by ordinance of the Prime Minister, after having been launched in 2014 as a pilot. 
CICO is a mechanism to restrict the increase of the costs of newly introduced or reinforced 
regulations by abolishing or relaxing regulations that carry equal or greater costs. As of late 
2018, 27 central administrative agencies have adopted CICO concerning regulations that 
generate direct costs for profit-seeking activities of any individual or business. Since 
CICO requires the responsible agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for outgoing 
regulations that are bound to offset the costs of newly introduced regulations, there is a 
built-in mechanism to reassess the validity, rationality, and appropriateness of the existing 
regulations.  
The CICO system entails a different calculation compared to the general RIA analysis 
carried out in Korea. In particular, the system looks only at the direct burdens added and 
subtracted as a result of new legislation. In this respect, this system does not cover the 
broader, indirect impacts stemming from regulation for the economy. Table 3 below shows 
an illustration of this difference.  
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Table 3 – Calculation of net benefits in RIA and CICO system in Korea 
 
Source: OECD and KDI (2007) 
 
The following cases are exempted from the CICO programme: 
• Regulations necessary for dealing with national crisis or emergency; 
• Regulations required to implement treaties or international agreements; 
• Regulations directly related to maintenance of order or public life and safety; 
• Regulations necessary for preventing financial crisis, securing financial stability, dealing 
with environmental crisis, and fostering fair competition; 
• Regulations associated with administrative fees, administrative actions or 
administrative sanctions; 
• Regulations that are sunsetting within 1 year. 
Approximately 72% of new regulations established during the pilot project were subject 
to the exemption of application (OECD, 2017). 
In the CICO system, banking is allowed, whereas trading is not allowed and the agency 
increasing regulatory costs is itself responsible also for finding necessary offsets. 
In the pilot tests of CICO, started in July 2014, 15 ministries analysed and abolished (or 
relaxed) 28 existing regulations together in exchange for 24 newly-introduced ones. Only 
in July 2016 it was introduced in full force covering 27 agencies in total.  
All ministries and agencies have to evaluate their performance related to CICO bi-annually. 
RRO compiles this information and submits it to RRC. CICO is one of the factors that 
play a role in the evaluation of the ministries’ performance. The results are published 
online. Interestingly, ministries are graded based on their performance and financially 
rewarded for very good performance. The RRC submits an annual report to the National 
Assembly in which one chapter is dedicated to CICO. 
The key advantages of the CICO system in Korea include greater awareness of public 
authorities of the need for ex post evaluation of regulation, as evaluation becomes a 
conditionality for the identification of the rules to eliminate in case a new regulatory 
intervention is being proposed. Administrations also reportedly have the incentive to 
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replace old regulations with more efficient ones over time. The system, initially thought 
to be costly, proved to be cheaper than other ex post evaluation mechanisms. And its 
impact on the quality of RIA has also been found to be extremely positive in a recent 
study jointly undertaken by the OECD and the Korea Development Institute54.  
1.4.3 Mexico 
In Mexico, the new General Law on Better Regulation includes the adoption of an OIOO 
rule, which is implemented by the new National Commission of Better Regulation 
(CONAMER) in the Federal scope of government. Art. 78 of the new law aims directly at 
reducing or at least preserving the regulatory stock. Based on the new law, the OIOO rule 
require regulators to expressly indicate in their regulatory proposals the regulatory 
obligations or acts to be modified, abrogated or derogated; that the corresponding impact 
on cost is zero or negative; and that the acts or obligations to be eliminated are referred to 
the same subject matter or regulated sector than the ones introduced. 
Additionally, based on the Presidential decree dated March 8th, 2017, the Federal 
government initially applied a similar version of the OIOO rule, which requires regulatory 
authorities to eliminate two55 regulatory actions or administrative acts in the same 
economic sector, in order to issue a new regulation. This initial OIOO rule, as a result of 
the 2017 Presidential Decree, is still valid for Federal regulatory proposals and the 
CONAMER currently makes a joint interpretation of both versions of the OIOO.  
The General Law on Better Regulation published on May 18, 2018, recovered the OIOO 
policy at a national level scope, in which the CONAMER has the responsibility of 
overseeing the implementation of OIOO at the Federal scope of government and the 
subnational oversight authorities are responsible of overseeing the implementation of 
OIOO at the subnational scope of government (Congreso general de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, 2018). The rule requires departments and agencies to offset an increase in 
direct compliance costs to individuals caused by a newly introduced regulation by repealing 
or modifying one or more regulatory obligations or acts from the same economic sector 
with an equivalent or superior value of costs. 
The OIOO rule generally applies to all national regulations imposing direct compliance 
costs to individuals. However, the following regulations can be exempt from both versions 
of the OIOO rule:  
• Regulations that address an emergency situation, provided that they have a validity of 
no more than six months, seek to avoid imminent damage or mitigate existing damage, 
and an act with equivalent content has not previously been issued; 
 
54 http://www.oecd.org/gov/improving-regulatory-governance-9789264280366-en.html  
55 It must be emphasize that this rule might not be interpreted as an "one in two out OITO" rule because the spirit of the 
Presidential decree was to verify that, for each new regulatory proposal, there would be at least a reduction in the 
compliance cost for the individuals by eliminating 2 regulatory obligations or acts (including procedures), with a 
greater emphasis on the amount of cost saved by eliminating these regulatory obligations or acts. 
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• Regulations with automatic sunset or evaluation clauses; 
• Regulations related to the disbursement and operation rules of the Federal subsidies; 
• Regulations issued by the President; 
• When the regulator proves that the economic sector to be affected by the regulatory 
proposal does not have current regulations to be eliminated in order to comply with 
the OIOO rule. In this case, the regulator can request CONAMER to exempt the 
compliance with the OIOO rule.  
In the period of March 9th, 2017 to October 31st, 201956, 13.7%57of the total of new 
Federal regulatory proposals received by CONAMER were applicable to the OIOO rule. 
In Mexico, the CONAMER monitors the offsetting of compliance costs for individuals 
following the introduction of new Federal regulations as part of the OIOO rule (Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, 2017). Since its introduction, the OIOO rule has shown the following 
statistics in the Federal regulations applicable to the OIOO: between March 9th, 2017 to 
October 31st58, 2019 CONAMER reported USD517 million of new regulatory compliance 
costs, and almost USD15.8 billion of savings, leading to net savings of USD15.3 billion59. 
As a conclusion, the following lessons has emerged as a result of the implementation of 
OIOO rule in Mexico: 
1. This tool has become an effective way to differentiate relevant regulations from those 
that are not, since regulators are not willing to comply with their OIOO obligations in 
the case of unnecessary new regulations, so with this tool, the oversight authority can 
easily identify the magnitude of the new regulatory proposals. 
2. The implementation and interpretation of the OIOO by the oversight authority has 
avoided a non-planned dismantling of the legal framework of current regulations in 
order to comply with the OIOO, since the spirit of this rule focuses on avoiding the 
increase in the amount of costs of new regulations, without focusing exclusively on the 
elimination of regulations in order to comply with the rule. 
 
56 Source: internal statistical reports in CONAMER 
57 Between March 9th, 2017 to October 31st, 2019, the CONAMER received 3466 new regulatory proposals from which 
2990 (86.3%) were applicable to the exceptions included in the OIOO rule or were regulatory proposals that didn’t 
generate compliance costs to individuals.  
58 Source: internal statistical reports in CONAMER 
59 During this period, over 80% of the reduction in compliance costs (12,662.5 million dollars) was result of a regulatory 
proposal issued by the National Banking and Securities Commission about "Financial Hybrid Limits" (Resolution 
modifying the general provisions applicable to the institutions of credit), in which at least 4 provisions of current 
regulatory obligations were repealed as part of the OITO rule. The consequence was more flexibility in the use that 
credit institutions could give to their capital, so, the credit institutions were able to put more resources in the financial 
market and that financial profits could not be generated if they had to be placed as capital, as it was stipulated in the 
initial provisions. The repeal of provisions as a result of the OITO rule implied that credit institutions could generate 
additional profits in the market of around 12,662.5 million dollars per year. 
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3. The implementation of the OIOO rule has allowed to systematically increase the 
quality of regulatory impact analysis and also improve the quality of the human capital 
dedicated to performing this type of analysis. 
4. The adoption of the OIOO rule must take into account a great sensitivity by the 
oversight authorities in order to safeguard the public interest of regulations and 
thereby avoid place the obligation of achieving the regulatory simplification before 
particular situations in which the regulation aims to safeguard the public interest. 
5. The statistical evidence of this policy after two years of implementation confirms its 
success since the savings generated would not have been achieved by another 
mechanism if the rule did not exist.  
1.4.4 The United States 
In the United States, under the Trump Administration, Executive Order (EO) 13771 
adopted on January 30, 2017, titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs”, introduced a new regulatory budgeting system. The goal pursued by the new Order 
is to reduce regulation, i.e. reducing the number of regulations; and to control regulatory 
costs, i.e. avoiding new regulation if it leads to an increase in the costs imposed by the 
existing stock of federal regulation. The new rule was later accompanied by EO13777 on 
“Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda”, which aimed at strengthening the governance 
of regulatory reform inside the administration, in particular by mandating the creation of 
Regulatory Reform Task Forces in each agency. Overall, the new Executive Orders 
introduce a radically new system in federal agencies, with substantial consequences for the 
regulatory process and oversight.  EO13771 introduces a number of new features in the 
U.S. federal rulemaking process:  
• A “stock-flow linkage rule”, which combines an OI2O rule in terms of number of 
regulations and an OIOO rule in terms of volume of incremental regulatory costs. The 
rule mandates that “any new incremental costs associated with new regulations shall, 
to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated 
with at least two prior regulations” (Sec. 2c)60.  
• A regulatory budgeting system, based on which from 2018 onwards the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget will attribute specific incremental cost allowances to each 
federal agency, with a view to reaching an overall target for the reduction of incremental 
costs, which can change every year.  
The new qualifying regulatory initiatives will not only have to comply with the offsetting 
requirement: they will also need to comply with the pre-existing EO 12,866, which means 
 
60 The expression stock-flow linkage rule is used at the OECD level to denote rules that link the management of the 
regulatory stock with the adoption of new regulations. See e.g. “Regulatory Policy in Perspective A Reader's 
Companion to the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015”, at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy-in-
perspective-9789264241800-en.htm.   
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that they will have to produce net benefits, or at least have benefits that justify the cost. 
OIRA has also confirmed, in this respect, that the definition of incremental cost to be used 
for the purposes of EO 13,771 is the same that is contained in Circular A-4 and applied to 
EO 12,866; and that the renewed focus on incremental costs shall not lead to neglecting 
regulatory benefits. Agencies will thus be confronted with what could be defined as a 
double constraint, since they will be asked to propose regulation only after two basic 
preconditions are met: (i) that the benefits of the new rule justify the costs (EO 12,866); 
and (ii) that the incremental costs are offset by at least two qualifying deregulatory actions, 
which have to be identified and finalized at the time of adoption of the regulatory action, 
and certainly by the end of the fiscal year (EO13,771).  
The new guidance document also explains that the term “offsetting” implies that the cost 
of new significant regulatory initiatives will have to be “appropriately counterbalanced” by 
incremental cost savings generated by the deregulatory actions, consistently with the 
agency’s total incremental cost allowance. Depending on the agency’s incremental cost 
allowance, the rule might thus not take the form of a precise “one in, one out” rule based 
on the volume of incremental costs, but rather lead to different constraints and objectives 
for each agency. Imagine, for example, that the EPA has been given a mandate to reduce 
regulatory burdens by 25% (or a nominal amount, say $500 million) in 2018: then, rather 
than simply offsetting the incremental cost of each new qualifying regulatory initiative, the 
EPA will have to ensure that the sum of all “ins” and “outs” is consistent with the negative 
incremental cost allowance. This, as will be discussed below, could lead to cases in which 
an agency abandons the adoption of potentially welfare-enhancing regulatory initiatives 
since they comply with EO12,866, but not with the specific incremental cost allowance 
attributed to the agency by the OMB.  
Agencies that do not comply with the incremental cost allowance by the end of fiscal year 
will be given a strict deadline of 30 days to develop a compliance plan. If they comply, or 
go beyond the allowance, they will be able to “bank” incremental cost allowances for the 
subsequent fiscal years. They will also be able to request, whenever appropriate, that some 
of the incremental cost allowances be transferred to or from other agencies, subject to 
approval by the OIRA.  
Figure 5 below provides a sketch of the new cycle, in which OIRA attributes incremental 
cost allowances, agencies   
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Figure 5 – the new regulatory budgeting system – fiscal year cycle 
 
Source: Renda (2018) 
 
From fiscal year 2018 onwards, the OMB also attributes an incremental cost allowance to 
each agency. Each agency then has to draft a yearly Unified Agenda of Regulatory and 
Deregulatory Actions, in which foreseen actions leading to qualifying regulatory and 
deregulatory actions are identified. As clarified by OIRA, the rule applies (at least for the 
“one in” part) only to “significant regulatory actions”, as defined in Section 3(f) of EO 
12,866 (which continues to apply)61; as well as to “significant guidance documents”, as 
defined in OMB’s Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices62. For each new such 
initiative planned, agencies have to issue and finalize during the fiscal year at least two 
“EO13771 deregulatory actions”, which have total incremental costs less than zero and 
qualify both as “two out” measures; and for the purposes of meeting the overall incremental 
cost allowance attributed to the agency by the OMB. Importantly, the new guidance 
document clarifies that deregulatory actions may lead to either repealing, or also merely 
revising existing regulations to reduce incremental costs, contrary to what the previous 
interim guidance document implied63. All in all, it seems that the two offsetting 
requirements (“one in one out” in terms of incremental costs, and “one in two out” in 
terms of number of regulations) will be separable at the time of adopting new significant 
regulations; but will have to be jointly met by the end of the fiscal year. 
 
61 These are regulations that have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health 
or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities (also termed “economically significant regulations”); 
and regulations that create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another 
agency; materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programmes or the rights and 
obligations of recipients thereof; or raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s 
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order. Importantly, under Executive Order 12866, OIRA is 
responsible for determining which agency regulatory actions are “significant” and, in turn, subject to interagency 
review. 
62 See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2007-01-25/E7-1066.  
63 See M-17-21, answer to Question 35.  
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The new system introduced by EO13771 and EO13777 is substantially different, and in 
many respects, more ambitious and complex than the regulatory budgeting and stock-flow 
linkage rules that have been tested in other countries. In particular, the U.S. is seeking the 
implementation of such rules without narrowing down the scope of the system to 
compliance costs or administrative burdens. This is a very critical choice since all 
comparable systems have significantly departed from the notion of opportunity cost that 
typically backs economic analysis of the social welfare impacts of regulation. Many of these 
countries have adopted simpler and narrower cost definitions and rely on financial analysis 
as opposed to economic analysis, with the clear intent to simplify the whole exercise and 
avoid having to engage in complex calculations of opportunity costs, in particular ancillary 
or indirect ones, or distributional impacts of regulation. To the contrary, the U.S. system 
promises to remain in line with a more economically sound approach to regulation, but it 
is difficult to foresee whether this methodological choice will prove sustainable.  
Among the most relevant question marks that surround the new system are thus the 
following: whether the U.S. administration will manage to reconcile benefit-cost analysis 
with the regulatory budgeting system introduced by EO13771 and EO13777; whether the 
new rules will incentivize more meaningful retrospective review of regulation in each 
agency; whether the new system could lead to strategic behaviour both on the side of 
agencies, and OIRA; and whether the combined effects of budget cuts and regulatory cuts 
could really undermine the stability and soundness of the U.S. regulatory state.  
1.5 Summary table and graph: OIXO rules in Europe and beyond 
Table 4 below shows a summary of our comparative analysis of OIXO rules in the EU 
Member States and in non-EU OECD Member States. As already mentioned, in the EU28 
there are ten countries that already have such rules in place; two countries in which the 
rule was recently discontinued; one country where it is formally in place but not 
implemented in practice; and four countries that are currently planning to adopt an OIOO 
rule. In addition, we report information on existing OIXO rules in Canada, Korea, the 
USA, and Mexico. 
 Table 4 – Overview of the experience with OIXO rules in EU member states and non-EU OECD Countries 
Country Rule Type of costs 
covered) 
Scope (law) Regulated 
entities) 
Timing of 
offsets 
Banking Trading Exemptions Details Experience 
Austria OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Federal 
legislation 
Citizens and 
businesses 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. OIOO foreseen 
in the 
Deregulation 
Act 2017.  
n.a. 
Denmark OIOO 
(discontin
ued in the 
summer of 
2019) 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
(but not 
independent 
agencies) 
Businesses Simultaneous No No 1. Minimum implementation 
of EU regulation.  
2. Large deals with the 
business community (e.g. 
deals made by labor and 
employer organizations).  
3.Substantial public interest.  
The 2015 
OIOO was part 
of the burden 
stop on business 
regulation. 
Administrations 
became more 
attentive to 
costs. The rule 
was however 
discontinued by 
the new 
government. 
Finland OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary 
legislation 
(pilot) 
Businesses Within 
Government 
term. 
Yes No Emergency legislation Pilot test in 
2017, applied in 
two ministries 
and including 
also major 
compliance 
costs. Pilot 
continued in 
one ministry 
after 2017. 
Positive so far 
(still pilot) 
France OI2O 
(number), 
OIOO 
(costs) 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
National 
regulations, 
decrees and 
circulars 
Businesses, 
Local 
Administrati
on and 
services, 
Citizens 
Simultaneous No No Decrees without impact on 
civil society and decrees that 
accompany new laws or 
regulations 
Since 2015 
OIOO. Then 
OI2O in 2017 
with Macron. 
First tests did 
not achieve the 
desired results. 
The government 
decided to move 
to an OI2O for 
this reason. 
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Germany OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses Within a 
year's time 
No Yes Ministry can ask the steering 
group of state secretaries for 
an exemption (never 
happened to date) 
Taxes and Budget 
1:1 transposition of EU-
directives 
Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court 
Since 2015 
OIOO. Limited 
to costs for 
businesses. 
Offsets should 
occur within a 
year's time.   
Positive: 
ministries 
became more 
attentive to 
costs. 
Hungary OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs  
 
Primary and 
secondary 
legislation 
submitted to 
the 
Government 
Citizens and 
businesses 
and public 
administrati
ons 
Simultaneous/
within a short 
time 
No No - Government 
Decision in 
March 2019.  
Positive: 
administrations 
became more 
attentive to costs 
Italy OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary and 
Seconday 
legislation 
(but not 
independent 
agencies) 
Citizens and 
businesses 
Within 90 
days after the 
publication of 
the annual 
report 
No No Fiscal, tax, public games and 
lotteries regulations are 
exempted. 
Since 2011 
OIOO rule in 
the Statuto delle 
Imprese. It is a 
sort of 
regulatory 
budgeting 
system applied 
to admin 
burdens only. 
 
Latvia OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Business Within 6 
months (but 
offsetting 
measures are 
announced in 
the impact 
assessment of 
the "in" 
regulation) 
No No 1.Budgeting and tax policy.  
2.Compliance with 
minimum requirements to 
be introduced in the EU  
3.International agreements 
and obligations 
4. Emergency regulation 
5. Situations where the issue 
needs to be addressed 
immediately in relation to 
Entered into 
force since 1st 
November 2019 
n.a. 
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the occurrence of adverse 
effects affecting the essential 
interests of the public (incl. 
consumers) or the 
international, financial, 
economic or security 
interests of the country, 
assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
Lithuania OIOO Administrative 
burdens 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses n.a. No No n.a. OIOO - Cap on 
Administrative 
Burdens in 2014 
n.a. 
Spain OIOO Administrative 
burdens 
Government 
regulation 
Businesses Within a 
year's time 
(but offsetting 
measures are 
announced in 
the impact 
assessment of 
the "in" 
regulation) 
No Yes • Transposition of EU 
legislation or international 
agreements   
• Regulations on civil 
emergencies;  
• Measures to prevent 
financial risk, contain 
inflation, regulate taxes and 
fees, fines and penalties and 
social security contributions 
• Regulations with 
temporary validity (especially 
those with an annual term) 
Since 2013, for 
administrative 
burdens 
Positive: 
administrations 
became more 
attentive to 
costs, the quality 
of IAs improved, 
along with the 
quality of 
regulation 
Sweden OIOO Administrative 
burdens 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. “Loose” OIOO: 
Administrative 
burdens for 
businesses 
should be lower 
in 2020 
compared to 
2012. 
n.a. 
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The UK OIOO in 
2011; 
OI2O in 
2013; 
OI3O in 
2016 and 
2017 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses         Currently the 
OIXO rule is 
only a lever by 
which to help 
deliver the 
Business Impact 
Target, which is 
a statutory 
requirement.   
  
Poland – planned introduction of an OIOO rule 
Romania – planned introduction of an OIOO rule 
Slovakia – planned introduction of an OIOO rule 
Slovenia – planned introduction of an OIOO rule 
Non-EU OECD countries with an OIXO rule 
Canada OIOO Administrative 
burdens  
Secondary 
legislation 
 Within 24 
months 
Yes  No • Regulations that 
implement non-
discretionary obligations; 
• Regulations related to tax 
or tax administrations;  
• Regulations that address 
emergencies or crisis 
situations, Or other 
unique circumstances.  
  
Korea OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Secondary 
legislation 
  Yes  No • Regulations necessary for 
dealing with national 
crisis or emergency; 
• Regulations required to 
implement treaties or 
international agreements; 
• Regulations directly 
related to maintenance of 
order or public life and 
safety; 
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• Regulations necessary for 
preventing financial 
crisis, securing financial 
stability, dealing with 
environmental crisis, and 
fostering fair 
competition; 
• Regulations associated 
with administrative fees, 
administrative actions or 
administrative sanctions; 
• Regulations that are 
sunsetting within 1 year. 
Mexico OIOO 
 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Secondary 
legislation 
    • Regulations that address 
an emergency situation, 
provided that they have a 
validity of no more than 
six months, seek to avoid 
imminent damage or 
mitigate existing damage, 
and an act with 
equivalent content has 
not previously been 
issued; 
• Regulations with 
automatic sunset or 
evaluation clauses; 
• Regulations related to the 
disbursement and 
operation rules of the 
Federal subsidies; 
• Regulations issued by the 
President; 
• When the regulator 
proves that the economic 
sector to be affected by 
the regulatory proposal 
does not have current 
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regulations to be 
eliminated in order to 
comply with the OIOO 
rule. In this case, the 
regulator can request 
CONAMER to exempt 
the compliance with the 
OIOO rule. 
The 
United 
States 
OIOO  
(coupled 
with 
OI2O in 
terms of 
number of 
rules) 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Secondary 
legislation 
Citizens and 
businesses 
By end of 
fiscal year 
Yes No    
Figure 6 below shows a map of the EU28 with an indication of those countries in which 
an OIXO rule is currently in place (deep blue); countries in which the introduction of the 
rule is currently being planned (blue); and countries in which the rule used to be in place, 
but was recently discontinued (light yellow); countries in which the OIXO rule formally 
exists, but is not being implemented (yellow). Countries where no such rule is in place are 
marked in brown.  
 
Figure 6 – The experience of EU Member States with OIXO rules 
  
 
As shown in the figure, a large number of Member States, representing a large portion of 
the GDP and the population of the EU, currently have an OIXO rule in place. More 
specifically: 
• Many Member States have chosen to cover both administrative burdens and substantive 
compliance costs in implementing their OIXO rules. They include Austria, Finland 
(pilot), France, Hungary, Germany and Sweden.  
• Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain have a rule in place that is limited to administrative 
burdens.  
• Four Member States (Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) are planning to 
introduce an OIXO rule in the near future.  
• One Member State (Portugal) has introduced an OIOO rule but never implemented it.  
• Two Member States (the UK and Denmark) has had a OIOO rule until recently, but 
the rule has been discontinued by the new government.  
• All countries marked in “brown”, as will be explained in the next section, have 
experimented with the measurement of administrative burdens in the past years.  
OIXO is in place
OIXO is planned
OIXO recently discontinued
OIXO exists but not implemented
OIXO not in place
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In summary, a number of lessons can be learnt from the observation of the national 
experience with OIXO rules at the EU level. First, the majority of EU member states has 
already developed experience with OIXO rules: such experience is prevalently positive, 
which motivates many national governments to support the adoption of a similar rule at 
the EU level. Second, countries have reported that the key advantage of the OIXO rule is 
a “disciplining” effect on administrations, which appear to have become more attentive to 
costs as a result of the introduction of the rule. Third, most countries incorporate a degree 
of flexibility, by allowing for a closed number of exemptions in the application of the rule; 
allowing modifications of legislations, rather than only repeals; and granting the 
administration a relatively long timeframe for the adoption of the reduction measures that 
realise the “outs” (e.g. within a year, or within the solar year). Fourth, and not surprisingly, 
countries that have extended the application of the OIXO rule beyond administrative 
burdens, to embrace also substantive compliance costs, have reported more significant 
results: as a matter of fact, administrative burdens are most often a tiny share of direct 
compliance costs.  
2 Experience of EU and OECD countries with burden 
reduction targets 
Most EU Member states have had, or currently have, experience with burden reduction 
targets. Already in Renda (2017) a comprehensive overview of these experiences was 
presented. For the purposes of this study, we have updated the national experiences and 
integrated in our analysis the results of our survey, which (as already mentioned) retrieved 
21 useful responses (See table 1 above). 
2.1 Experience in the EU Member States 
2.1.1 Austria 
In Austria, a programme to reduce administrative burdens was launched already in 2006. 
The following year administrative burdens were estimated at 4.3 billion Euros (1.6% of 
GNP). A 25% reduction target for administrative burdens (around one billion Euros) was 
set and achieved by 2012. Measures such as the Business Service Portal and e-invoicing 
were major simplifications. Another plan was launched, based on surveys and interviews, 
in 2009 and led to the identification of the 100 most burdensome activities for citizens; 
this then led to 140 reduction measures, aimed at reducing burdens by at least seven million 
hours (out of a total of 32.3 million hours generated by the 100 most burdensome pieces 
of legislation): eventually the government announced in 2014 a reduction of 7.4 million 
hours, which slightly exceeded the target.  
In line with the work programme of the Austrian Federal Government for 2013 to 2018, 
a task and deregulation commission was established. 245 concrete reform proposals with 
an enormous potential for savings were elaborated and proposed to the Federal 
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Government. The work programme of the Federal Government for 2017/2018 also 
included concrete measures to reduce the number of regulations, which should lead to a 
sustainable relief for citizens and companies. Besides the OIOO rule, the government 
committed to ensuring that all new regulations will only be enacted for a certain amount 
of time (“sunset legislation”); and that when transposing EU legislation into national law, 
any higher level of regulation than foreseen at the EU level will have to be duly justified (to 
avoid “gold-plating”). The government programme for 2017-2021 acknowledged problems 
of administrative burden for the business environment.  
Seeking to reduce, inter alia, this burden, Austria adopted a new ‘clearing’ law (Zweites 
Bundesrechts-bereingungsgesetz), pursuant to which all federal laws adopted before 2000 were 
repealed by 31 December 2018 unless listed in the law’s annex. This concerned 5 000 
(basic) legal acts, half of which (631 [38%] out of 1645 statutory laws, 1823 [49%] out of 
3355 government regulations) were repealed (including younger legal acts, 1604 statutory 
laws, and more than 3500 government regulations remained).  
As a further step to reduce administrative burdens for businesses, the Federal Government 
recently launched the national Once-Only-Principle program. Relevant information 
obligations for businesses will be recorded in an Information Obligation Database to foster 
the detection and elimination of redundancies in business reporting. This is achieved by 
recording all forms, data fields and legal passages involved in processes between businesses 
and the government. The implementation of an Information Hub connecting 
decentralized registers will lead to an easier data exchange between public agencies and to 
fewer reporting duties for businesses. 
All in all, Austria has had a very positive experience with burden reduction targets for 
businesses, but does not currently have a specific target for its administrative or compliance 
costs.  
2.1.2 Belgium 
In Belgium efforts to simplify the legislative environment and reduce administrative 
burdens started very early, at least 25 years ago. Initiatives such as the Auditform and the 
Kafka portal (1999) were pioneers in the field of administrative burden reduction. A 
Measuring Office operates since 2007 within the Administrative Simplification Agency 
(ASA, itself created in 1998), with the mandate to capture the changes in administrative 
burdens caused by the adoption of new or changed regulations in selected areas. A publicly 
available database includes the main measures of the administrative burden for companies 
and the self-employed in Belgium from the biennial surveys conducted by the Federal 
Planning Bureau (FPB) since 2000: the database also includes a qualitative part, which 
allows the evolution in the perception of the quality of regulation and of contacts with the 
administration to be followed. The database, limited to businesses (companies and self-
employed), is conducted every two years using the same methodology and includes three 
regulatory domains for companies - employment, taxation and the environment - and two 
regulatory domains for the self-employed - taxation and the environment.  Despite all these 
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efforts, however, both the OECD (2015) and the European Commission (in its country 
specific recommendations for Belgium, May 2016) argued that “the business climate is 
hampered by administrative and regulatory burdens, which inhibit the creation and 
expansion of companies”64. 
At the request of the Council of Ministers and in collaboration with the Administrative 
Simplification Agency (ASA), the Federal Planning Bureau is responsible for estimating, 
every two years, the amount of the administrative burdens on companies and self-employed 
persons in Belgium65. In 16 years, the relative weight of administrative expenses has been 
reduced by more than half, from 3.48% of GDP in 2000 to 1.60% in 2016.   The "SME 
Plan" approved on Friday 27 February 2015 proposes 40 concrete measures to support 
SMEs in their development. The objective of this plan is to generate 30% savings for 
companies. Among proposed reforms are the creation of a “one stop shop” for SMEs (the 
Crossroads Bank for Enterprises, CBE) and a systematic and more targeted dissemination 
of contract notices on existing electronic procurement portals66. The 30% reduction target 
applies to business-relevant legislation and specific sectors/policy areas. The results 
obtained only concern administrative burdens on companies and self-employed people, 
not those faced by citizens. In addition, the survey addressed to companies only covers 
administrative burdens in three regulatory areas, taxation, employment and the 
environment, and the survey addressed to self-employed persons only covers costs 
administrative matters related to taxation and the environment. The target applies to both 
administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs and is expressed in percentage. 
In Flanders, the government has experimented in the past with the OIOO rule, and is 
currently very actively seeking the reduction of administrative burdens. A Compensation 
Rule for Administrative Burdens was introduced by the Flemish Government in 2004 
(VR/2004/1712/DOC.1271). The rule implied that any increase in administrative 
burdens as a result of a government decision (decree, decision, etc.) had to be accompanied 
by an equally large reduction in existing administrative burdens (thus, configuring an 
OIOO rule)67. After an internal evaluation, however, the rule was no longer maintained as 
from 2014. The reasons for discontinuing the application of the rule were related to the 
too small number of dossiers in which the impact on administrative burdens was being 
measured, the low quality of the measurements, the lack of perceived impact by the target 
 
64 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/csr2016_belgium_en.pdf 
65 The first national survey, conducted from 15 March to 1 July 2001, covered administrative costs in 2000. The second 
survey, conducted from June 1 to August 31, 2003, focused on administrative expenses for 2002. The third survey, 
conducted from June 1 to August 31, 2005, was on administrative expenses for 2004. The fourth survey, conducted 
from June 1 to September 5 2007, covered administrative expenses for 2006. The fifth survey, conducted on June 1 
as at 7 September 2009, covered administrative expenses for 2008. The sixth survey, conducted from May 4 to 
September 6, 2011, covered administrative expenses for 2010. The seventh survey, conducted from 31 May to 3 
September 2013, covered administrative burdens in 2012. The eighth survey, conducted from 29 May to 3 September 
2015, covered the administrative costs of the year 2014. This ninth investigation, conducted from May 31 to 
September 20, 2017, focuses on the charges of the year 2016.   
66 See: https://www.plan.be/databases/data-29-fr-les+charges+administratives+en+belgique and   
http://www.cerap.be/IMG/pdf/charges_administratives_2016.pdf 
67 This compensation rule was also mentioned in the report ‘Better Regulation in Belgium’ by the OECD, at 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/betterregulationineuropebelgium.htm 
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groups, and the decision by the Flemish government to go beyon the ‘standard cost model’ 
to consider various types of costs to be reduced, including i.a. through eGovernment -
projects. In the new coalition agreement of the Flemish government 2019-2024 there are 
several engagements for reducing administrative and regulatory burden. These include a 
commitment to systematically reduce the regulatory burden on citizens, companies and 
associations by making them less restrictive and less detailed. The government also works 
on administrative simplification from the bottom up, in cooperation with the local 
authorities, and ask the input of citizens, companies and associations to remove 
administrative barriers and unnecessary legal obligations.’ 
2.1.3 Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, three consecutive plans for the reduction of administrative burdens have been 
completed between 2009 and 2018. All these plans focus on administrative burdens and 
on businesses only, and mostly covered purely national legislation, rather than 
transposition measures of EU legislation. Bulgaria had a 20% reduction target for 
administrative burdens during the implementation of the first and the second Action 
plans and 30% reduction target during the implementation of the third Action plan. The 
first target was introduced in 2009 and it applied to business-relevant legislation, or specific 
sectors/policy areas. The target only applies to administrative burdens. And it is expressed 
in percentage68. The second target was introduced in 2015 and by the end of 2018 was 
achieved 26% of the planned 30% reduction. 
More recently, during 2017 and the first quarter of 2018, new measures were adopted to 
ease administrative burdens on SMEs:  
• The Decision 338/2017 of the Council of Ministers, ‘Reduction of Administrative 
Burden’ intends to reduce further administrative burdens by withdrawing the 
requirement for presenting certified/notarised documents to the public 
administration.  
• The ‘Strategy for the Development of Electronic Governance in the Republic of 
Bulgaria 2019-2023’ aims to define new and improved e-services.  
In addition, the ‘Amendment to the Administrative Procedure Code’ was formally 
announced during the current reference period. The measure intends to digitalise 
administrative proceedings. 
By Decision of 5 October 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a new package of 
1 528 measures aimed at changing and improving administrative services for citizens and 
businesses. The changes are based on data from visits of 3 700 points providing services 
from all central administrations and their territorial units, including all district, municipal 
and regional administrations. 
 
68 See Atanassov (2017).  
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Bulgaria reported a rather negative experience with reduction targets, but thanks to the 
target the administration became more attentive to costs. The main negative effects was 
that businesses did not feel the relief from regulatory costs. The main obstacle was that it 
was difficult to quantify and monetise costs. Overall, the government reported that the 
measurement and quantification of costs is extremely expensive and difficult, and at the 
same time companies did not see a difference before and after achieving the target. 
2.1.4 Croatia 
In Croatia, the Ministry of Economy Entrepreneurship and Crafts has implemented the 
Standard Cost Model and SME Test to help support businesses, which face steeper burdens 
and procedures than in many comparable countries. More specifically, Croatia is using the 
SME test for the prevention of the introduction of new administrative costs measured by 
SCM methodology. This method enabled the rapid identification of various burdens and 
the effective preparation of reform measures, as well as the possibility of monitoring the 
quality of the implementation of these reforms. In addition, the Croatian administration 
is planning to extend the scope of the impact assessment for the SME test to other criteria 
by introducing new regulatory impact assessment methodologies for secondary legislation 
(e.g. using adapted cost-benefit analysis). Regarding the implementation of a regulatory 
offsetting model, the Croatian government considers the merit of starting with minor, 
gradual steps, such as focused reviews of existing regulations, strengthening administrative 
capacity as well as building a comprehensive Better Regulation system. All of that in long-
term is expected to will provide a good foundation for the possible setting up of the OIOO 
model. 
The Action Plan for Administrative Burden Reduction on the Economy is part of a broader 
reform package from the National Reform Plan drafted by the government within the 
European Semester. The purpose is to create an improved investment climate, simpler 
business conditions and to provide easier access to market services through the full 
implementation of the EU Services Directive. The three action plans (2017, 2018 and 
2019) cover administrative commitments of the current annual cost for the economy of 
HRK 12.4 billion, and the implementation of all measures under these action plans will 
open up the relief of HRK 2.7 billion or a total decrease in measured liabilities by 21.86%. 
In less than three years, the Croatian government has implemented 300 measures that 
include some kind of administrative burden reduction, at the same time 821 SME tests 
were carried out.  
The Ministry of Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts estimates that implementing all 
the measures would save the economy HRK 625.9 million – an administrative burden 
reduction of 12%. The goal for administrative reduction until the end of 2021 is 21%. The 
cost reduction target applies to business-relevant legislation and to administrative burdens; 
it is expressed in percentage. 
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Overall, the Croatian government had a positive experience with reduction targets, as the 
administration became more attentive to costs. There were no negative effects, but the 
biggest obstacle was the resistance in the administration. 
2.1.5 Cyprus 
In Cyprus, there have several, partly successful attempt to measure administrative burdens 
for businesses, and at the end of 2011 the government presented the results of a project on 
the reduction of the administrative burden, which lasted from November 2009 to the 
beginning of 2011 and formed part of the Better Regulation initiative. A manual for the 
mapping and reduction of administrative burdens, entirely inspired by the SCM, was 
published by the government in 2011. The goal was to achieve a 20% reduction of 
administrative burdens on businesses by the end of 2012: the project included a mapping 
of 5,500 different legal obligations imposed on businesses, the selection of 8 areas of 
priority and the measurement of costs generated by such obligations. The 30 proposals that 
emerged from the final report were almost entirely implemented by June 2013, reaching a 
total of about 19% reduction of administrative burdens. Another action plan on better 
regulation was then approved by government in October 2015, and was accompanied by 
selected, sectoral initiatives to reduce burdens in specific sectors. For example, a 25% 
reduction target was introduced in the tourism sector (study published in December 
2015); and dedicated inquiries have been launched in the construction permits sector 
(started in September 2016), in the Social Insurance Service administration, in the Civil 
Registry and Migration Department and in the simplification of environmental permits 
(started in January 2017).  
A new Action Plan for better regulation for 2019-2022 was approved by the Council of 
Ministers in November 2019, which consists of policy areas of high priority for the 
reduction of administrative burden, under three priority axes: 
(i) Simplification of procedures and legislation and reduction of administrative 
burden. 
(ii) Better law making and impact assessment of new legislation. 
(iii) Embedding the culture and enhancing relevant skills in relation to better 
regulation. 
The new Action Plan includes, among others, actions for the modernisation of the 
Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver, the Tax Department, the Service of Industry 
and Technology and the Asylum Service. Furthermore, it includes measures aiming to 
improve the effectiveness of impact assessment procedures and stakeholder 
communication: e.g. development of a central government website for e-consultation. 
In summary, Cyprus does not currently have a reduction target for administrative burdens 
in terms of numerical quantification, however sectoral areas have been identified with 
specific measures being introduced, as well as horizontal measures towards the goal of 
achieving a reduction in administrative burdens.   
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2.1.6 Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, a “Remeasurement of the administrative burden for entrepreneurs” 
(the Remeasurement Project) was undertaken in 2012, with the help of an external 
consultancy which performed the independent research on 16 selected administrative tasks 
and identified the irritating obligations: the exercise led to a total measure of administrative 
burdens (65.3 billion CZK/year), resulting from 104 legal regulations issued by selected 
ministries, which imposed 1,338 reporting obligations on entrepreneurs69. 53 measures 
from 12 areas were suggested for reduction of the administrative burden for entrepreneurs. 
In 2014 a new Expert Group was established with the aim to reduce the burden on 
entrepreneurs, which informs the public administration about irritating obligations for 
business. A new goal has now been set to repeal 60 measures by 2015. Another 
measurement of the administrative burden for entrepreneurs was initiated in 201670.  
Today, the Czech Government does not have any reduction target for regulatory costs. 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade has taken systematic steps towards reducing the 
administrative burden on businesses since 2005. In 2007 the government approved the 
first plan on administrative burden reduction of the entrepreneurs. The original goal was 
to reduce the administrative burden by 20% till 2010. Based on the official reports, the 
administrative burden was reduced by total 31% till 2016 when compared with 2005. 
However, the business association criticized that the results had been achieved mostly by 
reduction of unused regulation or merging 2 forms into 1. Nowadays, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade continues only in fulfilling its program of reduction of administrative 
burden on businesses.  40 measures are planned to be taken by 2020. Concrete measures 
are defined instead of aiming for percentage values. 
The regulatory process is overseen by a dedicated body, the Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Board, established as part of the Government‘s Legislative Council in 2011, and composed 
of independent experts. RIAB provides statements to RIA reports regarding their form, 
adherence to the RIA methodology and overall reasoning. 
2.1.7 Denmark 
In Denmark, a systematic reduction of administrative burdens for business using the SCM 
was carried out between 2004 and 201071. This activity implied extensive use of the SCM 
and led to a large number of proposals for simplifications, which ultimately reduced 
burdens for businesses by a total of 24.6%. In 2012, a Business Forum for Simplification 
was established, with the goal of singling out suggestions for further simplification of 
legislation. Moreover, thematic reviews of the following areas have been carried out: reuse 
 
69 A comparison of the data showed a reduction in the administrative burden for entrepreneurs of 24.4% compared to 
2005 (in 2013 prices). 
70 http://www.mpo.cz/dokument142910.html 
71 http://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/file/239619/redegorelse_erhvervslivet_reguleringen_20092010_juni2011.pdf 
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of data, employment of foreigners, implementation of EU legislation, digitalisation, 
subnational implementation and processing times, working environment / health & safety, 
statistics, Denmark as an industrial nation, accounting and taxation. In these areas 60 
proposed simplification measures have been identified72. With the appointment of the 
present government in the summer of 2019, the Danish Business Forum for Simplification 
and the Danish Implementation Council were merged into a Danish EU and Regulatory 
Forum.  
Denmark has had a reduction target for regulatory costs until recently. The last reduction 
target, introduced in 2016, was 4 Billion Danish Kroner in annual reductions by 2020; a 
further 2 Billion Danish Kroner had to be reduced by 2025 (EU regulation was 
exempted). The target applied to business-relevant legislation and to both Administrative 
burdens and substantive compliance costs. However, the target was discontinued by the 
new government in the summer of 2019: after having continuously stepped up efforts to 
reap the remaining burden reduction potential, Denmark does not any longer have 
reduction targets, and the focus shifted to achieving simplification and better solutions for 
businesses and citizens through the promotion of digital-by-default and future-proof 
regulation as well as intensifying the efforts for simplification of existing regulation at the 
areas and sectors stakeholders find the most relevant and burdensome. 
2.1.8 Estonia 
Estonia carried out a Mapping the Evaluation Need of Administrative Burdens and a 
subsequent Evaluation of Administrative Burdens since 2009. The measurement was then 
carried out in four areas: economic administrative law, environmental law, construction 
and planning law, social law. Since 2015, the reduction of administrative burdens has been 
considered as part of a whole-of-government plan aimed at slowing down the production 
of legislation and reducing bureaucracy. This plan is particularly focused on the ex ante 
assessment of new legislation, but includes as part of its goals the need to reduce 
administrative burdens for citizens and businesses.  
Although not having concrete targets for reduction for regulatory costs, it was declared also 
in a 2016 policy document that a reduction in unnecessary burdens, i.a. on businesses, has 
to occur in case burdens in some other areas need to be increased. The perception is that 
better regulation does not mean deregulation, and reviews have to be done case by case. 
Moreover, the government has simultaneously launched the zero-bureaucracy project with 
the goal to reduce burdens on businesses by collecting ideas for reductions from businesses 
themselves.73 Several reductions have already been introduced as a result and several will 
be introduced in the near future. 
The zero-bureaucracy project ended in December 2018 and follow-up activities are 
currently underway. These activities mainly focus on ensuring that all burdens imposed are 
 
72 http://enklereregler.dk/temaer 
73 https://www.mkm.ee/en/zero-bureaucracy. 
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as simple to fulfil for the subjects as possible, mainly using innovative digital solutions. 
Reducing administrative burdens is also an objective under the Research, Development, 
Innovation Strategy and Entrepreneurship Strategy 2021-2035.74 These aims are achieved 
through legislation and through practical solutions, e.g.: 
• There is a continued policy that all burdens introduced must be guided by public 
interest and proportionate towards the subject. This also means that all unmotivated 
and disproportional burdens should be abolished. In order to enhance the achievement 
of this goal, there are plans to improve the drawing up of impact assessments through 
(partial) automatization of administrative burden calculations. 
• The fulfilment of the obligations should be based on once-only principle (data and 
information), be as automated as possible and take place in real time. This includes the 
development of Real-Time Economy conception and the use of single digital gateways 
when dealing with public sector. 
2.1.9 Finland 
Finland has carried out numerous studies on administrative burdens for businesses in the 
period 2008-201275. The government from June 2015 to May 2019 started a new 
programme to reduce and simplify regulation. Under the plan, Finnish ministries are 
supposed to come up with lists of legislation to be amended or repealed in 2015, to 
establish indicators for deregulation in 2016 and to propose legislative amendments in 
2016-2017. Specific plans were also formulated to reduce burdens in specific areas, such as 
simplified permits and compliant procedures for companies. In terms of governance, an 
independent Council of Regulatory Impact Analysis was established at the Prime Minister's 
Office in December 2015. The Council is responsible for issuing statements on 
government proposals and on their regulatory impact assessments. It aims at improving the 
quality of bill drafting and, in particular, the impact assessment of government proposals. 
It also aims to develop the overall bill drafting process including the scheduling and 
planning of government proposals and bill drafting. In April 2016, the Government 
appointed the Council for its first term of office, running from 15 April 2016 to 14 April 
2019. The current term of office runs from 15 April 2019 to 14 April 2022. 
A project was launched by the Prime Minister’s Office on freezing regulatory costs that 
incur to business companies (Tuominen-Thuesen et al. 2018). The main results are 
summarized by Ahonen (2018) as follows:  
• The notion of “regulatory burden” should be used only with caution.  
 
74 https://www.hm.ee/en/activities/strategic-planning-2021-2035. 
75 
https://www.tem.fi/en/enterprises/reduction_of_the_administrative_burden_on_businesses/initial_level_of_admi
nistrative_burden_on_businesses/studies_of_the_administrative_costs_and_administrative_burden_on_businesses  
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• The focus on relieving regulatory burdens should be upon unnecessary burdens rather 
than any regulatory cost.  
• One focus in reforming regulation should be put upon systems of government-awarded 
permits.  
• Sufficient attention should be paid to reducing burdens to the regulated from having 
to provide regulation-related information for the public authorities.  
• High-quality and adequately resourced preparation of legislation comprises one of the 
important preconditions for high-quality regulation.  
• Abolishing contradictory, imprecise, complex and ambiguous regulation should 
continue.  
• Regulatory burdens should be assessed together with other broad-based policy impacts. 
The multiplicity of the objects of regulation should be taken into account, from 
business companies to citizens and voluntary organizations.  
2.1.10 France 
In France, after a first application of the Standard Cost Model in 2004, the government 
decided to rely on a simpler method to continue monitoring the evolution of 
administrative burdens76. In 2013, the government introduced a “simplification shock” 
that involved the creation of a Business Simplification Council (January 2014) and the 
appointment of a Minister of State for State Reform and Simplification attached to the 
Prime Minister (June 2014). A first package of 124 business simplification measures was 
announced in July 2013 and 50 new business simplification measures have been 
announced every six months since April 2014. Measures include the “ask only once” 
programme designed to reduce the provision of redundant information requested from 
businesses and the “silence means consent” principle for a first batch of procedures. The 
government has adopted in 2015 a “one-in, one-out” approach to regulation.  
Accordingly, it developed a simpler, less systematic measurement method based on user 
surveys. These surveys are based on life events which generate administrative procedures 
(e.g. birth of a child, setting up a business) and must make it possible to identify the most 
complicated, frequent and/or irritating administrative formalities for different categories 
of user (members of the public, firms, associations). The approach therefore changes from 
 
76 The Oscar database was developed in order to take account of the administrative burden of new regulations, which 
implies a “net” target. As such it is interesting for the purposes of this project, even if it is not used in support of a 
comprehensive baseline measurement of regulatory burdens or costs.  Oscar uses reference data collected from 
DGAFP (Direction générale de l’administration et de la fonction publique), the INSEE statistics office and the Budget 
Directorate on the hourly costs of civil servants and the cost of company employees for each socio-professional 
category and sector of activity. Furthermore, the database resulting from the work of the MRCA (Measure to reduce 
the Administrative Burden) provides preliminary information on the default values in Oscar for the “initial 
deployment “ phase and the additional learning cost and indicates reference values for the recurrent application 
phase to the user. 
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one that is basically top down to one that is bottom up, and the emphasis has squarely been 
placed on “listening to users”. For each of these life events, the Directorate-General for the 
Modernisation of the State (DGME) analysed the procedures users had to follow and, using 
the findings of sample satisfaction surveys, identified points along the way where 
procedures could be improved. Since October 2008, the DGME conducted studies, 
working closely with a specialised institute, to gain an understanding of what users expected 
(users were divided up into four target groups: members of the public, businesses, 
subnational levels and associations). The surveys were aimed at identifying both problems 
encountered in the course of administrative procedures and users’ expectations as regards 
the procedures to be simplified (how easy/complicated the user perceived them to be for a 
given life event). After the surveys had been completed and their findings analysed, the 
DGME established lines of approach to simplification in collaboration with different 
ministries and identified 15 areas of work or measures to be pursued by the ministries. 
These 15 work areas or measures constitute the simplification plan announced in October 
2009.  
The DGME identified a lead ministry (or inter-ministerial body as the case may be) and 
prospective head of project for each area of work. The monitoring of progress in each work 
area is part of the overall process of monitoring the RGPP programme. Indeed, the DGME 
published an initial report on the progress made with each of the 15 measures in February 
2010. In the past three years, the government has promoted even further its simplification 
agenda. 450 new simplification measures have already been tabled since the announcement 
in March 2013 of a “simplification shock” by the President of the Republic. The 
Government then introduced 92 new measures on 1st June 2015. These are aimed at 
facilitating everyday life for French people in various sectors: justice, social, administration, 
economy, business and industry. Of these measures, 40 are designed to simplify everyday 
life and procedures for individuals.  
More recently, the Prime Minister has planned, in its circular of January 12, 2018, in 
addition to the establishment by each ministry of a plan for simplification of law and 
procedures in force , that as of the second quarter of 2018 each sectoral bill would include 
a component of measures to simplify legislative standards in the same area of public policy 
and in relation to the purpose of the law. Law No. 2018-1021 of 23 November 2018 on 
the evolution of housing, planning and digital technology is the first piece of legislation to 
have implemented this instruction by the Prime Minister.  In his circular of July 26, 2017 
on controlling the flow of regulatory texts and their impact, the Prime Minister said that 
“The control of the flow of regulatory texts is the first step of a broader simplification 
exercise that is intended to also cover the texts of law. As part of the constitutional reform 
announced by the President of the Republic, it will be up to the Parliament to define the 
terms of a better framework for legislative production”. However, Constitutional Bill 911 
for a more representative, accountable and effective democracy, which was considered by 
the National Assembly on Sunday, July 22, 2018, does not contain any provisions to better 
control normative inflation, but rather to rationalize parliamentary procedure. The Senate 
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has also launched initiatives to simplify laws. On 7 March 2018, it adopted a proposal for 
an organic law aimed at improving the quality of impact assessments of draft laws.  
The Senate has now embarked on a process of repealing old laws on the initiative of its 
mission of legislative simplification, called "mission BALAI” (Bureau d’abrogation des lois 
anciennes inutiles), launched in January 2018 by his Office. On March 13, 2019, the Senate 
passed a bill to improve the readability of the law by repealing obsolete laws, which removes 
49 laws passed between 1819 and 1940 that have become obsolete. The "mission BALAI" 
plans to propose the repeal of other obsolete laws adopted between 1940 and 1970.  
2.1.11 Germany 
Germany has a strategic approach on regulatory cost reduction since 2006. Between 2006 
and 2011 it successfully implemented a reduction target of 25% regarding administrative 
burdens for businesses. With the aid of the Federal Statistical Office, the Federal 
Government conducted a "baseline measurement" of the costs ensuing from statutory 
information obligations for businesses, so as to provide a starting point for verifiable cost 
reductions. The exercise was largely based on the Standard Cost Model, and led to an 
overall estimated burden of around €49 billion a year due to information obligations under 
Federal law. The intention was to reduce these costs noticeably – by 25% (net target), i.e. 
by roughly € 12 billion.  
The National Regulatory Control Council (NKR) was introduced to provide independent 
oversight regarding the respective numbers and figures in the Impact Assessments and to 
support the Government’s efforts to achieve the target. The net reduction target was 
subsequently achieved in 2013, and since then a Bureaucracy Cost Index has been 
maintained, which keeps track of new additions and reduction in regulatory costs. The 
German experience has shown that bureaucracy costs ensuing from information 
obligations account for only a small part of the follow-up costs incurred by Federal 
regulations, and this led to an expansion of the scope of the reduction efforts to cover also 
compliance costs. The “Bureaucracy Reduction and Better Regulation” programme has 
thus been significantly expanded, as has been the mandate of the NKR. All measures (which 
include the OIOO rule described above) are based on a common methodology (regarding 
administrative burdens: SCM, regarding compliance costs: a common methodology, which 
was developed based on the SCM)77.  
Recently, the German government has also experimented with “life events” surveys. So far 
the cost reduction strategy refers only to ex ante assessments. However, in the end, the 
strategic approach of ex post evaluation should lead to further cost reductions as well (when 
legislation is reviewed and revised after the ex post evaluation procedure).  
In Germany a key role is attributed to the NKR, an independent body in charge of 
regulatory scrutiny and oversight, with  
 
77 See also Renda et al. (2013c), for a description.  
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Under the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries, the NKR is incorporated 
into the legislative process. Draft regulations must be submitted to the NKR at the 
beginning of the coordination process within the Federal Government and in practice, 
ministries often involve the NKR at an earlier date. Ahead of the Cabinet vote, during all 
stages of the legislative process the NKR provides informal advice in order to improve the 
ministries’ impact assessments as far as possible. The NKR issues a formal opinion only at 
the end of the process, when Cabinet issues the proposals. The NKR has no formal right 
of veto. The Cabinet, Bundestag and Bundesrat always receive the government drafts 
together with the NKR’s opinions and the NKR reviews draft regulations from the 
Bundesrat when the Bundesrat refers these to the NKR. It comments on draft legislation 
from the floor of the Bundestag only at the request of the parliamentary group or members 
introducing the bill. 
2.1.12 Greece  
In Greece, a project to reduce administrative burdens was launched in cooperation with 
the OECD at the end of 2012. The most burdensome areas (13 economic sectors) were 
identified through desk research, and the search was later narrowed down to the most 
burdensome obligations, accounting for approximately 20% of all burdens. The SCM was 
used to measure the burdens generated by those laws, Measurement results were presented 
in 2014, showing a total 3.28 billion Euros generated by the selected obligations. These 
were followed by 87 recommendations, which were expected to lead to a 25% reduction of 
administrative burdens.  
The Growth strategy launched in 2018 includes major reforms that will have as a result the 
reduction of administrative burdens: these include in particular the setup of an e-One Stop 
Shop (e-OSS) and interoperability between the Taxis and the General Commercial 
Register/GEMI databases. In collaboration with the SRSS, an action plan is being 
prepared, aiming at the quantification and assessment of the administrative processes that 
are most burdensome for companies throughout their lifecycle. The action plan will 
provide a road map for the simplification and digitization (where applicable) of those 
processes, based on the one-stop shop and once only principles. With the new law, business 
licensing is done immediately, with a simple and digital notification in the Integrated 
Information System, while the required inspections take place later on during the operation 
of the business, safeguarding more effectively the public interest. While it previously took 
30 days on average for a business license to be issued, with the adoption of the new law the 
operation of a business can begin immediately after the terms and conditions have been 
disclosed. 
The country does not currently have a burden reduction target. However, according to the 
provisions of the new Law on the “Executive State” (4622/2019), the Government’s annual 
plan drafted by the Presidency of the Government, can set an annual target for reduction 
or rationalization of legislation (par. 2 art.50). 
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2.1.13 Hungary 
In Hungary, the Cutting Red Tape Programme (a coordinated set of measures of the 
Government aimed to reduce administrative burdens for entrepreneurs) started in 2011. 
An ex post evaluation of the programme was completed in 2013, and concluded that the 
target of 25% administrative burden reduction was successfully achieved.78 Subsequently, 
the Government decided to take actions to further reduce burdens. Based on the National 
Competitiveness Council’s suggestion – which was established in the end of 2016 – the 
Government has adopted several amendments to legislation which would make starting a 
business easier. At its meetings in spring 2017 the Council has focused on short term 
regulatory measures with immediate impact on the business environment (“quick wins”), 
identified by using the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey as a benchmarking tool. 
Based on the Council’s recommendations, a number of regulatory amendments were 
passed in the summer of 2017 in the areas of starting business, construction permits, utility 
connection procedures and corporate insolvency. As a result of the National 
Competitiveness Council’s work, in late autumn 2018 the Council accepted the 
“Programme for a more competitive Hungary”, which synthesizes the initiatives from the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry for Innovation and Technology, the Hungarian National 
Bank, and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The programme affects 
several areas, like taxes, employment, education, health, business environment and service 
state, with altogether 42 actions. 
For what concerns the modernization of the state, the objective of the Good Governance 
– Magyary Programme (2010-2014) was to create a simple, efficient and customer friendly 
public administration. Later, the Public Administration and Public Service Development 
Strategy (2014-2020) aimed at building a Service-provider State. The document defines the 
goals to be achieved. According to these goals, a Service-provider State has to be organised, 
cost-efficient, professional and through different measures it has to implement integration, 
bureaucracy reduction and strengthening of the managers. By the year 2019, 306 
Government Windows have been set up all over the country with an average distance of 
14,4 km between them. In 2018, 13 507 900 customers got their 14 616 789 cases 
administered in these one-stop-shop offices.   
 
78 This Programme identified 114 measures in ten intervention areas, among others, taxation and accounting, e-
government, public authority procedures, construction permits and employment. According to an impact 
assessment report – which was presented to government – by the end of 2013, 96 of the 114 measures had been 
implemented (8 were canceled, 10 were still being implemented), resulting in a 211 billion HUF administrative 
burden reduction. The remaining measures were expected to result in an additional 110 billion HUF. Beyond the 
Cutting Red Tape program, an additional 115-130 billion HUF administrative burden reductions were 
implemented in this period through other solutions like tax burden reduction, transparency of rules, amendments 
to the Public Procurement Act, Labour Code, Product Fees Act, OSAP revision, and the introduction of KATA 
(fixed rate tax for small enterprises) and KIVA (small business tax).  
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2.1.14 Ireland 
In Ireland, a programme for the reduction of administrative burden was run between 2008 
and 2012, with a target of 25 per cent reduction of administrative burdens on business by 
2012. The programme ran across seven Government Departments, the Central Statistics 
Office and the Revenue Commissioners. By November 2012 an estimated 18.6 per cent 
overall reduction had been achieved. Since then burden reduction has carried on, where 
appropriate, across the gamut of Government activities but has not been seen as part of a 
single programme. For example, the Companies Act 2014, the Companies (Accounting) 
Act 2017, the eGovernment strategy 2017-2020 and the Data Sharing and Governance Act 
have led to very significant reductions of administrative burdens. In addition, the Central 
Statistics Office’s Response Burden Barometer, which measures the administrative burden 
placed on the Office’s business respondents in line with the preferred method of 
calculation of the European Statistical System, has fallen substantially (41.4 per cent from 
peak to latest). The work of the independent National Competitiveness Council must also 
be noted, as it focuses mostly on improving the business environment in Ireland (Renda 
and Dougherty 2017). 
The overall experience of the Irish government was positive, as it can be argued that it 
helped embed consideration of the need to reduce burdens on business balanced with the 
need for proper protection for, i.a., consumers, employees, the environment, health and 
safety and financial market stability. 
2.1.15 Italy 
Italy adopted the Programme for reducing administrative burdens 2007-2012 to reduce 
administrative burdens on businesses by 25% by 2012. The target was introduced in 2007. 
The review covered 93 high-impact procedures in the following sectors: Labour and 
Welfare, Fire Prevention, Landscape and Cultural Heritage, Environment, Taxes, Privacy, 
Public Procurement, Safety and Health at Work, Constructions. The Government 
achieved and exceeded the 25% reduction target, reducing the administrative burden by 
29%79. The target was specific to business legislation. The 93 high-impact procedures to be 
covered for reduction target were selected also on the basis of stakeholder consultation. 
The target applies to administrative burdens and is set in percentage.  
Targeted simplification measures were adopted to reduce high impact administrative 
burdens. However, Businesses did not perceive sufficient relief as a result of the measures 
adopted. This made it very difficult to communicate the added value of the reduction 
target. 
 
79 See results on: http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/i-risultati-del-programma-di-misurazione-degli-oneri-2007-2012 
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2.1.16 Latvia 
In 2007 Latvia has set the goal to reduce administrative burden on average by 25% of the 
imposed burden in obtaining licenses and permits, VAT, administration of excise duties, 
registration of real estate, employment of labour, receipt of direct and area payments in 
agriculture, etc. areas80. Even if the document came with no precise methodology, it was at 
least partly successful in promoting reform inside the administration. In 2007, the first 
pilot projects to define administrative costs and administrative burdens were launched. 
These studies included an analysis of the existing regulatory framework (ex-post analysis) to 
identify the regulatory reporting obligations. The administrative burden calculation (also 
in monetary terms) has also been carried out within the project "Reducing Administrative 
Burdens for Entrepreneurs in the Latvian-Lithuanian Border Region" (REDBURDEN). 
Projects were carried out by different institutions and there was no single coordinating 
body for them. Contrary to most OECD countries, Latvia has not carried out a large 
programme on ex post measurement of administrative burdens. The Latvian government 
has rather opted for a more qualitative approach based on a sustained and systematic 
dialogue with stakeholders. The approach seems to be delivering tangible results, 
contributing to steadily improving the country’s performance over the past few years. The 
approach is also generally viewed positively by the representatives of the private sector and 
the public administration bodies81. 
The longest standing and arguably most significant initiative undertaken by the 
government to ease doing business in Latvia is the Action Plan for Improvement of the 
Business Environment (the “Action Plan”), elaborated yearly since 1999 by the Ministry of 
Economy in co-operation with stakeholders: the National Economic Council, the Foreign 
Investors Council in Latvia, the Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the 
Employers’ Confederation of Latvia. The Action Plan lists concrete measures aimed at 
eliminating excessive regulatory burdens in all areas related to running a business. Over the 
years, several hundreds of such measures were identified and introduced as a part of the 
plan. The Action Plan currently being implemented, issued in February 2017, includes 46 
measures that fall under the portfolio and responsibilities of several ministries. The 
implementation of the Action Plan and the respect of the targets and deadlines defined 
therein is hence decentralised, with rather soft co-ordination and oversight powers 
entrusted to the Ministry of Economy. In case of significant delays and lack of progress, 
political discussions take place at the ministerial level.  
Reduction of red tape and introduction of electronic services to simplify administrative 
procedures has become a horizontal principle of public administration. Portal 
 
80 Basic guidelines of Public Administration Policy Development 2008.-2013. Available at: http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/documents/2675 
81 To date, ministries have not yet fully deployed quantification methodologies such as the Standard Cost Model (or 
equivalent), grounding their simplification programmes on qualitative assessments and perception surveys. One 
established source of information in this respect is the portal Let’s Share Burden Together!, which offers citizens and 
businesses the opportunity to report excessive administrative burdens and submit proposals for simplification 
(OECD, 2016).  In addition, every other year a business survey, “The Impact of Administrative Procedures on 
Business Environment” is conducted to collect inputs from the stakeholders on perceived barriers to doing business 
and on trends further to the simplification agenda. 
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www.latvija.lv offers 718 e-services and 408282 descriptions of public services. Separately the 
electronic declaration system of State Revenue service provides possibility to submit all 
relevant declarations via Internet. Already 56% of all public services were requested and 
granted online and most probably that is the reason why the complexity of administrative 
procedure is not regarded as a problem for doing business in Latvia, although burden of 
government regulations is high. Noteworthy is also the Public Administration Reform Plan 
2020, Priority 8, which seeks to leverage better regulation policy and strengthen efficiency 
and effectiveness audits to minimise administrative burdens.  
In summary, Latvia does not operate a burden reduction target, but is extremely active in 
seeking the reduction of administrative burdens through targeted actions and leveraging 
the potential of digital technologies.  
2.1.17 Lithuania 
Lithuania had a cost reduction target in 2011, after revising administrative burden on 
business. It was planned to reduce administrative burdens for business by 30% in particular 
areas (taxation, statistics, environment etc). The goal was not reached, probably because the 
agencies were not well prepared and did not realise the importance of improving the 
regulation. Among positive results, the administration increased the quality of the ex ante 
impact assessments, for instance the level of quantification, to capture the amount of costs 
to be reduced.  
In summary, Lithuania does not have a burden reduction target. Its past experience was 
not very positive. However, as mentioned above, it operates a zero-growth policy, which 
equates to a OIOO rule.  
2.1.18 Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg, a 2009-14 plan set a national target for reducing administrative burdens 
by 15% by 2012 in four priority areas, social security, municipal development planning, 
environment and taxation. The choice of fields was based in part on a 2006 business survey, 
and the target has been set at what is considered a feasible level. Cutting red tape is the 
responsibility of the Committee for Administrative Simplification (Comité à la 
simplification administrative, CSA), which was established in 2004. This committee 
comprises representatives of public administrations and employers' organisations and 
meets once a month. The presence of business representatives on the CSA has allowed for 
active co-operation by businesses in the work of administrative simplification.  
Previously, simplification efforts focused solely on businesses, but in the period 2009-2014 
the plan was extended to citizens and administrations. An inter-ministerial platform for 
administrative reform and simplification (Platforme Interministérielle de Réforme et de 
 
82 Available at: http://polsis.mk.gov.lv/documents/6483 
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Simplification Administrative) was created in 2014, and focuses on simplification and 
streamlining of administrative procedures; it is chaired by the Minister for Civil Service 
and Administrative Reform, and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. One of the 
relevant legislative actions was an 'omnibus bill' that modified 33 clauses, which aimed to 
reduce administrative burdens in the areas of regional development, town and country 
planning, establishing licenses for industrial sites, environmental law, and housing. The 
original preparatory work involved different ministerial departments and stakeholders, as 
well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acting in these specific areas. 
In summary, Luxembourg has had sectoral reduction targets in the past, but currently does 
not operate any such targets. 
2.1.19 Malta 
Malta has launched a programme to reduce administrative burdens in 2006, and in 2008 
the government published a plan to reduce administrative burdens, committing itself to 
reducing administrative burden on businesses by 15% by 2012 as measured using the 
Standard Cost Model methodology. The target was exceeded; in fact, 62 initiatives realised 
15.6% administrative cost savings (equivalent to 18 million Euros yearly savings, liberating 
more than 640,000 man-hours every year). 
The Budget Speech 2018 included a reference to measurable targets in Section 6.9.: “the 
simplification and mitigation of unnecessary bureaucracy are important in sustaining the 
economic growth rhythm of our country. While substantial progress has been achieved, we 
are committed to reduce bureaucracy by a further 30 per cent during this legislature.”83   
2.1.20 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands were the pioneer in launching an administrative burdens reduction 
programme, following early pilot programmes such as MISTRAL. The country has had a 
reduction target since 199484. During the first years, the target was aimed at reducing 
administrative burdens for businesses only. Since 2000 there is a common methodology, 
external scrutiny and a network within all departments. Between 2003 and 2007, as will be 
described in more detail in the next Section below, the Dutch government launched a 
programme for the reduction of administrative burdens for Business. The government 
promised the parliament to reduce administrative burdens by 25% in the period 2003-
2007; as part of this project, not all legislation was reviewed, but it still qualifies as a 'major 
review'. In 2007 the approach introduced the need for perceivable effects and better services 
for citizens/businesses. A covenant was for instance agreed with municipalities to lower the 
 
83 https://mfin.gov.mt/en/The-Budget/Documents/The_Budget_2018/Budget_speech_English_2018.pdf, pgs. 65-66. 
84 In the years before, there was also a project to reduce the admin burdens – but there was no target. 
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burden with 25% for citizens. Also, the inspections established a reduction target (which 
no longer exists though).  
The Cabinet developed a better regulation strategy built around six cornerstones: less 
regulatory burden by improving the quality of legislation (i.e. internet consultation, role of 
Actal); a structural net reduction of 2.5 billion Euros for businesses, professionals and 
citizens by 2017 compared to 2012 levels; a perceivable reduction with a sector-specific 
approach; smarter and more effective enforcement; less regulatory burden through 
cooperation with municipalities and the EU level; and better (digital) services.  
Importantly, the current net reduction target for the Netherlands goes beyond that of many 
other Member States in a number of respects: it covers both administrative burdens, 
substantive compliance costs (which according to Dutch definition include information 
obligations to third parties) and inspection/enforcement costs; it covers both primary and 
secondary legislation; it envisages both a general plan and sector-specific “deep dives”85; 
it relies on a well-established independent oversight body; it covers administrative burden 
stemming from the implementation of EU directives; and it sometimes also covers 
amendments presented by Parliament.  
The targets introduced a strong “disciplining effect” on the administration and greater 
sensitivity for the topic of regulatory policy. The main criticism was the lack of 
noticeability of the reductions achieved. Besides, energy in the administration was more 
focussed on achieving the target rather than making a real noticeable difference for 
businesses with measures that matter. It became a “book-keeping exercise”, with measures 
that looked good on paper but were not necessarily noticed by businesses and recognized 
as important. 
2.1.21 Poland 
Poland has launched a burden reduction exercise in 2008, when the government 
established the general target of reducing administrative burdens for businesses by 25% 
within 3 years. The government added a focus on seven chosen areas of economic law: 
environment, land development plan, economic activity law, social security, hallmarking 
law, tourist services, and employment law. However, the target has not been achieved (the 
estimated reduction was 15.95%). In 2010 a baseline measurement was carried out, which 
identifying administrative burden as reaching 2,9% of GDP. Since then, administrative 
burdens identified in the analysis have been gradually eliminated.  
Reduction of regulatory burdens (not only administrative ones) for business but also for 
citizens remains one of the priorities. In particular, a Strategy for Innovation and Efficiency 
of the Economy was established in 2012 which included cost reduction targets – 1% of 
 
85 With the sector-specific approach special attention for reduction is given to the following sectors: Logistics, Chemical 
sector, Agrofood, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, Financial sector, Construction, Care and Cure in the health 
sector, Recreational sector/tourism, Craft shops, Child care, Metal industry, Volunteers, Police, Judicial system, 
Education (aimed at professionals), Public transport for people with a handicap. 
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GDP till 2015 (0,72% achieved) and 1,5% of GDP till 2020. The simplification of 
economic law and regulatory burden reduction were also included in the Responsible 
Development Strategy launched in 2017 for the perspective up to 2030. Today, burden 
reduction is mostly relying on dedicate legislative instruments, such as yearly deregulation 
acts developed by the Ministry competent for economic affairs in close cooperation with 
entrepreneurs and business organisation representatives. 
Recently, in 2018, an ambitious “Constitution for Business” package was launched, along 
with a “100 changes for enterprises” proposal. The “100 changes” aim at abolishing the 
most burdensome regulations which are barriers to conducting business, and is estimated 
to potentially bring saving opportunities for entrepreneurs of around PLN 230 million per 
year (approx. 53 million euros). Within the package “Constitution for Business”, the 
Entrepreneurs’ Law Act of 6 March 2018 introduced the obligation for all Ministries to 
yearly evaluation of adopted law having impact on business in order to reduce 
administrative burdens with focus on SMEs. The need to minimize the regulatory burdens 
when drafting new economic law has also been emphasized in the Entrepreneurs’ Law Act. 
2.1.22 Portugal 
In Portugal, since 2006 the Government launched a series of ongoing reforms known as 
the annual Simplex programme, with the aim to make everyday life easier for individual 
citizens and businesses by reducing bureaucratic red tape, cutting costs, and extending the 
use of information and Communication Technologies to a wide range of public services. 
Until 2010, 757 initiatives were promoted, 80 per cent of which have been fully 
implemented. These initiatives were proposed by civil servants, businesses, professional 
associations and ordinary citizens, and consequently they address a wide range of issues 
across the board in terms of both central and local government. In general the aims of the 
programme are to simplify laws and procedures; maximise the number of procedures that 
can be done online; reduce the amount of certification; consolidate existing legal rules; and 
facilitate access to public services. Since then, the emphasis on administrative burdens has 
led to new initiatives. In line with the Action Programme for Reducing Administrative 
Burdens in the EU, Portugal launched a strategy in 2008 to reduce 25% of administrative 
burdens for businesses until 2012 (RCM 196/2008). The inventory is now being expanded 
to citizens via public consultation (along the ‘red tape challenge’ model adopted in the UK, 
see below). Parliament Resolution 31/2014, in introducing Simplificar, a programme of 
administrative modernisation and simplification, also introduced a “one-in, one-out” 
principle as part of the system for administrative burden control. Simplificar follows three 
main principles: (i) Ask only once; (ii) digital by default; and (iii) One-In, One-Out, where 
every euro of costs created by new legislation or rules, must be compensated by the 
reduction of one Euro in other costs generated by the same or other pieces of legislation.  
Finally, ten years after the SIMPLEX programme, a new SIMPLEX+ Programme was 
launched and is now under implementation, with 255 projects to deal with both 
administrative and legislative simplification. Within the new programme, a Technical Unit 
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for Regulatory Impact Assessment (UTAIL) has been recently created (RCM 44/2017) 
within the Legal Centre of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (CEJUR) to 
implement a specific project named “How much does it cost?” (focused on primary 
legislation). UTAIL is responsible for the impact assessment of proposed new legislative 
acts: notably, since the beginning of 2017 UTAIL is assessing, besides the administrative 
burdens that may result from legislative acts proposals, also other compliance costs for 
firms: direct costs (with fees and other public charges); specific costs with equipment, 
implementation, external services, material and other that may be directed related to the 
obligation that is being imposed; and nonspecific costs, as overheads. 
2.1.23 Romania 
Romania has had a better regulation strategy since 2008, and the current strategy runs until 
2020. The “Strategy for better regulation at central government level, 2008 – 2013” 
comprised, as priorities on medium term, “preliminary analysis of the issue of 
administrative burden, development of a general methodology to assess the administrative 
costs and to elaborate a concrete action plan in order to implement the Standard 
Administrative Cost Model”. The current strategy foresees the creation of an inventory of 
administrative burdens, but implementation is still ongoing.  
2.1.24 Slovakia 
Slovakia has launched a burden reduction programme in three main phases. The first phase 
in 2009 focused on 12 policy areas: commercial law, civil law, accounting, bankruptcy and 
restructuring, market regulation, taxes, duties and fees, regulation of investment incentives, 
other financial regulations, labour and employment, levies, environment, intellectual 
property. 54 recommendations were identified to change the legislation. 
Recommendations focused on electronic reporting and communication with authorities, 
decreasing the frequency of reporting, keeping of electronic evidence, produce manuals etc.  
The second phase (2010-2012) mostly dealt with Occupational Safety and Health 
Protection Act and its implementing regulations. 165 information obligations (from 12 
law) were measured and 18 recommendations were defined. Recommendations focused of 
on digitisation of services, exceptions to the obligations, simplifications of forms, analysing 
the needs of specific obligations etc. An economy-wide review of administrative burdens 
(third phase) was later launched in 2013-2014. 282 legal instruments were deeply analysed, 
4566 information obligations were identified, 2.7 billion Euros calculated as total 
administrative costs for business of which 10% is the estimated administrative burden86.  
The Slovak Government, since the latest parliamentary elections in 2016, approved three 
packages of measures, in total 94 measures. The 1st one in June 2017 with 35 measures; 
 
86 http://www.mhsr.sk/informacia-o-vysledkoch-merania-administrativnych-nakladov-podnikania/144171s 
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the 2nd one in May 2018 with 23 measures and 5 analyses; and the 3rd one in February 
2019 with 36 measures. Reduction of regulatory burden on business and improvement of 
business environment related to those measures represents estimated annual savings of 
almost 95 mil. Euros. As there is a very positive response from the business environment 
the Ministry of Economy is currently preparing a 4th package. It is expected to be submitted 
to the Government of the SR in January 2020. The packages of measures are one of the 
tools for bridging the period into a complete reform of regulation, which is planned from 
2020 within the implementation of RIA 2020 Strategy of Better Regulation. 
By implementing the RIA 2020 - Strategy of Better Regulation, the Slovak government 
anticipates and plans to reduce regulatory costs and administrative burdens. Based on the 
RIA 2020 Strategy and the subsequent national project Improvement of Business 
Environment in Slovakia and Assessment of Policies in Competence of Ministry of 
Economy, the Ministry is currently developing a methodology for ex post evaluation of 
existing regulation. Together with the results from pilot projects, planned to be carried out 
at ministries and other governmental bodies responsible for regulation drafting, the 
methodology will be completed by the end of 2020.  
The Slovak government considers its experience with reduction targets to be positive. The 
administration increased the quality of the ex ante impact assessments, for instance the 
level of quantification, to capture the amount of costs to be reduced. 
2.1.25 Slovenia 
In Slovenia since 2009 a programme “Minus 25%” for the reduction of administrative 
burdens was carried out and reduction target was fully met (27 % reduction achieved by 
the end of 2015). By using the SCM Methodology, the administrative costs were measured 
in 3,529 different regulations and as a result of this process, over 5,000 information 
obligation and more than 16,000 administrative activities were identified, amounting 
together 1.5 billion EUR administrative burdens per year. This remarkable figure led the 
Government to set an objective of reducing the cost of existing administrative burdens by 
25 % (EUR 365 million per year) by the end of 2015. The analyses showed that greater 
emphasis regarding the burden reduction will have to be put on the area of environment 
and spatial planning, labour legislation, cohesion (drawing on European funds), finance 
(including taxes and excise duties), the economy (including status related legal affairs, and 
business or financial reports), and taxes and other duties. At the same time, it was 
confirmed by Strategic Council to avoid creating new administrative burdens unless 
absolutely necessary. In the same year National Assembly adopted a Resolution on 
legislative regulation that represented a political commitment from the incumbent 
government to respect the principles of better regulation during the process of policy-
making in a particular field or during the process of drafting new regulations, and to involve 
the public and relevant stakeholders into the procedures of participation when adopting 
new regulations. 
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In October 2013 the Government of the Republic of Slovenia adopted a Single document 
to ensure better review over realization of burden reduction for business environment, 
better regulation and increase competitiveness. In the same year there were added in the 
Single document  245 concrete measures in 16 different fields in line with ministries that 
are responsible for the implementation, follows the commitments taken by the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia in the national reform programme from 2013 to 
2015 and constitutes the basis for long-term strategies (such as Slovenia's Development 
Strategy, Europe 2020 strategy) and the implementation of programmes planned by the 
Government and the competent Ministries87. In 2014 website which contained content 
from “Single document” was created. It has provided a one-stop shop approach enabling 
users to gain an overview of all measures and insight into the current stages of 
implementation of measures to improve the regulatory and business environment. The 
“Single document” is still a living mechanism, with new measures aimed at removing 
administrative burdens based on proposals by stakeholders, the expert public and different 
chambers for business being added periodically. The responsibility for the realisation of 
individual measures is clearly defined taking into account the content of an individual line 
ministry. The deadlines for the implementation of these measures are also clearly defined. 
To realise the objectives of adopted action programmes in relation to the Single document, 
a suitable mechanism for coordinating regulations, and a dialogue at the level of the inter-
ministerial working group have been established. Individual members of the working 
groups report about the realisation to the Ministry of Public Administration as the 
coordinator, which then submits the report to the Government for discussion onceper year. 
The realisation of the measures is published on the websites of the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia and at the STOP the Bureaucracy website88.  
In April 2015, the government launched a new Public Administration Development 
Strategy 2015–2020, which contains a further reduction target, i.e. to reduce burdens by 
a further 5% annually. At the same time, more attention must be paid to overregulation 
and increased EU standards (gold-plating), and the (non)use of exceptions or reduced 
burdening of a certain section of the population – the introduction of the “introduce or 
explain” approach.  
Slovenia considers its experience with reduction targets to be positive. The administration 
increased the quality of the ex ante impact assessments, for instance the level of 
quantification, to capture the amount of costs to be reduced. Since January 2017, the “SME 
test”89 has been mandatory, whether laws are drafted using the regular or shortened 
procedure. Since 2018, web-based tool “SME test” has been available on the eDemokracija 
 
87 https://www.stopbirokraciji.gov.si/en/home/ 
88 https://www.stopbirokraciji.gov.si/en/home/  
 
89 An inter-ministerial working group was established in 2014, which will focus on the introduction of impact assessments 
on the economy using the SME test in 2015, and prepare and introduce other assessments in all fields by 2020. The 
supervisory authority for assessing impacts on the economy will be the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Technology, and the supervisory authority for assessing impacts on other fields will be line ministries responsible for 
those fields. 
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(e-Democracy) website, allowing SMEs, their representatives and other stakeholders to 
respond to the impact assessments, make comments during public consultation and 
prepare their own SME tests. 
2.1.26 Sweden 
In Sweden, between 2006 and 2012 there was a dedicated strategy with ex post evaluation 
on administrative burdens for businesses which included a baseline measurement. There 
was a net reduction target of these costs by 25% within that time frame, but the result was 
only a reduction by 7%. Today, there is a general commitment to reduce the cost of 
regulation. Regarding the ongoing administrative costs for businesses (the SCM with ex 
ante assessment is used), there is a net target that the administrative costs for businesses 
should be lower in the year 2020 than in 2012.90 Other types of costs for businesses 
(investment, compliance, indirect cost and financial costs such as taxes and fees) are also 
measured since 2016 but no deadline has been set regarding the reduction of these costs. 
However, the method is not yet fully complete for all of the cost categories.  
An important role is played by the Swedish Better Regulation Council, an independent 
government-appointed committee of inquiry that assess the quality of the impact 
assessments of proposals for new and amended regulations that may have effects on the 
working conditions of enterprises, their competitiveness or other conditions affecting 
them. Except for the outlined general target for 2020, Sweden does not have a nominal or 
percentage target for reducing regulatory costs, and seems particularly focused on achieving 
significant burden reductions through an ambitious digital government agenda. Since 
2009, Sweden has a website (verksamt.se), which simplifies the process of starting and 
developing a business by providing information and e-services. The website is the result of 
a collaboration between different government agencies. Since 2018 Sweden has a new 
agency called the Agency for Digital Government, which will serve as a hub for 
digitalisation of the public sector and to achieve more transparent governance. 
Furthermore, The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, a government 
agency under the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation that reports to the Government 
Offices, is (among other things) tasked with collecting and dealing with suggestions on 
administrative burden reduction from businesses. For example, the agency maps ‘customer 
journeys’ to gather insights into the needs of businesses when developing new digital 
services. Using insights from such customer journeys, the agency has, in collaboration with 
other government agencies, brought forward a proposal concerning the development of an 
ecosystem for businesses’ contacts with government, regional and local authorities. The 
main benefit of the ecosystem is simpler regulatory compliance by making the once-only-
principle possible and through connected processes between government agencies. 
 
90 This net target is interpreted as a “loose” OIOO rule within this study, see Chapter 1.1.12. 
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2.1.27 Spain 
In 2008, Spain launched a National Plan for administrative burden reduction, with a target 
of achieving a 30% reduction until 2012. The target was achieved. No further target has 
been set after that experience. However, building on this achievement and on the Royal 
Decree on RIA (1083/2009, 3 July), which established a simplified methodology for 
administrative burden measurement and reduction, the new report for the modernization 
of public administration (CORA Report) relaunched the need for administrative burdens 
reduction. A CORA report proposed a series of reforms to simplify the normative 
framework for business: these included the adoption of a OIOO rule, which is detailed 
above, Section 1.1.11). 
2.1.28 The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom had a partly successful experience with the baseline measurement of 
administrative burdens in 2005-2006, which came with an initial 25% reduction target. 
The Better Regulation Task Force calculated that adopting the SCM for measuring 
administrative burdens and then targeting a 25% cut in such burdens over four years could 
reduce direct regulatory costs on businesses by £7.5 billion, yielding a £16 billion increase 
in the UK GDP in the medium term.  
In 2010, an independent body, the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), was set up to 
validate the costs and benefits of all new regulatory and de-regulatory proposals. Over the 
2011-12 period, government departments removed around £963 million more in business 
burdens than they introduced, in full compliance with the OIOO rule91. In the following 
years, along with the implementation of OIXO rules (see Section 1.5.2 above), a nominal 
reduction target for regulatory burdens of £10 billion was introduced in the last Parliament, 
reflecting the lessons learned in several years of setting and implementing cost reduction 
strategies92. Both the scope and metric for the BIT are set out within the Written Ministerial 
Statement on better regulation made on 20 June 2018. The end of Parliament Report was 
published on 5 November 201993.  
2.2 Non-EU OECD countries 
A quick overview of non-EU OECD countries reveals that sectoral or overall reduction 
targets are increasingly used. For example:  
 
91 This figure is based on independent validation by the Regulatory Policy Committee. 
92 The independent Regulatory Policy Committee publishes its Opinion on all ex ante assessments, including whether it 
has validated 'One-in, Two-out' measures from departments. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/regulatory-
policy-committee-opinions-on-impact-assessments 
93  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/business-impact-target-bit-report-2017-to-2019 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 84 of 143 
In Norway, for the last two decades all governments have had better regulation strategies. 
From 2011, a concrete regulatory cost reduction strategy was adopted. The current 
government, in office from October 2013, strengthened this strategy by setting a more 
ambitious goal. The goal to reduce the cost of annual administrative burdens by 15 billion 
NOK (25%) for the period 2011–2017 was achieved. The current goal for the period 2018–
2021 is to further reduce the cost of annual administrative burdens by 10 billion NOK. 
Simpler rules for accounting and bookkeeping (reporting duties and documentation), and 
for the governance of limited companies are prominent examples of recent regulation 
simplifications. In addition, digital reporting solutions through the virtual one-stop shop 
Altinn has made life easier for business and citizens. A simplification project was in 2012 
initiated by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries in order to keep track of 
implemented simplifications in current regulations and the associated gains. The 
Simplification Project uses, in general a simplified standard cost model when evaluating 
cost reductions. In order to hamper unnecessary burdens from new regulation, a dedicated 
independent oversight body, the Norwegian Better Regulation Council (NBRC) was set up 
in December 2015 and became a member of RegWatchEurope the year after. The focus is 
essentially on businesses and the NBRC is required to consider all relevant costs for 
business in their assessments. In 2016, the guide lines Instructions for Official Studies was 
revised.94 An important goal for the revision was to clarify the requirements to consider all 
relevant benefits and costs for all stakeholders associated with substantial new measures; a 
proportionality principle states that mapping of benefits and costs depends on the 
importance of the measure95.  
In Australia, in September 2013 a deregulation agenda was launched by the Australian 
government, which sought to reduce the costs of red tape by $1 billion in net terms per 
year: however, this agenda reportedly had limited effect on the business operating 
environment. Under the Deregulation Agenda, the total estimated compliance and delay 
costs on individuals, businesses and community organizations from proposed regulatory 
changes—whether it be new regulation, amendments or removal of existing regulation—
were to be quantified. Government portfolios were also assigned an annual red tape 
reduction (savings) target by Ministers. The combined total of the portfolio targets set in 
both 2014 and 2015 significantly exceeded the annual target of $1 billion. By the end of 
2015, the Government publicly announced measures to deliver estimated total net savings 
of $4.80 billion. Prime Minister Abbott pledged to remove more than 9,500 regulations, 
saving Australians more than $700 million annually. The Prime Minister has committed 
to holding at least two Repeal Days each year and has formed deregulation units within 
 
94 See https://dfo.no/filer/Fagområder/Utredningsinstruksen/Guidance_Notes_on_the_Instructions_for_Official_Studies.pdf.  
95 The minimum requirements applicable to all studies are to answer the following six questions: 1. What is the problem, 
and what do we want to achieve? 2. Which measures are relevant? 3. Which fundamental questions are raised by the 
measures? 4. What are the positive and negative effects of the measures, how permanent are these, and who will be 
affected? 5. Which measure is recommended, and why? 6. What are the prerequisites for successful implementation? 
From a better regulation perspective, the new minimum requirements seem to have had a positive effect, so far. 
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each regulatory portfolio, noting, “It’s sometimes more important to repeal old laws than 
to pass new ones.”96  
 
 
Figure 7 – Three and a half decades of deregulation in Australia 
 
Source: Douglas (2018) 
 
As already recalled, in the United States specific target regulatory cost savings are set for 
each Federal Regulatory Agency for every fiscal year by the Office of Management and 
Budget. The application of EO 13771 led to a dramatic reduction in new rulemaking. In 
the first 18 months of the Trump Administration, OIRA reviewed 70% fewer regulatory 
actions in the Trump Administration than in the Obama Administration and 66% fewer 
than in the Bush Administration. The Federal Register, as observed by Dudley (2019), 
printed 20,000 fewer pages in 2017 and 2018 than it did during President Obama’s first 
two years. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data show that executive branch 
agencies, over whom the president arguably has more control, have issued less than half as 
many major regulations as they had at this point in the Obama administration. Trump’s 
executive agencies issued 57 major regulations, compared to 127 and 71 during the first 
two years of the Obama and Bush administrations97. According to Coolidge (2019), The 
OIXO initiative “caused” this precipitous drop in new rules. 
 
 
96 Australian National Audit Office (2016); See also Bennett & Dudley (2014), Australia’s Regulatory Bonfire, Regulation, 
Fall 2014, pages 14-15.  
97 See Coolidge, at http://yalejreg.com/nc/my-talk-at-regulatory-change-the-trump-administrative-state/ 
Box 1: Commonwealth Government deregulation milestones 
 
• 1978 — Inquiry into Unnecessary Paperwork (Lynch, 1978) 
• 1980 — Comprehensive Review of Paperwork by all Commonwealth Departments and authorities (Department of Industry and Commerce, 1980) 
• 1985 — Business Regulation Review Unit established and Regulation Impact Statements (RISs) first mandated 
• 1994 — Legislative Instruments Bill 1994 introduced — would have mandated RISs and automatic sunsetting of legislative instruments after five years 
• 1996 — Time for Business (Small Business Deregulation Task Force 1996) recommended that regulatory gate keeping be strengthened 
• 1997 — More time for business (Howard 1996) mandated RISs and sunsetting of subordinate legislation 
• 2003 — Legislative Instruments Act 2003 — mandated registration and sunsetting of Commonwealth delegated legislation, typically after 10 years 
• 2006 — Rethinking Regulation report (Regulation Taskforce 2006) — 178 specific recommendations, including stronger RIS requirements, regulator 
performance measurement and sunsetting of subordinate legislation after five years 
• 2010 — Regulatory Impact Assessment framework strengthened and new Best Practice Regulation Handbook published 
• 2012 — Independent Review of the Australian Government’s Regulatory Impact Analysis Process (Borthwick and Milliner, 2012) 
• 2103 — Mandatory RISs for all Cabinet submissions, regulatory costings and offsets, $1 billion annual deregulation target 
• 2014 — Semi-annual Parliamentary Repeal Days, regulatory audit, updated regulator performance measurement and reporting (Abbott 2014) 
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Figure 8 – EO13771: savings targets and savings achieved 
 
 
Source: OIRA 
 
The White House has recently reported that agencies have accelerated the pace of 
regulatory reform in fiscal year 2018, eliminating $23 billion in overall regulatory costs 
across the government. As already recalled, agencies issued 176 deregulatory actions, of 
which 57 actions were significant. In fiscal year 2019, agencies anticipate saving a total of 
$18 billion in regulatory costs from final rulemakings. This does not include one of the 
most significant deregulatory rules anticipated in fiscal year 2019, “The Safer Affordable 
Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light 
Trucks”, which the proposed rule estimates will save between $120 and $340 billion in 
regulatory costs. OIRA did not include this rule in its regulatory budget, however, due to 
the unique size of its savings estimate98.  
The overwhelmingly largest component of the upcoming deregulation is the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) expected repeal of the “Clean Power Plan,” 
with $51.6 billion in currently estimated total “avoided costs.” Other rules with notable 
cost reductions include a pair of significant rules also affecting energy production as well 
as the first stage of the administration’s reconsideration of the “Water of the United States” 
rule. In terms of the estimated $10.4 billion in potential new costs, it is important to note 
that the vast majority (11 out of the 13) had their proposed version published under the 
Obama Administration. Thus, while agencies still intend to finalize them per the Unified 
 
98 https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/a-mid-fiscal-year-review-and-projection-of-the-regulatory-
budget/#ixzz5lqRXNPfK 
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Agenda, the new administration may make significant changes that substantially alter the 
final total. However, looking at regulatory and deregulatory initiatives published as of April 
5, 2019, it looks like the goal is going to be very hard to achieve.  
 
Table 5 – 2019 regulatory budget goals and actual savings as of April 2019, United States 
Agency FY2019 Budget 
(Costs/Savings $millions) 
Year to Date ($millions) Difference ($millions) 
HHS -8,995.6 -3,003.8 -5,991.8 
Education -3,173.0 0.0 -3,173.0 
DOT -1,869.5 -2,170.1 300.6 
USDA -981.3 5,485.4 -6,466.7 
EPA -817.8 567.2 -1,385.0 
Interior -793.6 0.0 -793.6 
Labor -723.2 -71.8 -651.4 
HUD -490.7 -30.0 -460.7 
Commerce -51.2 0.0 -51.2 
SBA -8.8 0.0 -8.8 
Treasury 0.0 9,653.2 -9,653.2 
Justice 0.0 312.1 -312.1 
Defense 0.0 1.8 -1.8 
EEOC 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FAR 0.0 0.0 0.0 
GSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NASA 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OMB 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OPM 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 
State 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USAID 0.0 0.0 0.0 
VA 0.0 -5.2 5.2 
Energy 0.0 -37.5 37.5 
DHS 0.0 -568.0 568.0 
Total -17,904.8 10,133.3 -28,038.0 
Source: American Action Forum (2019) 
 
Moreover, Mexico, based on the guidelines set out in the PND 2013-2018, set the objective 
of reducing the regulatory burden of federal procedures and services by 25%. At the 
beginning of this administration it was estimated that the cost of compliance with federal 
procedures and services was equivalent to 4.25% of the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") 
of the country, so that meeting the target would reduce it to 3.15% of GDP. As of today, 
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thanks to the application and monitoring of Regulatory Improvement Programs promoted 
by CONAMER, Mexico reached and exceeded the goal, positioning the indicator at 2.47% 
of GDP, which implies economic benefits for companies and citizens of over 210,449 
million pesos, through more agile and simple federal procedures99. 
2.3 Summary and comparison of national experiences 
Overall, the international experience, and in particular that of EU Member States, suggests 
that setting and implementing a cost reduction strategy is possible, although its success 
requires strong political commitment and an adequate governance, methodology and 
resources. In addition, the main findings of our international comparison include the 
following: 
• Many EU Member States still focus essentially on administrative burdens, although there is a 
clear tendency towards extending the cost reduction efforts towards broader categories, such as 
substantive compliance costs or more generally regulatory costs.  
• All countries focus on direct costs, mostly for businesses, and only one country (the UK) 
includes some notion of benefit (in particular, in the form of business revenues) in the 
implementation of a net reduction mechanism. 
• There is a degree of divergence in the terminology and methodology used to measure regulatory 
costs: for example, the definition of compliance costs in the Netherlands does not 
coincide with the one used in Germany. On the other hand, the definition of 
administrative burdens is more standardized (although, for example, third party 
administrative burdens are not defined in the same way everywhere, and parameters 
such as overheads, BAU factor, etc. can diverge across countries).  
• There seem to be at least four emerging approaches to cost reduction strategies: (i) standard, 
SCM-based administrative burden reduction; (ii) “life events”-based surveys and 
reduction strategies; (iii) extension to compliance costs coupled with net reduction 
targets; and (iv) extension to compliance costs coupled with a “one in, x out” rule.   
The international experience is very rich and diverse, but some common traits can be 
found. As shown in a recent report by the Japanese government (see figure below), many 
of the governments that apply an OIXO rule today have started with an application of the 
SCM to carry out baseline measurements in the past. One notable exception is France, 
where a simpler approach based on “life events” was introduced since 2007. Such approach 
is adopted in Portugal since 2004,100 and was later adopted also in other countries, notably 
in Germany (together with many other initiatives).  
 
99 https://conamer.gob.mx/docs-bin/IAD/Informe_Anual_2018.pdf 
100 In Portugal, in the second edition of Simplex Programme, 2007, all simplification initiatives were organized in life 
events.  
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Table 6 below summarises our findings for all EU and non-EU OECD countries covered 
by this Report. As shown, the international landscape portrays an extremely rich and 
diverse set of experiences, which will form the basis for our discussion of a possible system 
at the EU level in Section 3 below.  
Table 6 – Summary table for EU countries and non-EU OECD-Countries 
  SCM Targets OIXO Scope (costs) Scope (law) Scope 
(regulated 
entities) 
Experience 
Austria 2006, leading to results in 
2012. 
25% was reached by 2012. 
Currently no target in place.  
OIOO foreseen 
in the 
Deregulation 
Act 2017.  
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Federal 
legislation 
Citizens and 
businesses 
n.a. 
Belgium KAFKA (similar to SCM) in 
2004. Measurement in 2002-
2006 and 2007-2012 with 
25% reduction targets 
The SME plan in 2015 set the goal 
of 30% savings for companies. 
No Administrative 
burdens 
  Businesses    
Bulgaria Since 2009, three plans.  A 20% reduction target was 
achieved in 2012 and 2014. A 26% 
of the planned 30% reduction target 
was achieved in 2018.. Currently no 
target. 
No Administrative 
burdens 
  Businesses    
Croatia First pilots in 2015, a new 
project started in 2017. 
Current goal to reduce 
administrative burdens by 2021 is 
21%. 
No Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
Cyprus First project in 2009-2012.  Goal to achieve 20% reduction in 
admin burdens by end 2012. 19% 
was achieved. Since then, sectoral 
targets were introduced - eg in 
Tourism. 25% target set in 2015. 
Currently no target. 
No Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
Czech 
Republic 
SCM since 2005. In 2013-
2016, 85 measures were 
implemented and in 2016, the 
Ministry of Industry and 
Trade measured the burden 
on entrepreneurs, finding a 
31.49% reduction compared 
to 2005. Then new long-term 
goals were set to reduce 
the burden by 2020 and carry 
After the measurement and 
remeasurement of administrative 
burdens, currently no target is in 
place. Specific measures are 
implemented.  
No Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 91 of 143 
out another 
measurement in 2021. 
Denmark 2004-2010, leading to a 24.6% 
decrease. 
No current target. The previous 
government’s reduction target of 4 
billion DKK in 2020 and 
additionally 2 billion DKK in 2025 
compared to 2015 has been 
discontinued by the new 
government appointed this summer 
2015 OIOO as 
part of the 
burden stop on 
business 
regulation 
(discontinued 
by the new 
government 
appointed this 
summer)  
Previous 
system: 
Administrative 
burdens, 
Compliance 
costs, indirect 
costs (accounts 
for benefits) 
Previous 
system: 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation (but 
not 
independent 
agencies) 
Previous 
system: 
Businesses 
Previous system: 
administrations 
reportedly became 
more attentive to costs. 
Greece Yes, with OECD in 2012. 25% reduction of administrative 
burdens: results presented in 2014. 
No  Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
Estonia Since 2009, focused on four 
areas.  
No current target, but rather a zero-
bureaucracy plan. 
No     Businesses and 
citizens 
  
Finland 2008-2012, aimed at a 25% 
reduction. 
No current target. OIOO - Pilot 
test in 2017, 
applied in two 
ministries and 
including also 
major 
compliance 
costs. Pilot 
continuing in 
one ministry 
after 2017. 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
Primary 
legislation 
(pilot) 
Businesses Positive so far (still 
pilot) 
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France 2004 first attempt. Then 
moved to life events. 
No current target. Since 2015 
OIOO. Then 
OI2O in 2017 
with President 
Macron. 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
National 
regulations, 
decrees and 
circulars 
Businesses, 
Local 
Administration 
and services, 
Citizens 
First tests did not 
achieve the desired 
results. The 
government decided to 
move to an OI2O for 
this reason 
Germany 2006-2012, leading to a 25% 
reduction 
Since 2006. Net target achieved in 
2012. Since then a Bureaucracy Cost 
Index is maintained.  
Since 2015 
OIOO. Limited 
to costs for 
businesses. 
Offsets within a 
year's time.   
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs (only 
ongoing costs, 
not one-off 
costs) 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses Positive: 
administrations became 
more attentive to costs 
Hungary Cutting Red Tape Programme for 
Businesses (2011) and additional 
measures helped to achieve the 
target of 25% administrative 
burden reduction. “Programme 
for a more competitive Hungary” 
(2018) affects several areas, with 
altogether 42 actions. Results were 
achieved also by Good 
Governance – Magyary 
Programme (2010-2014) and the 
Public Administration and Public 
Service Development Strategy 
(2014-2020). 
25 % reduction target was achieved. 
No current target. 
Since 2019 
March  
OIOO Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs   
Primary and 
secondary 
legislation 
submitted to 
Government 
Businesses and citizens 
and public 
administration. 
Ireland 2008-2012, aimed at a 25% 
reduction. 
By November 2012 an estimated 
18.6% had been achieved. No 
current target. 
No Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
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Italy 2007-2012, aimed at a 25% 
reduction. 
A 29% reduction was achieved in 
2012. No current target. 
Since 2011 
OIOO rule in 
the Statuto delle 
Imprese. It is a 
sort of 
regulatory 
budgeting 
system applied 
to admin 
burdens only 
Administrative 
burdens  
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation (but 
not 
independent 
agencies) 
Citizens and 
businesses 
 
Latvia 2009-2015 plan (but no 
precise methodology). 
No current target. OIOO - Since 
1st November 
2019 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs  
Primary and 
Seconday 
legislation  
Businesses    
Lithuania No Aimed at 30% reduction in 
particular areas, but the goal was not 
reached. No current target. 
OIOO - Cap on 
Administrative 
Burdens in 
2014 
Administrative 
burdens 
Primary and 
Secondary 
legislation 
Businesses n.a. 
Luxembourg Limited and voluntary use of 
the SCM. 
2009-14 plan set a national target for 
reducing administrative burdens by 
15% by 2012 in four priority areas, 
social security, municipal 
development planning, environment 
and taxation. SCM was used in 
social security. No current target. 
No          
Malta In 2008 committed to reduce 
administrative burden on 
businesses by 15% by 2012 
using the SCM methodology.   
In 2018, Malta committed to reduce 
bureaucracy by a further 30% during 
this legislature. 
No  Administrative 
burdens  
  Businesses     
The 
Netherlands 
Pioneer with MISTRAL in 
1994, SCM in 2003-2007, and 
then second baseline 
measurement.  
Structural net reduction of 2.5 
billion Euros for businesses, 
professionals and citizens by 2017 
compared to 2012 levels. No 
current target. 
No  Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
 Citizens and 
businesses 
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Poland 2008-2010, aimed at a 25% 
reduction. Then new Strategy 
in 2012, with new targets for 
2015 and 2020. 
2010 Target not achieved (15.95%). 
In 2012, goal to achieve a reduction 
equivalent to 1% GDP by 2015 and 
1.5% by 2020. Today, no target is in 
place. 
OIOO - 
Planned 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
 Businesses n.a. 
Portugal Since 2007 with 25% target 
until 2012. 
No current target. OIOO foreseen 
in 2014 but not 
implemented 
Administrative 
burdens 
Regulations 
created within 
Government 
and Central 
Administration 
Businesses n.a. 
Romania No. No current target. OIOO - 
Planned 
Administrative 
burdens 
      
Slovakia Two plans, in 2009 and in 
2015. 
In March 2015 66 new measures 
related to seven 
ministries aimed at an estimated 
reduction goal of about 55 million 
Euro. 
OIOO - 
Planned 
Administrative 
burdens 
      
Slovenia Goal to reduce the 
administrative burden by  
25% or EUR 365 million per  
year was fully achieved (27 %).  
From April 2015 further 
reduction target is to reduce 
burdens by a further 5% 
annually. 
 Yes Not yet, but in 
the 
government's 
plans 
Administrative 
burdens 
Federal 
legislation 
Citizens and 
businesses 
 
Spain 2007-2012, net reduction 
target of 30%, which was 
achieved. No further target 
was set. 
No Since 2013, 
OIOO for 
administrative 
burdens 
Administrative 
burdens 
Government 
regulation 
Businesses Positive: 
administrations became 
more attentive to costs, 
the quality of IAs 
improved, along with 
the quality of 
regulation 
Sweden 2006-2012, with 25% target 
(but only 7% was achieved). 
Net target that the 
administrative costs for businesses 
should be lower in the year 2020 
than in 2012. 
No, but the net 
target for 2020 
can imply a 
“loose” OIOO 
Administrative 
burdens 
 Businesses   
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The UK SCM applied in 2005, with 
25% target. 
10bn pound savings set in 2015, 
current BIT at 9bn pound. 
OIOO in 2011; 
OI2O in 2013; 
OI3O in 2016 
and 2017. OIXO 
not in force since 
2017 
Administrative 
burdens and 
substantive 
compliance 
costs 
 
Businesses   
Importantly, for the purposes of this Study, the following main lessons emerge from the 
experience of some of the more advanced countries in the setting of reduction targets. 
These comments, even where not explicitly mentioned, apply also to OIXO rules, which 
can be considered as a special case of burden reduction target. 
• Targets can be set politically: there is no need for extensive data collections and/or baseline 
measurements before the target is set. Many Member States have experimented with 
baseline measurements in the past, but have then come to realize that focusing on the 
flow of new regulation is a more cost-effective way to achieve and monitor cost 
reductions. That said, this political nature does not require that targets be arbitrarily 
set: the more information is available on the composition and magnitude of the stock 
of regulatory costs, the more accurate and actionable the target will be. 
• Target-setting can have a significant behavioural impact on the officials in charge of policy 
assessment and evaluation. Rather than requiring extensive prior data collection, often 
targets can lead to better data and methodological improvements. Establishing a whole-
of-government target can motivate officials to look more carefully for possible cost 
reductions and provide them with a general obligation to quantify and monitor the 
costs that regulation generates for stakeholders. The effect is reinforced whenever a 
stock-flow linkage rule such as OIXO is in place. 
• There is no obvious inconsistency or incompatibility between the adoption of a cost reduction 
strategy and a fully fledged better regulation agenda focused on benefits. Not only governments 
of different “colour” have adopted similar strategies to modernise the administration; 
but some of them have clearly continued to pursue a proactive regulatory agenda (See 
Section 3 below for more details), while at the same time attempting to introduce more 
discipline, awareness and incentives in the administration to identify and reduce 
unnecessary costs.  
• A fully fledged better regulation agenda requires the launch of a variety of initiatives, which 
cannot be limited to OIXO rules or cost reduction strategies. The menu of better regulation 
tools is now expanding to encompass experimental policymaking, alignment with 
sustainable development goals, behavioural economics, the innovation principle and 
much more. As will be highlighted in Section 3 below, investing in regulatory 
budgeting, OIXO rules or burden reduction targets may well be necessary, but is not 
going to be sufficient as a precondition for fully effective regulatory reform: this possibly 
explains why some countries that have heavily invested in cost reduction and 
simplification measures, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, are now 
prioritising other areas where effort has reportedly been less massive and effective over 
the past decade, such as the impact of regulation on innovation, or sectoral "deep dives” 
aimed at improving the business environment in specific domains.  
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3 Towards a possible OIOO rule at the EU level 
The European Commission has launched important initiatives aimed at simplifying EU 
legislation since the 1990s, and even more after 2007, when a first baseline measurement 
of administrative burdens generated by EU legislation was initiated. That measurement 
covered 43 EU Directives that had been flagged as particularly burdensome for businesses 
by a pilot study based on data from four Member States (the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark and the UK). The measurement led to the identification of a number 
of “low hanging fruits”, which were prioritized as “fast-track actions” in the effort to reduce 
administrative burdens by 25% during the 2007-2012 period. The reduction efforts were 
accompanied and overseen by a High-Level Group on Administrative Burdens, which was 
later discontinued in 2014 when the Juncker Commission took office.  
At the same time, since 2012 the Commission has re-organized its better regulation (and 
in particular, regulatory simplification) efforts with the launch of the REFIT programme, 
which focuses on entire policy areas with the aim of ensuring that EU laws deliver their 
intended benefits for citizens, businesses and society while removing red tape and lowering 
costs.  
At the end of 2014, the Council conclusions on better regulation already called on the 
Commission to “develop and put in place – on the basis of input from Member States and 
stakeholders – reduction targets in particularly burdensome areas, especially for SMEs, 
within the REFIT Programme”, noting that “this approach would not require a baseline 
measurement and should consider at the same time the costs and benefits of regulation”.  
After the adoption of a new better regulation package in May 2015, the Commission has 
also created a new REFIT Platform (composed of a government group and a stakeholder 
group),101 chaired by the First Vice-President and aimed at making “EU regulation more 
efficient and effective while reducing burden and without undermining policy 
objectives”102. Over the past few years, as recalled in the Introduction to this Report, the 
Council has asked in several occasions to the Commission to consider the adoption of 
burden reduction targets. These calls were accompanied by similar suggestions, for example 
in the Franco-German Meseberg resolutions of June 2018. 
Most recently, the new President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, 
announced that the Commission will apply the OIOO principle “to cut red tape”103. The 
new President stated that “the Commission will develop a new instrument to deliver on a 
‘One In, One Out’ principle”, adding that “every legislative proposal creating new burdens 
should relieve people and businesses of an equivalent existing burden at EU level in the 
same policy area”; and that the Commission “will also work with Member States to ensure 
 
101 The REFIT Platform brings together the Commission, national authorities and other stakeholders in regular meetings 
to improve existing EU legislation. For more information, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly/refit-platform_en 
102 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/overview-law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-
laws/reducing-burdens-and-simplifying-law/refit-platform_en  
103 https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-5542_en.htm 
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that, when transposing EU legislation, they do not add unnecessary administrative 
burdens”104 
3.1 The Juncker Commission’s arguments against burden reduction targets 
and OIXO: an analysis 
The Juncker Commission has resisted the repeated calls by Member States to introduce 
burden reduction targets by putting forward a number of counter-arguments. These were 
outlined in two main documents: the Communication on “Completing the Better 
Regulation Agenda” adopted in October 2017, and in the Staff Working Paper and 
Communication on “Taking Stock of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda”, 
published in April 2019. They concern burden reduction targets in general, including 
OIXO rules. 
In the 2017 Communication, the Commission explicitly mentioned its commitment 
within the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, “…to update and simplify 
legislation and to avoid overregulation and administrative burdens for citizens, 
administrations and businesses, including SMEs, while ensuring that the objectives of the 
legislation are met...”, and present within its REFIT programme an “annual overview, 
including an annual burden survey, of the results of the Union's efforts to simplify 
legislation and to avoid overregulation and reduce administrative burdens and … assess the 
feasibility of establishing objectives for the reduction of burdens in specific sectors”. The 
Commission’s feasibility assessment took into account  
• the Commission's experience with the Administrative Burden Reduction Programme 
(ABR and ABRPlus) between 2007 and 2013;  
• the implementation of the REFIT programme since 2012;  
• the results of a targeted survey of members of the REFIT Platform carried out in July 
2017 on their experience and views regarding the implementation of burden reduction 
objectives, the quantification of regulatory burdens at EU level and the ways to ensure 
and monitor impact of burden reduction on the ground;  
• the experiences of Member States, the OECD and analysis by research institutes.  
The feasibility assessment considered all types of burden reduction objectives (sectoral and 
global) and it is applicable to all types of regulatory costs. While carrying out the feasibility 
assessment, the Commission examined in particular whether the REFIT programme could 
be usefully complemented by quantitative burden reduction objectives, in the light of 
acceptance (legitimacy), results and resources used (effectiveness and efficiency) and the 
capacity to drive further regulatory burden reduction among EU institutions (cultural 
change). 
 
104 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-maros-sefcovic-2019_en.pdf 
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The main arguments put forward by the Commission and a few national governments are 
listed below. 
Argument 1 Baseline measurements are not cost-effective ways to achieve meaningful cost 
reductions, since calculating a baseline is a costly and complex exercise due 
to the data availability, transparency and reliability105.  
Argument 2 Politically set burden reduction objectives create a significant risk of deregulatory 
pressure and complicate the ability to adopt new legislation that is objectively needed.  
Argument 3 Burden reduction objectives set without a significant involvement of stakeholders are 
likely to lead to a lack of legitimacy and acceptance by the stakeholders. Differences 
in the views expressed by the REFIT Platform’s government group (more in 
favour of politically set sectoral reduction targets) and the REFIT Platform’s 
stakeholder group (more divided) suggest that the sought-after change in 
administrative culture may not materialise due to lack of buy-in on the side 
of stakeholders.  
Argument 4 Burden reduction targets face a methodological challenge: the need to ensure that 
all Commission proposals are accompanied with reliable quantitative 
estimates of new costs and/or savings. This is particularly complex at EU 
level for reasons that include data availability and the nature itself of EU 
legislative proposals. The risk of building a target-based mechanism upon 
potentially costly, incomplete and/or weak quantitative estimates clearly 
needs to be taken into account. 
Argument 5 It is difficult to calibrate the ambition of any ex ante objective. The “absence of a 
sound methodology to identify what costs should be reduced on what 
sectors and why, creates the risk that objectives are set at a non-optimal 
level”.  
Argument 6 Burden reduction targets critically fail to consider “necessary costs”, and the benefits 
of legislation. The approach “does not differentiate between necessary costs 
that are those intrinsically linked to the achievement of a policy goal and 
un-necessary costs that can be reduced without preventing the 
accomplishment of the objectives of legislation”. 
Argument 7 There can be undesirable behavioural impacts from the adoption of burden reduction 
targets. The approach would “result in regulatory trade-off whereby necessary 
 
105 As reported by the Commission, the “ABRPlus programme demonstrated that reliable and comparable data to 
establish a more robust baseline than the initially estimated one in the ABR was not available”. The burden reduction 
objective in ABRPLus was based on evidence and extensive data gathering. However, it “could not clearly demonstrate 
its benefits with businesses on the ground”.  The ABRPlus programme suffered from several problems, including lack 
of data provision by Member States; lack of a commonly agreed methodology for classifying, gathering and providing 
data; lack of consideration for the implementation of examined measures by Member States; lack of a common 
strategy for the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of the ABR measures once implemented; limited 
knowledge among Member States on how the estimates of administrative burden were calculated and on the choices 
made by different Member States to implement the adopted EU initiatives; and limited commitment of businesses 
to participate in the exercise. 
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and beneficial regulation will be set aside simply to meet the burden 
reduction objective, without consideration of its merits”. The Commission 
also added that “some national experiences show that if quantitative 
reduction targets apply, administrations tend to focus on meeting the target 
rather than seeking to maximise policy benefits”. 
Argument 8 Politically set burden reduction targets would “impair the ability of the Commission 
to assume its political responsibility to put forward legislation where and when 
it is necessary and risks having a negative impact on its policy initiatives”.  
Argument 9 An OIXO rule would create delays, since “the need to find cost savings to 
finance any increase in costs due to a new regulatory initiative can represents 
a real impediment for the timely presentation of a new proposal irrespective 
of how useful or necessary it may be”. 
Argument 10 An OIXO rule would cause even bigger delays at the EU level, since “finding 
consensus among EU institutions over which legislation should be 
withdrawn or modified” would “delay even further the process”. 
Argument 11 Repealing or withdrawing a piece of legislation at the EU level would not guarantee 
cost reduction, since “this often implies that 28 un-harmonised laws will 
replace the legislation which is withdrawn, with the consequence that 
companies, particularly those operating cross-border, would face higher 
costs”.  
Argument 12 An OIXO rule would not be very effective at the EU level since “unnecessary 
regulatory costs often do not stem from EU regulation but from inadequate 
implementation” at Member State level. 
Against this background, the recent Communication on the Commission’s better 
regulation Agenda (“Taking Stock and Sustaining our Commitment”), reports the results 
of a survey in which, out of 538 respondents, 151 (28%) were satisfied or very satisfied with 
the Commission’s efforts to simplify existing EU laws and reduce costs where possible; 
while 220 (40%) were not106. Accordingly, in the remainder of this section we discuss the 
merit of these arguments, with a view to duly considering them when proposing new 
mechanism on simplification at the EU level (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below).  
3.1.1 It is widely acknowledged that baseline measurements are not cost-
effective 
As already observed, baseline measurements have proven to be too costly, and not 
necessarily more effective and even more accurate than systems focused on the so-called 
“delta”, i.e. the difference between new costs added by the regulatory intervention, and the 
costs repealed by the same intervention, or through the withdrawal or repeal of other 
 
106 The remaining 167 respondents (28%) were partially satisfied with the Commission’s efforts.  
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existing provisions. Interestingly, baseline measurements have also proven to be not 
necessarily more accurate than politically set targets, provided that the latter are reasonably 
evidence-based.  
The national experience to date confirms this view: some baseline measurements have 
proven to be unnecessarily costly (in the UK, over 15 million pounds; in the EU, 20 million 
Euros), and the operation of the Standard Cost Model often led consultants into acrobatic 
guesstimates both in terms of the classification of origin (EU, national, regional), and in 
terms of the estimation of the so-called “Business As Usual” or BAU Factor, among other 
parameters (Allio and Renda 2010). The EU experience in 2007 was similarly 
disappointing, with a budget of 20 million Euros spent on the mapping of 43 EU directives, 
which did not retrieve reasonably solid results, and ultimately did not provide for sufficient 
value for money. 
Accordingly, the Commission rightly observed in 2017 that launching another baseline 
measurement at the EU level would not be a good idea: even if all the governance and 
methodological challenges that the previous attempt faced in 2007 were successfully 
addressed, the cost of the exercise may still prove disproportionate. 
For this reason, the proposed system is not based on a baseline measurement but on 
measuring the development of burdens (flow) and on the results of a “life events” survey 
combined with existing evidence on unnecessary costs caused by EU legislation.107 
3.1.2 OIXO rules and burden reduction targets are not incompatible with an 
ambitious policy agenda 
The argument put forward by the Juncker Commission, that burden reduction targets bring 
about deregulatory stances, has some merit, since some countries have introduced OIXO 
rules and burden reduction targets in the context of a deregulatory effort. This is certainly 
the case of the United States, where the new rule introduced by the Trump administration 
was accompanied by an explicit attempt to “deconstruct the administrative state”108. But 
the fact that these rules have been used in the context of a deregulatory attempt does not 
mean that they are, per se, incompatible with a more far-reaching and proactive approach 
to deregulation.  
• In Germany, for example, the OIOO rule was adopted in a context in which by 
ambitious programmes such as Energiewende are in place, and a systematic scrutiny of 
the impact of new legislation on sustainable development is carried out: the country is 
now debating the adoption of a far-reaching Federal Climate Action Law 
(Klimaschutzgesetz)109. More generally, the European Commission’s Environmental 
 
107 See chapter 3.3.2. 
108 See Stephen K. Bannon, Comments at Conservative Political Action Conference, (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://time.com/4681094/reince-priebus-steve-bannon-cpacinterview-transcript. 
109Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel set up the so-called climate cabinet, a round of ministers with responsibilities 
relating to climate issues, such as the environment, transport, buildings and energy ministers. They are now tasked 
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Implementation Review for 2019 praises Germany for significant progress on dossiers 
that are often thought of as contrasting with a deregulatory thrust, such as the circular 
economy or eco-innovation110. The German government has explicitly recalled that the 
reduction of 1.9 billion Euros in compliance costs for businesses due to the operation 
of the OIOO rule was achieved without preventing a single project that was a political 
priority or reducing standards.   
• In France, the government uses the OI2O rule but at the same time adopts ambitious 
proposals in terms of social and environmental benefits. The European Commission  
observed in 2019 that France has adopted an ambitious agenda of planning measures 
to reduce emissions, technical improvements, and tax incentives to tackle air pollution 
at all levels; and welcomed the country’s ambitious roadmap for the circular economy 
adopted in April 2018; the ambitious biodiversity plan, which makes nature protection 
and preventing the loss of biodiversity central to government priorities; and the 
introduction of the “single environmental permit”, defined as a “major simplification”, 
which “simplified and streamlined procedures without lessening environmental 
protection”, also improving legal certainty for project promoters. This reform, adopted 
by a country that implements an OI2O rule, “should help save time and tighten 
deadlines while protecting the fundamental interests covered by the applicable 
legislation”. 
• In the Social Progress Index, countries like France, the UK and Spain, and also Canada 
and South Korea, all having experience with OIXO or burden reduction targets, rank 
in the top 20 countries in the world. Denmark, a country that had an OIOO rule in 
place until the summer of 2019, ranked first in the global SDG index score elaborated 
by Sachs et al. (2019)111; and France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands are all in the 
top 10 worldwide.  
In a nutshell: there is no incompatibility per se between the adoption of a cost reduction 
or regulatory budgeting system and an ambitious regulatory and policy agenda in the 
social and environmental domain. As already recalled, governments of both right- and left-
wing orientation have adopted OIOO rules and burden reduction targets (Hahn and 
Renda 2018): what is important is that the system targets “unnecessary costs”, such as 
redundant provisions, irritation burdens, and existing provisions that new developments 
(e.g. digital technologies) can now help simplify, without compromising on regulatory 
 
with deciding the “legally binding implementation” of Germany's climate targets for 2030. Merkel said her cabinet 
would decide "one or several climate action laws" before year-end. 
https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-climate-action-law-begins-take-shape 
https://www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/publication/2017/2301_wwf_studie_klimaschutzgesetz.pdf; 
https://www.spdfraktion.de/system/files/documents/ag_umwelt_ag_umwelt_entwurf_eckpunkte_klimaschutzgese
tz.pdf;  
110 “Germany’s Strong performance on eco-innovation has helped to develop a successful and highly competitive 
environmental goods industry, particularly in the fields of clean energy and water technology”. 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/eir/pdf/report_de_en.pdf 
111 Sachs, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2019): Sustainable Development Report 2019. New 
York: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). 
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benefits. Our survey of national experiences also confirms that OIXO rules and burden 
reduction targets have been well received by stakeholders. That said, the Commission was 
right to be concerned: this is why, in Section 3.3 below, our proposed cost reduction 
mechanism for the EU level will be designed in a way that mitigates the risk that a cost 
reduction mechanism is used for unjustified deregulatory purposes, and preserves the 
evidence-based nature of the EU better regulation agenda.  
The need to avoid compromising on regulatory objectives also implies that an OIXO rule 
at the EU level may include forms of “banking”, but not incorporate forms of “trading” 
of administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs across policy domains, if not 
in exceptional circumstances. As will be explained in Section 3.3, if OIXO rules and 
burden reduction targets are not part of an indiscriminate cost-cutting strategy, then 
trading should be kept to exceptional circumstances or be excluded upfront, since shifting 
burden reductions from one policy field to another would require an accurate estimate of 
the indirect impacts and in particular the benefits affected by the shift, plus distributional 
impacts.  
3.1.3 OIXO rules and burden reduction targets do not necessarily lead to a 
lack of legitimacy and acceptance by the stakeholders 
Critics argue that OIXO rules and burden reduction targets set without a significant 
involvement of stakeholders often lead to a lack of legitimacy and acceptance by the 
stakeholders. The Juncker Commission based this argument on the feedback received in 
2017 by the REFIT Platform stakeholder group, which reportedly differed from the 
feedback given by the REFIT Platform government group. If the OIXO rule or the burden 
reduction targets are chosen in a way that does not involve stakeholders (as, in the Juncker 
Commission’s opinion, would arguably be the case for politically set reduction targets, or 
mechanically designed OIXO rules), then stakeholders would oppose the new system, since 
the decision on rules to be repealed or modified would not be shared with them, but taken 
directly through bureaucratic means.  
Once again, there is merit in the Juncker Commission’s concern that a too mechanistic, 
bureaucracy-driven system would be opposed by stakeholders, especially in a system like the 
EU, where stakeholders are extensively consulted and involved in the selection of proposals 
that should be adopted, repealed, simplified. But an OIOO rule at the EU level does not 
necessarily have to exclude stakeholders: rather, the role of the REFIT Platform and 
stakeholder consultation should be preserved in full while deploying a future strategy to 
reduce unnecessary costs. Moreover, the EU better regulation agenda already implies 
extensive stakeholder consultation whenever a rule is adopted, modified, or repealed. 
Proposals are subject to inception impact assessments that are open to consultation for 
twelve weeks during their preparation, and another eight weeks consultation once the 
proposal has been finalised by the Commission. The yearly (and now also multi-annual) 
regulatory agenda provides information on the proposals being considered, and offer ample 
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possibilities to stakeholders to join in the debate and participate in an increasingly evidence-
based process.  
These achievements of the EU better regulation agenda should not be undermined by 
the introduction of an OIXO rule that transforms the Commission back into a “black 
box”, as it was accused to be until 2015, when draft impact assessments were not made 
public. What can be learned from the Juncker Commission’s stated concern is that there 
would be no merit in introducing a system that deprives stakeholders of their precious role 
in participating to the better regulation agenda; and/or weakens the EU’s orientation 
towards a proactive agenda, especially focused on social and environmental impacts.  
A real challenge for the introduction of a workable, effective system for the containment 
of regulatory costs and the reduction of unnecessary costs at the EU level is thus the need 
to tailor the system to the specific features of the EU policy process and better regulation 
agenda: the scope, design, timing and purpose of the system cannot deviate from the 
current, successful approach that the EU adopts in the better regulation field. This is 
why, in Section 3.3, we propose a system that leaves space to the contribution of 
stakeholders, and is deeply rooted in a better regulation agenda oriented towards 
sustainability, in line with Agenda 2030 (Renda 2017; 2019).  
3.1.4 It is true that reducing unnecessary costs requires reliable quantitative 
estimates: but this applies also to the current better regulation agenda 
In order to fully operate, an OIXO rule requires an estimate of the regulatory costs that are 
being introduced by new rules, as well as quantification of the unnecessary regulatory costs 
that are being eliminated. This, the Juncker Commission argued, requires widespread, 
ubiquitous quantification of costs and benefits, which is not always possible. However, the 
Commission also convincingly stated in its “Taking Stock” Communication in 2019 that 
in order to ensure that legislation remains fit-for-purpose, there should be focus on 
“tackling unnecessary costs and eliminating administrative burdens without compromising 
policy objectives”. Moreover, the latest Annual Report of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board112 
showed that “the Board has higher expectations today for standard elements such as 
quantification, stakeholder consultation and reporting of evaluation findings, because 
methodologies have improved and good practices have spread”: in 2018, the Report shows 
that more than 80% of impact assessments contained the quantification of costs, and more 
than 30% had a full quantification of costs. 
Accordingly, it is not clear why the adoption of an OIXO system would imply a 
disproportionate quantification effort on the side of the Commission. Even without this 
new system, the Commission’s commitment would remain the same: with the new system, 
Commission officials and stakeholders would have an additional incentive to locate and 
eliminate unnecessary regulatory costs. As we will discuss in Section 3.3 below, this shared 
 
112 For more information on the Regulatory Scrutiny Board see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/regulatory-scrutiny-board_en. 
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effort to identify and propose the elimination of existing costs, if coupled with a well-
designed system, can increase, not reduce, the evidence-based nature of the better 
regulation agenda.  
3.1.5 The future OIOO rule should target only unnecessary burdens 
The Juncker Commission also expressed concern that OIXO rules and burden reduction 
targets do “not differentiate between necessary costs that are those intrinsically linked to 
the achievement of a policy goal and un-necessary costs that can be reduced without 
preventing the accomplishment of the objectives of legislation”. It also argued that 
politically set burden reduction targets would impair the ability of the Commission to 
assume its political responsibility to put forward legislation where and when it is necessary. 
Considering these arguments, it is essential that a future OIOO rule targets only 
unnecessary costs113. However, these can also be costs that were considered to be necessary 
at the time of adoption of the legislation, but that are now unnecessary (or unnecessarily 
high) due to the availability of new solutions, such as digitally-enabled compliance 
measures. Likewise, in a system rooted in multi-criteria analysis and oriented towards 
sustainability, there would be no problem related to the reduction of benefits.  
3.1.6 Calibrating the ambition of any ex ante objective requires evidence and 
stakeholder consultation 
The Juncker Commission also expressed the concern that the “absence of a sound 
methodology to identify what costs should be reduced on what sectors and why” would 
create “the risk that objectives are set at a non-optimal level”. In other words, when targets 
are set politically, the lack of evidence-based analysis leads to a very tentative assessment of 
the potential for reducing unnecessary costs. Again, the Juncker Commission’s concern is 
correct: in Renda (2017) the issue was already addressed, and the need for backing political 
estimates with as much evidence as possible was already stressed in that publication.  
Against this background, it is important to stress that burden reduction targets and OIXO 
rules should be accompanied by an analysis of the potential for simplification and 
reduction of unnecessary costs at the sectoral level, through REFIT initiatives aimed at 
assessing both the potential for simplification of existing unnecessary costs (to be identified 
with the help of stakeholders); and the potential for further cost reductions due to 
consolidation of existing legislation, or digitalisation (to be identified also with the help of 
external studies). Strengthening stakeholder participation and the overall evidence base 
would increase the viability and reliability of politically set targets. 
 
113 See Box 1 in the introduction for a definition of unnecessary costs. 
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3.1.7 The adoption of burden reduction targets should avoid undesirable 
behavioural impacts 
According to the Juncker Commission, the adoption of burden reduction targets would 
“result in regulatory trade-off whereby necessary and beneficial regulation will be set aside 
simply to meet the burden reduction objective, without consideration of its merits”. The 
Commission also argued that “some national experiences show that if quantitative 
reduction targets apply, administrations tend to focus on meeting the target rather than 
seeking to maximise policy benefits”.  
These are important concerns, also since our analysis of national experiences showed that 
behavioural impacts are among the most relevant benefits from the adoption of an OIXO 
rule: indeed, the fact that “what gets measured gets done” is not necessarily always an 
advantage: if what gets measured is misleading or incomplete, then the overall result would 
be an inappropriate incentive scheme for public officials. This problem is not new in the 
EU better regulation agenda: the early years of the introduction of the Impact Assessment 
Board featured similar problems, with Commission DGs developing incentives to focus 
more on the areas that the oversight body tended to consider in its opinions (Renda 2011). 
However, this argument only stands as far as the OIXO rule or the burden reduction targets 
are badly designed, and fail to target unnecessary costs, or do not refrain from 
compromising on regulatory benefits. A well-designed system, with evidence-based 
assessments of the potential to reduce unnecessary burdens and adequate stakeholder 
involvement throughout the process, would not feature these problems. To the contrary, 
the need to find unnecessary burdens, consolidation possibilities or technologically-enabled 
simplifications such as RegTech solutions may lead to greater cost awareness, more in-depth 
scrutiny of the regulatory stock, and ultimately a more efficient administration and more 
cost-effective acquis, without compromising on regulatory benefits or ultimate policy 
impacts. Needless to say, the removal of unnecessary burdens will also liberate resources 
for the private sector: such resources could then be re-invested into more productive 
activities.  
3.1.8 OIXO rules and burden reduction targets can help strengthen the 
accountability of co-legislators 
Another important argument raised by the Juncker Commission against the adoption of 
OIXO rules and burden reduction targets is the possible dilution of the impact of 
simplification measures, due to the fact that Commission proposals are then amended by 
the European Parliament and the Council, and are then implemented mostly at the 
national or local level. We address both of these arguments in this section.  
First, it is true that Commission proposals that attempt to reduce unnecessary costs may be 
later amended by the European Parliament and the Council, in a way that frustrates the 
reduction attempt. This however applies to all cases in which the Commission attempts to 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 107 of 143 
tackle unnecessary burdens: as a matter of fact, identifying, describing and quantifying the 
unnecessary costs to be repealed and demonstrating that this would not compromise on 
regulatory benefits is likely to make it much more difficult for the European Parliament 
and the Council to amend the proposal in a way that frustrates the cost reduction attempt, 
given the strong evidence base and stakeholder involvement that each proposal would be 
accompanied by. Moreover, the existence of oversight capacity (at least in the European 
Parliament), and the shared responsibility reflected in the joint programming and 
commitments nested in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making would 
further reduce the possibility for Commission officials to arbitrarily depart from their 
political commitments: since the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) 
regularly analyses the Commission’s ex ante impact assessments, any attempt to circumvent 
sound economic analysis could be spotted not only by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, but 
also by the EPRS.  
Second, politically set (but strongly evidence-based) targets could be backed by the co-
legislators, and then included in the three-year rolling legislative programme. This could be 
possible, also since there seems to be strong support for these measures in the Council (as 
reported by the European Commission in 2017). Once agreement is reached, the 
accomplishment of the sectoral burden reduction plans would rely on the “ownership” of 
the Parliament and Council and may then proceed more smoothly.  
Third, the involvement of stakeholders in an OIXO system should in principle go beyond 
the early phase of the identification of provisions to be modified or repealed. Stakeholders 
could be involved throughout the process, including in the collection of feedback on the 
actual impact of simplification measures on the ground. This would facilitate the European 
Commission in keeping track of the impact of legislative proposals that were later amended 
by Parliament and Council.  
3.1.9 Arguments related to multi-level governance are not directly related to 
OIXO rules or burden reduction targets 
The Juncker Commission was of the opinion that OIXO rules and burden reduction targets 
would not be effective at the EU level, since unnecessary regulatory costs often stem from 
inadequate implementation at Member State level. This is an important concern, since an 
important part of the administrative burdens (more than compliance costs) tend to emerge 
in the interaction between the regulated entities and national or local administrations in 
charge of monitoring compliance or enforcing legal provisions, including administering 
sanctions. In classifying administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs it is 
always important to classify the origin of the cost, and in particular whether the cost 
originates in EU legislation, in the national transposition measure, or in purely national 
regional or local regulation: the original SCM included an “ABC” classification to this end, 
and subsequent implementations in many countries features a more articulate taxonomy, 
in which “A” and “B” types were broken down into “EU-Directive”, “EU-Regulation” and 
“other-international”, to sharpen the understanding and classification of the underlying 
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provision. In a future OIOO system at the EU level, such classification would be very 
helpful in attributing responsibility for the origination of administrative burdens and 
substantive compliance costs. Rather than making it more difficult for the Commission to 
administer the system, the monitoring and assessment of regulatory costs originated by EU 
legislation would become an extremely helpful tool to understand whether a given burden 
is inherently related to the original piece of legislation, or whether it depends on the way 
in which a Member State has implemented the measure. This analysis can only be 
undertaken in cooperation with stakeholders and Member States, as will be clarified in 
Section 3.3 below: if properly implemented, it would also shed light on cases of so-called 
“gold-plating” and “double-banking”, in which transposition measures become more costly 
for stakeholders due to added provisions at the time of transposing the legislation into 
national law (especially for “minimum harmonisation” EU directives); or failure to remove 
contrasting and overlapping pieces of legislation114. As a result, the unnecessary costs that 
cannot be reduced at the EU level and require action at the national level could be 
addressed within the European Semester and through the many existing national burden 
reduction programmes, leading to a further reduction of unnecessary costs for European 
businesses and citizens. 
In addition, most of the simplification proposals that allow the deployment of digital 
solutions for the purposes of demonstrating or monitoring compliance (as in so-called 
RegTech or SupTech solutions) would be focused on enabling drastic simplifications in the 
act of compliance, monitoring or enforcement, which would reverberate also on public 
authorities at the national, regional and local level. Accordingly, while the multi-level 
nature of the EU is certainly challenging for better regulation in general, there are 
advantages and benefits that could be reaped if an OIXO rule was properly implemented.  
Moreover, the Juncker Commission was also concerned that the multi-level governance 
that characterises the European Union may lead to additional costs introduced through 
national legislation, whenever “28 un-harmonised laws … replace the legislation which is 
withdrawn, with the consequence that companies, particularly those operating cross-
border, … face higher costs”. This is not a trivial concern: for example, the narrowing down 
of the scope of the Commission’s action to “ten priorities” under the Juncker Commission 
has, according to some stakeholders, created more leeway for Member States to regulate 
specific subject matters, thereby leading to a possible fragmentation of the Single Market. 
Likewise, the simplification of legislation may lead to the EU withdrawing from a “policy 
space”, which may later be filled by national legislation. This, however, appears to be a 
general argument that applies to all attempts by the European Commission to “tackle 
unnecessary costs” while preserving policy objectives: every time an ex ante impact 
assessment confirms that simplifying legislation or even withdrawing altogether a piece of 
 
114 As an additional note, one must also recall that most of the administrative burdens attributed to EU legislation would 
already be related to a given provision existing in the text of the EU legislation: should the problem lie in the 
implementation phase, the different origin should be already visible in the initial mapping of the costs. In addition, 
it is worth recalling that at least one Member States that successfully implemented an OIXO rule, Germany, is also 
implementing the system with sub-national governments (i.e. the Länder). This shows that managing an OIXO rule 
in a multi-level governance context is possible.  
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legislation is the preferred policy option, a counterfactual analysis should be run, which 
contemplates the possibility that Member States decide to regulate on their own what the 
Commission has decided not to regulate. This risk can be tackled and mitigated in various 
ways at the EU level: from the adoption of soft law to “maximum harmonisation” 
provisions, the tools in the hands of EU legislators are sufficiently sharp to allow the 
Commission to manage the risk of over-regulation in specific fields. That said, the risk 
highlighted by the Juncker Commission mostly referred to cases in which a “number-based” 
OIXO rule is in place, and accordingly Commission officials are forced to identify an 
existing provision to repeal whenever a new provision is proposed. This would certainly 
exacerbate the risk of rushing the elimination of specific provisions without adequately 
assessing the risk that Member States replace them with national rules: even in this case, if 
the Commission really and publicly identified “unnecessary costs” in the provision to be 
repealed, it would be very difficult for Member States to defend their decision to reinstate 
such provisions. And in any event, we explicitly exclude the adoption of a “number-based” 
rule in Section 3.3 below, and only analyse the adoption of a regulatory offset rule based 
on the volume of regulatory costs, not on the number of regulations115.  
Against this background, it would anyway be essential to establish a degree of cooperation 
between the EU level and the many Member States that have in place an OIXO rule or a 
burden reduction targets. As already mentioned in this report, countries that have 
implemented, or are about to launch, an OIXO rule or burden reduction targets already 
represent the bulk of EU GDP and population: these countries could provide very useful 
feedback to the Commission on the origin, the extent and the impact of specific provisions 
creating unnecessary costs: if there is common understanding on a multi-level basis on the 
unnecessary nature of a given cost, it would be very unlikely that Member States would 
reinstate those costs in national legislation, as this would also violate their OIXO rules, or 
compromise the achievement of their burden reduction targets. This coordination would 
even be stronger if a rule were agreed upon, based on which costs that have been labelled 
as unnecessary (or unnecessarily high) at the EU level should be classified as such also in 
Member States. 
3.1.10  A well-designed OIXO rule would not create delays 
Finally, the Juncker Commission was also concerned that “the need to find cost savings to 
finance any increase in costs due to a new regulatory initiative can represent a real 
impediment for the timely presentation of a new proposal irrespective of how useful or 
necessary it may be”, since “finding consensus among EU institutions over which 
legislation should be withdrawn or modified” would “delay even further the process”. This 
 
115 Complications may certainly arise in the operation of a OIXO rule at the EU level, whenever a proposed reform 
“moves” costs from one level of government to another, e.g. from the national to the EU level. In this latter case, two 
options would be available to incorporate the related costs into an OIXO system: either the situation in the member 
states is treated as business-as-usual costs and hence ignored at the EU level; or the total costs are transferred from 
the national to the EU level. In the case of abolishing European legislation in favour of national laws, the two possible 
solutions would work vice versa.  
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concern is again valid in all those systems in which there is no pre-defined list of provisions 
to be repealed, and offsets have to be contextual and simultaneous to the introduction of 
new rules featuring regulatory costs. However, our analysis of national experiences in the 
EU and in non-EU OECD countries shows that this is hardly the case in most advanced 
systems.  
In most countries, the provisions to be modified or repealed have to be either identified 
contextually, but repealed within a given timeframe (e.g. a year, by year’s end, by the end 
of the reporting period); or can be identified and repealed at a later stage, provided that 
this happens within a given timeframe. The former scenario (e.g., the United States) is 
more likely to create delays in the process than the latter: we will propose the latter for the 
EU OIOO rule in Section 3.3.  
3.2 Feedback from surveyed national governments 
As already mentioned, we have launched a survey that retrieved sixteen replies from 
national governments, as well as one reply from a sub-national government (Flanders). The 
results of the survey for what concerns the scope and design of national systems are reported 
in Section 1 above. As part of the survey, we also asked a more direct question on the 
desirability of setting up an OIXO rule or cost reduction targets at the EU level. In this 
section, we report the main feedback received from respondents on this direct question 
that relates to the EU level.  
Among respondents, there are very different opinions. The Bulgarian government’s 
respondent is not in favour of an OIXO rule or even a burden reduction target at the EU 
level: the main reason is that the measurement and quantification of costs is extremely 
expensive and difficult, and companies do not perceive a real difference before and after 
the target has been achieved. This seems to point at a lack of effectiveness of these strategies, 
which however contrasts with the rather positive experience of Member States that have 
adopted a strategy to date. The respondent from Croatia argued that the EU should adopt 
reduction targets focused mostly, but not exclusively, on most burdensome areas for SMEs. 
Denmark stressed the importance of developing an intelligent model for implementing the 
rule which delivers more simple, effective and future-proof regulation and contributes to 
the digital transformation, the green transition and better protection of consumers, health, 
environment and labour. The Croatian respondent added that targets should preferably be 
set in monetary terms in a way that avoids a baseline measurement; and should where 
possible consider at the same time the cost and the benefits of regulation. Among the 
expected positive impacts, Denmark expects that the right model has the potential to lift 
the whole better regulation cycle from impacts assessments and regulatory scrutiny to 
implementation and evaluation.  
The representative from Ireland argued that the Commission should adopt quantified 
targets for reductions in burdens, to maintain and improve focus on burden reduction. 
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The respondent highlighted that burden reduction targets can be used as an internal 
management tool for the Commission to prioritise actions. The respondent also observed 
that while the Commission has so far been sceptical about burden reduction targets, 
perhaps combining their use with a ‘perceived-burden’ approach on a sectoral basis might 
gain traction. The Italian government observed that the Commission should set sectoral 
reduction targets focused on particularly burdensome areas, especially for SMEs, always 
taking into account a high level of protection of consumers, health, the environment and 
employees, and respecting existing protection standards. These reduction targets should 
not require a baseline measurement and should where possible consider at the same time 
the cost and benefits of regulation. The Lithuanian respondent was in favour of both an 
OIXO rule, but only if the implementation of this rule is well organised (mechanisms of 
evaluation and compensation). Also, the Commission should set burden reduction targets 
in line with international best practice (OECD).  
The Netherlands expressed favour for a similar approach to the one it implements 
domestically: targets to be established by the Commission, linked to concrete measures to 
reduce regulatory burdens, a kind of “micro-targets”. These concrete measures can be part 
of an action plan that each Directorate General (DG) of the Commission can draw up to 
make transparent what ambitions it has in the field of Better Regulation. The action plan 
should contain measures that make a noticeable difference for businesses. The “targets” 
don't always have to be linked to an amount of cost savings. Targets can also be linked to 
measures aimed at increasing business satisfaction, e.g. satisfaction with the transparency 
of a system or the service delivered by tax or customs authorities. In those cases, the target 
can be the achievement of a higher degree of satisfaction. Working with action plans that 
contain targets linked to measurable concrete ambitions, in the way described, helps to 
achieve results. It creates a healthy pressure on all parts of the Commission to take action 
and show ambition. The action plans are also a good communication tool to enter in a 
dialogue with stakeholders to check if the proposed actions make a real noticeable 
difference for businesses as we act solely on concrete problems as put forward by business  
Working with targets will also be an incentive for the Commission services to make more 
and better quantified impact assessments and evaluations and will also make it possible for 
the Commission to deliver a better REFIT-scoreboard.  The Commission will have to 
change its procedures. In an early stage the Commission will have to formulate ex ante 
which concrete actions have to be taken to make a real noticeable difference for businesses 
and what the measurable results of the actions should be.    
Much in the same vein, the Spanish respondent observed that reduction targets could be 
adopted, but a preliminary study would need to be developed in order to ensure that policy 
goals are not affected and determine what sectors should be prioritized in the reduction. 
The respondent also added that the European Commission should establish (for example, 
with four-year plans) a target to reduce the costs of the legislation. Among other 
respondents, Slovakia and Slovenia are in favour of burden reduction targets (in the case 
of Slovenia, expressed in percentage). The Slovakian respondent, in line with the Spanish 
one, considers it necessary to perform a preliminary analysis and discuss possible 
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meaningful objectives based on its conclusions. Sweden supports burden reduction targets 
on the EU level as important tools and methods to increase efforts within the area of 
simplification and proactively pursue benefits to the business climate. According to the 
Swedish respondent, the OIOO which the incoming European Commission committed to 
could be such a tool, however, its contours and modus operandi remain to be defined in 
detail. On the more general level Sweden considers it to be important to bear in mind 
regarding the proposed system that it would require resources and an efficient apparatus 
to function properly. 
More generally, looking at the responses received, there seems to be important support 
among EU Member States for the adoption of burden reduction targets, focused on the 
most burdensome areas, especially for SMEs. A number of Member States have highlighted 
the need to target efforts and resources towards the areas that appear most burdensome, 
rather than applying a burden reduction target to the whole acquis. Arguments are also 
strong, but with a greater degree of caution, for the adoption of an OIXO rule, provided 
that it is properly designed and does not compromise protection standards. Indeed, it is 
not surprising that the debate on sectoral reduction targets is more consolidated than the 
one on OIXO rules. As a matter of fact, there is a long legacy of the Member States calling 
for burden reduction targets at the EU level, whereas the idea to implement OIXO is fairly 
new in the EU context. 
After the finalisation of the draft of this report, in the month of November 2019, additional 
comments were sent by several Member States, mostly with requests for clarification. These 
comments led to important additions and rewording in the final version of the report.  
3.3 Introducing an OIOO system at the EU level: opportunities, challenges, 
and risks 
Our analysis of the international experience in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as our discussion 
of the concerns expressed by the European Commission and by surveyed Member States is 
extremely important for the design of the features of a possible future OIOO rule.  In this 
section, we discuss a number of basic preconditions for the introduction of the new system, 
and then propose a system, which echoes the concerns expressed by the Juncker 
Commission and some national governments, and is designed to mitigate them. 
3.3.1 Key Preconditions 
Before we outline the key methodological and governance feature of a possible future 
OIXO system at the EU level, it is important to describe some of the key preconditions for 
the introduction of such system. In particular, it is essential to specify that there need not 
be any backtracking from Europe’s proactive and ambitious legislative and regulatory 
agenda; the system has to be flexible and based on a strong political commitment; the 
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system has to implement a regulatory budgeting framework, rather than a mechanistic 
application of algebraic rules; the system should economise on data and information by re-
using existing and future information and figures; and by making the most of a coordinated 
approach with Member States. We elaborate on each of those preconditions below.  
3.3.1.1 No stepping back from an ambitious policy agenda 
As discussed above, there is no incompatibility per se between OIXO rules, cost reduction 
plans, and a regulatory and policy agenda oriented towards proactively pursuing social and 
environment benefits. Contrary to what is happening in other parts of the world, such as 
in the United States, in Europe countries that have adopted OIXO rules and burden 
reduction targets have continued to take the lead on pursuing ambitious policies in 
domains such as human and fundamental rights, welfare policies, consumer protection, 
the circular economy, etc. Whenever costs are necessary to achieve these goals, there should 
be no hesitation based on the existence of any OIXO rule or burden reduction target: 
such rules and targets should only be referred (for the “outs”) to unnecessary costs, as 
defined in Box 1 in the introduction to this report. Accordingly, in a future OIXO system 
at the EU level the costs introduced should be always, by definition, “necessary” to achieve 
the objectives; whereas the costs that are removed as a result of the application of the OIXO 
rule should be identified among the “unnecessary costs”, i.e. those costs that can be 
removed or reduced without jeopardising the objectives of EU legislation.  
In terms of ambition, the Juncker Commission has marked important commitments in 
terms of social and environmental policies at the EU level, including the European Pillar 
of Social Rights, the Circular Economy Package and a “strategic long-term vision for a 
prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy by 2050”, now endorsed by 
18 Member States116. This happened despite an initial strong commitment to do less, more 
effectively at the EU level, through the so-called “ten priorities”. Recently, the Timmermans 
Task Force also revisited the concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality, calling for a 
sharper allocation of competences between the EU and Member States.  
The next Commission is expected to launch a more ambitious Agenda 2030, which will be 
even more oriented towards social and environmental benefits, but will also chiefly depend 
on digital technologies in order to achieve the sustainable development goals, which form 
the basis of Agenda 2030. All this can and should be achieved with the help of smart 
regulatory solutions, which do not compromise on outcomes, and yet leverage the 
effectiveness of strong institutions (another sustainable development goal), and benefit 
from enhanced productivity, a more citizen-friendly and business-friendly acquis.  
Against this background, it has to be made clear that the EU better regulation agenda 
should not be only about cutting costs, even if only unnecessary costs. The economic 
literature confirms that regulation is an activity that can be undertaken to achieve benefits, 
 
116 https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-strategy-2050/news/18-eu-countries-sign-up-to-2050-carbon-neutrality-
goal/ 
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promote socially relevant innovation, raise the ambition on sustainable development, 
encourage beneficial technological transition, and redistribute wealth117. There is 
accordingly no intention, in this report, to advocate a narrowing down of the scope of 
the EU better regulation agenda. Rather, the introduction of cost reduction mechanisms 
and strategies is aimed at maximising the benefits of regulation, by harnessing the positive 
impacts of the acquis, and minimising the negative ones.  
3.3.1.2 A flexible system, a strong political commitment 
Our analysis of existing rules and regulatory offset mechanisms in EU and non-EU OECD 
countries shows that these rules are not necessarily applied verbatim and mechanically, but 
are in place to show a general commitment to pay enhanced attention to the evolution of 
regulatory costs, either by preventing them from increasing over time (as in an OIOO) rule, 
or causing the decrease of unnecessary costs (as in other OIXO rules, with X > 1). The 
system is often applied with some degree of flexibility in order to allow the smooth 
functioning of the regulatory process. Moreover, an OIXO system should be as “light” as 
possible for the administration, so that it can be applied without taking up all the energy 
of government officials. 
Many countries envisage exceptions to the rules, but these exceptions are normally not used 
by Ministries or Departments118: importantly, the more the rule refers to “unnecessary” 
costs, the less exemptions and flexibility will be needed in order to accommodate ambitious 
policy initiatives. When exceptions are granted, it is important that a clear set of criteria 
for exemptions is introduced, in order to avoid that the flexibility introduced in the system 
does not translate into arbitrariness in the application of the rule. Also, the granting of one 
exception should be associated with a specific procedure, such as a formal political decision.  
Measuring and monitoring the evolution of regulatory costs in specific sectors ultimately 
amounts to experimenting with a “regulatory budgeting” system, but this requires neither 
a simultaneous adoption/withdrawal of rules, nor a systematic deregulatory effort. Rather, 
it entails that competent ministries, departments or DGs start paying enhanced attention 
to the costs their regulatory stock generates, and constantly seek opportunities to reduce 
unnecessary costs by engaging in simplification or in other forms of smart regulation. 
Moreover, the proposed OIOO rule aims at a regulatory offset rule based on the volume of 
regulatory costs, not on the number of regulations. 
As in all regulatory reforms, and as repeatedly stated at the international level by 
organisations like the OECD and the World Bank, the most important precondition is a 
strong, explicit political commitment to deliver on the promised measures. The strong 
backing of political leaders motivated civil servants to realise the common goal of 
eliminating unnecessary costs, while preserving the benefits regulation is expected to 
deliver. Commitment may also require enacting measures or implementing governance 
 
117 Ashford and Renda 2016; Renda 2019; Kalff and Renda 2019; Renda 2016.  
118 The only exception that is actively used, in particular in Germany, is the case of implementation of EU law.  
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mechanisms, such as reporting or stakeholder feedback, that increase the transparency and 
accountability of institutions when implementing the reforms.  
3.3.1.3 A system in which data and information are re-used 
The European Commission sits on a huge amount of data produced in several hundred ex 
ante impact assessments (and related background studies), interim and ex post evaluations, 
implementation reports, fitness checks, competitiveness studies, cumulative cost 
assessments, counterfactual evaluations (mostly by the Joint Research Centre/JRC),119 and 
of course general statistics. So far, these data have remained idle and have been hardly re-
used in subsequent analyses, which is unlikely to maximise their “value for money”, looking 
at the resources that are spent every year to ensure all this evidence backs EU policymaking. 
In a future OIOO, the need for an initial evidence base in setting meaningful targets 
without launching a new baseline measurement already requires that existing data are 
pooled and merged, and constitute a knowledge base for meaningful politically-driven 
actions. Moreover, the operation of an OIOO rule as described in the next sections requires 
that EU and national data are re-used to build more reliable estimates over time. This is a 
key precondition for a consistent system, and a system that makes the most of the resources 
spent to generate data and information. Incidentally, the stocktaking of existing knowledge 
about Administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs (and where relevant, 
charges) would also become instrumental to the setup of an “evidence register” of existing 
studies and policy evaluations, as announced by Vice-President-designate Šefčovič during 
his hearing in the European Parliament on September 30, 2019.  
3.3.1.4 A system built in coordination with Member States 
The EU, as already recalled, operates a multi-level governance system in which rules drafted 
and approved at the EU level are then most often implemented and enforced at the 
national or even local level. This makes it very difficult, at times, to attribute possible 
unnecessary costs to one level of government only: and, in turn, dilutes the responsibility 
for reducing such costs. Accordingly, as already observed, the European Commission has 
expressed scepticism on the feasibility of operating an OIXO rule and/or burden reduction 
targets in a situation in which part of the costs are not dependent on the EU level. At the 
same time, many large EU Member States have collected valuable information over the past 
years on which (EU) rules are most costly and burdensome in their territories, and this 
information will prove extremely valuable both in setting up the system, and in 
implementing it over time. 
 
119 The JRC is the European Commission's science and knowledge service which employs scientists to 
carry out research in order to provide independent scientific advice and support to EU policy. The 
JRC has seven scientific institutes and their respective support services, altogether employing some 
2750 staff. See https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en.  
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 116 of 143 
Accordingly, one of the key preconditions for a fully functioning system based on an OIOO 
rule is a constant cooperation and exchange between the EU institutions and Member 
States, especially those that have accumulated experience on the classification and 
measurement of regulatory costs. This will implicitly also provide incentives to other 
Member States to become more able to classify, measure and manage their regulatory stock, 
which in turn would be a way to strengthen the EU’s multi-level governance. 
The European Commission confirmed the importance of multi-level coordination in its 
April 2019 Communication on better regulation, in which it observed that “the quality of 
evaluation depends on a shared understanding with the co-legislators and Member States 
on when best to evaluate, which indicators and frameworks to use for measuring 
performance, and how to efficiently collect the necessary monitoring information”; and 
that “the delivery of the benefits of simplification efforts in Commission proposals depends 
on the respective provisions being maintained by the co-legislators and on Member States’ 
implementing choices”120. The Commission also added that in many cases, it “does not 
have adequate information about how Union legislation works in the Member States 
because the legislation as adopted by the co-legislators does not maintain the measures 
proposed to allow the collection of the data necessary to permit a good evaluation”, and 
that “obtaining data on the performance and impact of EU law in practice across all 
Member States remains a challenge”121.  
That said, rejecting the possibility of a well-functioning system for the reduction of 
unnecessary costs on the basis of the imperfections in the EU multi-level governance would 
imply that both the benefit of a more well-functioning system and those of cost reductions 
are foregone. Rather, the Commission is right to advocate a more transparent interaction 
between the EU and the Member State level, including through reports on the 
implementation and possible gold-plating and double-banking practices related to EU 
legislation (the Commission has reportedly set up a dedicated IT platform to this end, but 
complained that only two Member States have notified gold-plating provisions over the 
past three years). This could take place through the proposed system based on burden 
reduction plans and a general commitment not to increase costs. An ideal setting for this 
form of coordination would be the REFIT Platform’s government group, where many 
governments that are currently active in measuring regulatory costs could provide a decisive 
help to the European Commission in setting up the system.  
3.3.1.5 A system based on thorough and frequent stakeholder consultation 
Stakeholder involvement is essential to the success of an OIXO rule. The burden reduction 
plans should be developed with the support of the “Lighten the load-Have your say” 
platform, which enables stakeholders to propose reforms that improve laws and reduce 
 
120 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-taking-stock_en_0.pdf 
121 Id. 
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regulatory burdens;122 and relatedly, with the involvement of both REFIT Platform groups: 
the government group should be involved especially with a view to validating the choice of 
the offset decisions and the plans for implementing legislation that will realise the offsets; 
and the stakeholder group would ensure that the relief from unnecessary regulatory costs 
is perceived on the ground, and not just included in abstract calculations for the purposes 
of meeting the target. Moreover, it would be essential to include as a mandatory module, 
in the open public consultations that are carried out on the inception Impact Assessment 
(12 weeks)123 as well as on the finalised proposal (8 weeks)124, a set of questions on whether 
the costs are correctly identified, whether their reduction or elimination would produce 
the expected relief, and whether there is a risk that regulatory benefits or the achievement 
of sectoral goals are compromised as a result of the proposed intervention.  
3.3.2 Designing an integrated system: key features 
Based on the results of our analysis of experiences at the national level in EU and non-EU 
OECD countries, as well as on the key preconditions discussed in the previous section, we 
propose the introduction at the EU level of an OIXO rule, with the following 
characteristics:   
• We propose that the rule takes the form of an OIOO rule (thus, X = 1), in a way that 
mirrors most of the national experience we have surveyed. The choice of an OIOO rule 
is also motivated by the need to avoid that the rule introduced places excessive pressure 
on the EU administration to identify and reduce costs generated by the acquis; as a 
matter of fact, the proposed rule is aimed at enabling gradual awareness of existing 
unnecessary costs, and a gradual improvement of the quality of the regulatory stock 
through the introduction of necessary “ins” and the removal of unnecessary “outs”.  
• The OIOO rule would cover all direct compliance costs, thus including administrative 
burdens, substantive compliance costs, and charges where existing (see Box 1). As a 
matter of fact, in the systems, which have adopted this wider approach and not only 
focussed on administrative burdens, the most significant positive results have been 
observed. This can be explained by the fact that substantive compliance costs are, in 
most cases, more significant than administrative burdens.  
 
122 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/lighten-load_en.  
123 Inception Impact Assessments aim to inform citizens and stakeholders about the Commission's plans in order to allow 
them to provide feedback on the intended initiative and to participate effectively in future consultation activities. 
Citizens and stakeholders are in particular invited to provide views on the Commission's understanding of the 
problem and possible solutions and to make available any relevant information that they may have, including on 
possible impacts of the different options. Since 2015, consultation on inception impact assessments was introduced 
in the EU better regulation agenda. See Renda (2015).  
124 Once the Commission has finalised a legislative proposal and submitted it to the European Parliament and the 
Council, you have another opportunity to give feedback. The feedback period for Commission proposals is 8 weeks, 
after which the contributions will be passed on to the Parliament and the Council. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say_en.  
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• Within the proposed system, all newly introduced costs count as “ins”. While “ins” 
may well correspond to necessary costs, “outs” can only be costs that were found to 
be unnecessary, as described already in Box 1 above. Again, we define “unnecessary 
burdens” as corresponding to unnecessary administrative costs, unnecessary substantive 
compliance costs, and unnecessary charges. These are the cost categories that will be 
included in our proposed “burden reduction plans” (see below).   
• The proposed OIOO rule would apply to businesses and citizens, in order to ensure 
that both can benefit from an improvement of the EU acquis, and the elimination of 
unnecessary costs. This would also be important to build ownership of the new system 
among all stakeholders, and avoid that reduction measures are exclusively focused on 
one category. Over time, also public administrations could be covered by the rule, but 
this would require a high degree of coordination between the European Commission 
and Member States. 
• The proposed system would allow for banking of cost reductions achieved, subject to 
the achievement of the overall cost reduction plan. Banking, however, works both ways: 
in case of failure to achieve the planned reductions during a given year, the reductions 
to be achieved would then be passed onto the following year.  
• The proposed system will cover recurrent costs, not one-off costs. The overall aim of 
the system is to reduce or, where possible, eliminate the unnecessary costs generated by 
existing EU rules: the one-off costs that emerge as a result of the introduction of a new 
rule are typically not “actionable” once they have been faced by regulated entities, no 
matter whether the administration seeks to simplify, consolidate legislation or seek 
digital solutions.  
• The system would in principle not allow for trading burden reductions, since this 
would lead to a possible confusion of regulatory costs and benefits, with potentially 
significant distributional consequences. The system in principle attributes to each 
Commission DG the responsibility to comply with the OIOO rule, by looking into its 
own regulatory stock to identify unnecessary costs, which could be eliminated or 
reduced. Only in exceptional circumstances trading could be admitted, if the area in 
which “ins” are being introduced does not feature unnecessary costs, and other areas 
can be identified, in which measures could be adopted without affecting regulatory 
objectives or creating undesirable distributional impacts. In addition, as in Scenario 2 
above, the proposal should be assessed with a view to demonstrating that the new costs 
are justified by the achievement of superior regulatory benefits. 
• As the proposed OIOO-system is not a strict, mechanistic rule, complete exemptions 
from the system are not necessary. This holds especially true as in the proposed OIOO-
system banking and, in exceptional circumstances, also trading provide sufficient 
flexibility. Outright exemptions would threat to undermine the effectiveness of the 
system. 
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• The proposed OIOO rule would require oversight, preferably by the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board, who would be asked to oversee the correct implementation of the rule, 
and ensure in particular: that ex ante impact assessments contain a section on the 
application of the OIOO rule, and that “ins” correspond to necessary costs; and that ex 
post evaluations report on possible unnecessary cost.  
• The proposed rule would require coordination by the Secretariat-General of the 
European Commission, in particular for what concerns the procedural steps that will 
be described in the next Section (i.e., the development and update of a “heat map”, the 
adoption and update of burden reduction plans, and the introduction of criteria for 
exceptions to the OIOO rule).   
Table 7 below shows the main features of the proposed system, following the scheme used 
in tables 4 and 6 above. 
Table 7 – Key features of the proposed system 
Country Rule Type of costs 
covered 
Scope 
(law) 
Regulated 
entities 
Timing 
of 
offsets 
Banking Trading Exemptions 
EU  OIOO  Direct 
compliance 
costs (charges, 
administrative 
burdens, 
compliance 
costs) 
All EU 
legislation  
Citizens and 
businesses (and 
over time, 
possibly also 
public 
administrations) 
By year 
end 
Yes Only in 
exceptional 
circumstances 
No 
 
3.3.3 Implementing the system 
The setting up of a new system for the measurement and reduction of unnecessary costs 
can be imagined as a staged approach. This approach is composed of a setup phase to be 
implemented during 2020, and a yearly cycle, which will repeat itself from 2021 onwards.  
First, already in 2020 the Commission should launch a preliminary study to take stock 
of existing evidence of unnecessary costs in various sectors of the economy. This, as 
explained in Box 1 above, are not a new category of costs, but rather any direct cost from 
regulation (including in particular administrative burdens and substantive compliance 
costs) that could be reduced or eliminated without compromising the achievement of 
regulatory objectives.  Such study was evoked i.a. by the Dutch and Spanish respondents to 
identify those areas that appear most challenging for European businesses (in particular, 
SMEs) and citizens. This study could take stock of all the cumulative costs assessments 
performed by external consultants for the European Commission in sectors such as steel, 
aluminium, glass, ceramics, chemicals and others. In addition, these data could be 
combined with data from impact assessments and ex post evaluations, plus all data from 
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JRC studies125. The JRC could be involved in this study, also due to its increased 
involvement in the collection of data for impact assessments to be performed at the EU 
level: this would also help retain knowledge of the costs generated by EU legislation inside 
the EU institutions, thereby ensuring continuity in the implementation of the system.  
Second, the study should be coupled with a “life events” survey at the EU level, aimed at 
understanding the areas that are perceived as being most affected by administrative burdens 
and substantive compliance costs in the key moments of the life of businesses and 
citizens.126 Such a life events survey, which could become an ongoing effort alongside the 
application of the OIOO rule, will retrieve important results, which would then be subject 
to further investigation in order to understand whether the perceived burdens are related 
to EU-level policy, implementation or enforcement; or whether Member States should take 
action to address the issue127. An important consequence of launching this pan-European 
survey would also be the uncovering of differences in implementation and enforcement 
across Member States, and the possible inclusion of simplification measures at the national 
level as policy priorities in the context of the European semester. For the EU level, the life 
events survey will be complementary to the fact-finding exercise described above, and will 
lead to the definition of a “heat map” on regulatory costs, broken down by policy domain.  
The definition of a “heat map” would replace the otherwise too costly baseline 
measurement phase, which was correctly defined by the European Commission and 
Member States as not cost-effective (see above, Section 3.1.1).  
In principle, this scanning of the EU acquis could be carried out by taking as unit of analysis 
either individual policy domains (e.g. healthcare, financial services, taxation, etc.); or 
industry sectors (e.g. steel, ceramics, retail, etc.). The former approach should be preferred, 
 
125 Without investing excessive resources, the Commission should be able to set up Better Regulation Task Forces at the 
DG level (or for clusters of DGs), in order to refine the heat map and identify (i) the provisions that are perceived as 
costly and feature margins for simplification (for example, by adopting technological solutions); and (ii) the perceived 
costs that depend mostly on the EU level, rather than on the national or local level (as is the case whenever compliance 
costs depend on gold-plating, and/or administrative burdens are generated by enforcement practices at lower levels 
of government). 
126 A “life events” survey identifies a number of typical events in the life of companies and citizens, and surveys them to 
understand the quality of their interaction with government. This approach was tested i.a. in France and Germany 
over the past years. Examples of the selected life events for citizens were marriage, the birth of a child, the start of a 
training course, the death of a loved one and the loss of a job. Businesses were asked about their experiences of 
processes such as starting a business, developing a new product and ceasing operations. In Germany, responsibility 
for designing the survey and for developing and analysing the questionnaire lays with the Federal Statistical Office; 
the task of conducting the telephone interviews was put out to tender. At the EU level, the life events survey would 
most likely have to adapted to the specific scope of the EU acquis, and avoid asking questions exclusively related to 
the relationship between citizens and local administrations. One example of perception survey that retrieved 
interesting results at the EU level is the consultation on the top 10 most burdensome pieces of legislation for SMEs 
(TOP10), on which see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_188. The TOP10 public 
consultation was an on-line questionnaire using Interactive Policy Making software. It ran from 1 October 2012 until 
21 December 2012 and was available in 21 EU languages. The TOP10 public consultation attracted widespread 
attention among SMEs and their representative organisations with a total of 1000 replies received by the deadline 
(779 enterprises, 154 organisations representing the interest of enterprises and 67 other stakeholders). 
127 A “life events” survey typically retrieves results that are related to all levels of government, including citizens’ and 
businesses’ interaction with local authorities. The results of the life events survey would indeed require an 
apportionment of the resulting costs according to the origin (EU, national, local) of the costs identified. 
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in line with national experience and with the approach announced by the new 
Commission: it allows a more effective understanding of the existing possibilities for 
revising or repealing existing legislation in the same domain. This way, whenever a new 
piece of legislation with new “ins” is envisaged, the competent DG could directly recur to 
its policy domain’s heat map to look for possible “outs”. Consequently, individual DGs 
would retain control, ownership and accountability of the new system. Besides this, a policy 
domain based system is preferable because it makes it more likely that both businesses and 
citizens benefit from the new system; and that all pieces of legislation, including the more 
cross-cutting, non-sector-specific ones (e.g. data protection rules, rules on trade subsidies, 
competition rules) are included in the analysis.  
The heat map will be essential to identify the possible “outs”, i.e. the existing provisions 
that are considered to create unnecessary costs128. The key characteristics of the heat map 
could be the following: 
• An indication of the presence of perceived administrative burdens and substantive 
compliance costs, divided by type of cost (administrative burdens, substantive 
compliance costs, and where relevant charges). The heat map would then contain an 
indication of those costs that originate in EU legislation.129  
• The identification of “high cost”, “medium cost” and “low cost” areas of EU legislation, 
for example with a “traffic light system”, coupled with more detailed information on 
the individual provisions, especially those included in the high cost areas.  
• An indication of which areas and provisions are considered likely to feature 
unnecessary costs, divided into administrative burdens and substantive compliance 
costs; and whether these costs fall on businesses, citizens or other stakeholders. 
• Within provisions that are thought to contain unnecessary costs, the map could provide 
a description of the provision; a motivation of why the costs associated with the 
provision are thought to be unnecessary; and an indication of the possible way  in which 
the cost reduction could be achieved (repeal or revision; and simplification, 
consolidation or digitalisation). 
 
128 A similar “heat map” approach was already implemented, though in a much narrower and purely business-oriented 
context, in the cumulative cost assessments commissioned by DG GROW in order to assess the impact of EU 
legislation on the cost competitiveness of industry players in specific sectors, such as steel, aluminium, chemicals, 
glass, and ceramics. This led to the identification of those provisions that were thought to create significant costs for 
the industry. Examples are found i.a. in the Cumulative cost assessment (CCA) of the EU ceramics and glass industry 
published on 14 July 2017 by the European Commission and carried out by CEPS, Economisti Associati and Ecorys. 
See https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/cumulative-cost-assessment-cca-eu-ceramics-and-glass-industry-published_en. 
For cumulative cost assessment studies led by CEPS, a preliminary heat map was also prepared in consultation with 
stakeholders and the European Commission in the early phases of the study, in order to identify the pieces of 
legislation that were perceived as featuring higher cost levels. The heat map proposed in this report, however, differs 
in many respects, as it would include information on so-called “unnecessary costs”, would focus also on citizens, and 
would be developed with a view to identifying the possible “outs” in the OIOO rule. 
129 In case during the development of the heat map significant costs are highlighted, which originate in national legislation 
and thus require action at the Member State level, the cost reduction could be addressed within the European 
Semester, by proposing specific measures in the country-specific recommendations. 
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Figure 9 below shows a stylised example of a heat map, showing its main inputs, its main 
content, and its relations with burden reduction plans.  
Figure 9 – Sample heat map and burden reduction plans: inputs, format, content 
 
 
The main purpose of the heat map would thus be to highlight where costs exist, and identify 
areas in which reductions of unnecessary costs are possible, through simplification, 
consolidation and digitalisation130. The heat map could be updated annually to reflect the 
proposals adopted by the European Commission, the amendments presented by other 
European institutions, as well as the results of ex ante impact assessments, ex post evaluations 
and input by stakeholders (in particular, through the REFIT Platform).  
Once the heat map and the reduction potential have been finalised, the next phase would 
entail the setting of ad hoc burden reduction plans for each DG. A reduction plan would 
consist in a document prepared by the competent DG, in which possible measures to be 
adopted for reducing unnecessary costs would be classified in the three mentioned buckets 
(simplification, consolidation and digitalisation), leading to an estimate of the reduction 
potential for each DG. Reduction plans could also contain an estimate of the potential cost 
reduction that could be achieved by repealing or revising the selected provisions. The 
potential reduction of unnecessary costs could be expressed in absolute terms, rather than 
as a percentage: the main reason for preferring this approach is that it avoids the 
specification of the total amount of costs per area (the 100%), which would require a very 
costly baseline measurement. In addition, the main purpose of the proposed OIOO rule is 
not to achieve a cost reduction per se, but rather an improvement in the quality of the EU 
 
130 More specifically, simplification refers to a process in which individual pieces of legislation are reformed to achieve 
the same benefits at lower costs (for example, by moving towards a risk-based approach to inspections); consolidation 
requires action to eliminate overlaps and redundancies between different pieces of legislation belonging to the same 
policy areas (e.g. moving to the “ask only once” principle; or streamlining information requirements contained in 
legislation, substantially aiming at collecting the same information); digitalisation implies achieving (often significant) 
cost reductions by allowing implementation or compliance through  the use of digital solutions (e.g. e-invoicing; 
digital record-keeping; RegTech and SupTech solutions). 
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acquis, obtained through the introduction of necessary costs (“ins” are always necessary by 
definition); and the elimination of unnecessary costs.  
The measures proposed in the burden reduction plans could then flow into the yearly 
Commission Work Programme, as well as in the multiannual programming instituted by 
the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. More specifically, based on 
the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (paragraph 8), the Commission 
Work Programme should include “major legislative and non-legislative proposals for the 
following year, including repeals, recasts, simplifications and withdrawals”; and for each 
of these measures, the Work Programme should indicate “the intended legal basis; the type 
of legal act; an indicative timetable for adoption by the Commission; and any other relevant 
procedural information, including information concerning impact assessment and 
evaluation work”.  
In the new system, the Work Programme should also indicate whether newly proposed 
measures are likely to increase costs (corresponding to an “in”), as well as a preliminary 
identification of the “out”, e.g. the provisions that will be repealed, recast, simplified or 
withdrawn in a way that offsets the proposed new costs. This could follow the procedure 
already foreseen in the Interinstitutional Agreement (paragraph 9), based on which “when 
the Commission intends to withdraw a legislative proposal, whether or not such withdrawal 
is to be followed by a revised proposal, it will provide the reasons for such withdrawal, and, 
if applicable, an indication of the intended subsequent steps along with a precise timetable, 
and will conduct proper interinstitutional consultations on that basis”. This way, the 
proposed measures will be subject to agreement by all three institutions: this will in turn 
strengthen the likelihood that all institutions follow the new system within the ordinary 
legislative procedure. In addition, the Commission could also be allowed to notify the 
Parliament and the Council whenever amendments that they propose are likely to increase 
direct compliance costs. 
The estimates provided in the Work Programme will then have to be translated into 
concrete measurements in the impact assessment phase. The impact assessment would 
also need to ensure, with a greater level of depth, that the measures adopted do not affect 
regulatory objectives. Here, three scenarios may emerge: 
Scenario 1. A new policy proposal does not significantly affect regulatory costs. Then 
the current better regulation system remains unchanged.  
Scenario 2. A new policy proposal achieves simplification, consolidation or 
digitalisation solutions, thereby directly realising a reduction of 
unnecessary costs (“outs”). In this case, the ex ante impact assessment will 
have to ensure that the new proposal generates benefits that justify the costs, 
and that as a consequence, the overall cost reductions achieved do not 
generate other direct or indirect costs for society: these are to be intended as 
opportunity costs (see Renda et al. 2013c), and as such include the foregone 
benefits that accrue from the enactment of the new proposal. This reduction 
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of unnecessary costs (“outs”) can be banked in the OIOO system and be used 
to offset new regulatory costs (“ins”) – from the following scenario 3. 
Scenario 3. A new proposal creates new regulatory costs (“ins”). In this case, the OIOO 
rule would apply. This does not mean that the regulatory offset would need 
to occur contextually: the ex ante impact assessment of the proposal would 
need to include a section, in which a mention of the estimated offset and an 
indication of the measures that will be repealed or revised to achieve the offset 
would be included. Such measures would need to be adopted by the end of 
the year.  
At this stage, one change with respect to the existing system would be that the overall 
assessment of the new proposal may take into account also the fact that the costs introduced 
will be offset: this may even lead the Commission to adopt more ambitious regulatory 
proposals, despite the fact that regulatory costs are equal or superior to the benefits: this 
would be possible since the Commission would be able to argue that the regulatory costs 
introduced will be offset through the repeal or revision of other measures, containing 
unnecessary costs.  
At the end of the year, the Commission should keep track of all the new “ins”, as well as 
the changes in unnecessary costs achieved through “outs”, and compare them with the 
burden reduction plans adopted. This would be a key component of the so-called “Annual 
Burden Survey”, which the Commission has committed to producing every year as part of 
the stocktaking exercise that leads to the presentation of the new yearly Work Programme. 
The Annual Burden Survey should be fully transparent regarding all “ins” and “outs” and 
would thus indicate: the reductions of unnecessary costs achieved by the Commission over 
the year; the measures that were adopted, which directly reduced unnecessary costs; the 
measures that were introduced, which increased regulatory costs; and the measures that 
were repealed or revised to offset cost increases. For each of these indications, the 
Commission would then need to distinguish between achieved cost variations; and 
proposed ones, which are subject to the completion of the ordinary legislative procedure, 
as well as implementation in Member States131.  
3.3.4 A step-by-step approach to implementing the system 
Figure 10 below shows our understanding of the possible step-by-step working of an OIOO 
system at the EU level. Two distinct phases are distinguished: a setup phase, and a yearly 
cycle.  
 
131 Note that the Commission could also update its Impact Assessment at the end of the ordinary legislative procedure, 
to account for amendments proposed by Parliament and Council in the final text. Paragraph 16 of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making also specifies that “the Commission may, on its own initiative or 
upon invitation by the European Parliament or the Council, complement its own impact assessment or undertake 
other analytical work it considers necessary. When doing so, the Commission will take into account all available 
information, the stage reached in the legislative process and the need to avoid undue delays in that process. The co-
legislators will take full account of any additional elements provided by the Commission in that context”. 
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• In the setup phase, the Commission launches the preliminary study and a “life events” 
survey. Results are processed and presented ideally in September, with the presentation 
of the first heat map. The heat map is subject to consultation of both REFIT Platform 
groups, and then converted into burden reduction plans for each DG. This will be a 
relatively “loose” OIOO system, meaning that, as explained in the previous section, it 
would not require that for every Euro of regulatory costs introduced, a Euro of 
regulatory costs is contextually removed; and would not require the repeal of legislation, 
but contemplates also the revision of legislation. The system, together with the 
description of the OIOO rule, would be officially launched in November, when the 
Commission’s yearly Legislative and Work Programme is presented.  
• In the yearly cycle, new measures are proposed, with ad hoc changes in the stakeholder 
consultation and in the ex ante impact assessment132. Impact assessments feature an 
indication of the “ins” and a specification of where the “outs” will be achieved, and by 
when. The impact assessments are, as normally occurs, reviewed by the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board, which also ensures that the OIOO rule has been correctly 
implemented. The stakeholder consultations already foreseen during the policy cycle 
(on the Inception Impact Assessment, and after the proposal has been adopted by the 
Commission) carry a specific mention of costs, and the REFIT Platform is involved in 
the finalization of the Annual Burden Survey. The Survey also takes stock on what has 
been achieved for each sector, through which measures (simplification, consolidation, 
digitalisation), and what could be banked (or adds to the expected target) for the 
following year.  
 
Figure 10 – Step-by-step implementation of the new system 
 
 
132 Ex post evaluations of existing legislation may also be required to highlight the existence of unnecessarily high or 
redundant regulatory costs. 
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Figure 11 shows how the yearly cycle can be integrated with the EU policy cycle. The figure 
is based on the representation of the policy cycle offered by the European Commission in 
its latest stocktaking communication on better regulation.133 Based on the figure, the 
Commission proposals are followed by negotiation with co-legislators and adoption of draft 
acts.134 These acts are then finalised and implemented on the ground once they enter into 
force. The implementation phase is accompanied by monitoring and, within a specified 
timeframe, ex post evaluation.135  
Figure 11 – Additions to the existing policy cycle 
  
 
As shown in the figure, compared to the existing policy cycle, the new OIOO rule could 
entail the following additions (starting from the Commission proposal stage, clockwise in 
the figure): 
• A specific module on costs (administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs) 
included in the 12-week consultation on the Inception Impact Assessment. This is 
aimed at ensuring that stakeholders can provide information on whether the 
prospective measure is likely to lead to new “ins”; or (in the case of reduction measures) 
confirmation that “outs” correspond to the reduction of unnecessary costs. 
 
133 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-taking-stock_en_0.pdf. 
134 More in detail, the Commission’s major proposals are included in the Commission’s yearly Work Programme, 
accompanied by an inception impact assessment, which is subject to a 12-week stakeholder consultation; once the 
impact assessment has been finalised and the proposal adopted, an additional 8-week consultation is carried out. 
135 The Commission follows an “evaluate first” principle, which means that ex post evaluation is required before the 
existing act can be revised, which will require a new ex ante impact assessment. 
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• During the following ex ante impact assessment, a new section dedicated to the OIOO 
rule, in which new “necessary” costs (“ins”) are estimated, and unnecessary costs to be 
eliminated (“outs”) are identified. 
• A specific module on costs (administrative burdens and substantive compliance costs) 
included in the 8-week consultation on the finalised Commission proposal. This is 
aimed at ensuring that stakeholders can provide feedback on whether the proposal will 
lead to new “ins”; or (in the case of reduction measures) confirmation that “outs” 
correspond to the reduction of unnecessary costs, without compromising on regulatory 
objectives. 
• During the ordinary legislative procedure, the possibility for the Commission to warn 
co-legislators whenever proposed amendments risk violating the OIOO rule, since they 
introduce new costs not accounted for in the original proposal, or fail to achieve the 
planned reduction of unnecessary costs. 
• During the implementation phase, as the Commission monitors the impact of its 
proposals, feedback could be collected from stakeholders (through “Lighten the Load-
Have your Say”)136 and from the REFIT platform on the effective reduction of 
unnecessary costs. 
• When proposals are evaluated ex post, this can lead to an identification of the need for 
new regulatory measures (and possible new “ins”); or the existence of unnecessary costs, 
which could be reduced through measures such as simplification, consolidation or 
simplification (“outs”). This will lead to an update of the heat map, as well as the 
inclusion of new possible measures in the following Commission yearly Work 
Programme.  
4 Concluding remarks 
The adoption of OIXO rules and burden reduction plans has proven to be beneficial in a 
number of countries around the world, not only (and not prevalently) due to the cost 
reductions achieved, but rather for the impact it has had in terms of triggering greater 
awareness in the administration of the costs generated by regulation; as well as a greater 
incentive to manage the existing stock of regulation, and perform regular retrospective 
reviews. The setting of burden reduction targets, originally rooted in the implementation 
of the Standard Cost Model, has now become a way to reorder and better manage the 
regulatory stock in many EU Member States and non-EU OECD countries. These are 
widely considered as useful tools to improve the relationship between government and 
regulated entities, as well as to improve the overall quality of regulation and policy cycle. 
However, these tools should not be conceived as the only tools to be deployed to improve 
the quality of legislation: as this report already explained, the global debate on better 
 
136 Lighten the Load- Have Your Say is a platform that enables stakeholders to propose reforms that improve laws and 
reduce regulatory burdens. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/lighten-load_en. 
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regulation is increasingly welcoming the adoption of a variety of techniques to manage and 
improve the regulatory stock and flow.  
This report analyses OIXO rules and burden reduction plans as useful tools to be 
implemented at the EU level alongside with an ambitious regulatory agenda, focused on 
the benefits of intervening at the EU level to advance on Europe’s strategic priorities and 
liberate resources to be reallocated to more productive uses.  This is why we have set key 
preconditions that a future OIOO rule should satisfy. They include a firm political 
commitment, strong multi-level governance, greater re-use and sharing of data and 
information on existing and upcoming regulations, and emphasis on communication, 
rather than a mechanistic approach to “ins” and “outs”. We have then addressed all 
concerns expressed by the Commission in the past years, to build a system that is rooted in 
the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, and respects the peculiarities of 
the EU better regulation agenda, to ensure that in line with what is happening in many 
European countries, the implementation of these tools does not jeopardise the 
achievement of the EU’s policy agenda. Table 8 shows how the proposed system addresses 
the Juncker Commission’s main concerns as outlined in Section 3.1 above.   
 
Table 8 – How the proposed system addresses the concerns expressed by the Juncker Commission 
Concern of the Juncker Commission Features of the proposed system 
Baseline measurements are not cost-
effective ways to achieve meaningful 
cost reductions  
The proposed system does not require a baseline measurement, 
but rather evidence-based burden reduction plans. 
Politically set burden reduction 
objectives create a significant risk of 
deregulatory pressure and complicate 
the ability to adopt new legislation 
that is objectively needed.  
The proposed system focuses on unnecessary costs, and does not 
create an immediate pressure to identify, contextually, 
offsetting measures.  
By promoting the offsetting of new costs and incentivising more 
retrospective reviews on the regulatory stock, the system can 
even make ambitious regulation easier to justify.  
Burden reduction objectives set 
without a significant involvement of 
stakeholders, are likely to lead to a 
lack of legitimacy and acceptance by 
the stakeholders.  
In the proposed system, stakeholders are constantly involved: in 
the definition of the Work Programme (through Lighten the 
Load-Have Your Say and the REFIT Platform), through 
special modules in the 12-week consultation on Inception 
Impact Assessments and in the 8-week consultation on 
completed Commission proposals; and in the definition of the 
Annual Burden Survey.  
Burden reduction targets face a 
methodological challenge: the need to 
ensure that all Commission proposals 
are accompanied with reliable 
quantitative estimates of new costs 
and/or savings. This is particularly 
complex at EU level. 
The system requires quantification of costs from EU 
legislation, something that the Commission and the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board have advocated for more than a decade. 
Quantification of costs and savings is normally possible.  
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It is difficult to calibrate the ambition 
of any ex ante objective.  
Our system does not allow for arbitrarily set burden reduction 
targets: evidence is collected to back the adoption of burden 
reduction plans through a preliminary and on-going fact-
finding study, coupled with a life events survey. The exercise is 
repeated annually to account for the operation of the OIOO 
rule.  
Burden reduction targets critically fail 
to consider “necessary costs”, and the 
benefits of legislation.  
The proposed system clearly differentiates between necessary 
costs that are those intrinsically linked to the achievement of a 
policy goal and unnecessary costs (“unnecessary burdens”) that 
can be reduced without preventing the accomplishment of the 
objectives of legislation. The proposed OIOO rule is focused on 
unnecessary costs, and the reduction measures are classified in 
three different baskets: simplification, consolidation, 
digitalisation.  
There can be undesirable behavioural 
impacts from the adoption of burden 
reduction targets: necessary and 
beneficial regulation will be set aside 
simply to meet the burden target 
The proposed system does not compromise on the achievement 
of regulatory objectives. Complying with the  OIOO rule 
would remain a component of a broader strategy to improve 
the quality of regulation. In some cases, greater incentives to 
perform retrospective reviews may create even more space for 
ambitious regulations.  
Politically set burden reduction 
targets would “impair the ability of 
the Commission to assume its 
political responsibility.  
The proposed system operates well within the Commission’s 
ambitious regulatory agenda. This is possible and is confirmed 
by the majority of national experiences.  
An OIOO rule would create delays, 
due to the need to find cost savings to 
finance any increase in costs  
The delays would be unlikely in the proposed system. The 
regulatory offset does not need to be contextual or simultaneous 
to the new proposals, but needs to be identified in the Work 
Programme, and then assessed in practice by the end of the 
year. The “heat map” developed continuously as part of the 
system should offer sufficient information to enable the 
identification of “candidates” for repeal or revision, without 
significant delays in the process. 
An OIOO rule would cause even 
bigger delays at the EU level, since 
“finding consensus among EU 
institutions over which legislation 
should be withdrawn or modified” 
would “delay even further the 
process”. 
The proposed system builds on a shared commitment to reduce 
unnecessary costs, in line with the procedures included in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. It chiefly 
requires strong political commitment in all three institutions 
(like all regulatory reform processes). 
Repealing or withdrawing a piece of 
legislation at the EU level would not 
guarantee cost reduction  
Agreement between all EU institutions within the joint 
programming introduced by the Interinstitutional Agreement, 
as well as the heavy involvement of the REFIT Platform in the 
process, would mitigate this risk by ensuring constant follow-up 
of simplification initiatives. Stakeholder consultation on the 
Annual Burden Survey would lead to feedback of the impact 
of simplification measures on the ground.  
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An OIOO rule would not be effective 
since unnecessary regulatory costs often do 
not stem from EU regulation but from 
inadequate implementation at Member 
State level. 
The proposed system starts with the building of a “heat map”, 
which then attributes the origin of unnecessary costs to 
different levels of government. The unnecessary costs that 
cannot be reduced at the EU level and require action at the 
national level could be addressed within the European 
Semester and through the many existing national burden 
reduction programmes. 
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Annex 1: Questionnaire 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING A “ONE-IN-ONE-
OUT” RULE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Dear Respondent,  
This questionnaire is aimed at collecting detailed information on the regulatory offsetting 
rules and the regulatory cost reduction targets in place in EU Member States. It is part of 
a broader Study commissioned to CEPS by the German Ministry of Economy and Energy: 
the Study will look at the feasibility of establishing a regulatory offsetting rule at the EU 
level.  
We would be very grateful is you would find the time to provide answers to the following 
questions. The Questionnaire is divided in three parts: the first part is aimed at collecting 
basic information on your institutions and your position in the institution. The second 
part is dedicated to regulatory offsetting mechanisms in your country. Finally, the third 
part focuses on cost reduction targets. If your country uses both a regulatory offsetting rule 
and a reduction target, we kindly ask you to full in both parts.  
As the lead research for the Study, I remain available in case you would need help in filling 
the questionnaire. I would be happy to walk you through the questions by phone if needed. 
My contact details are reported below. 
Finally, in case you would be available for a short follow-up interview on some details, as 
well as on your views on a possible EU future regulatory offsetting rule, please check the 
box at the end of the questionnaire.  
Kind regards, 
 
Andrea Renda 
 
Senior Research Fellow and 
Head of Global Governance, 
Regulation, Innovation, the 
Digital Economy, CEPS  
+32 2 229 39 17  
-  mob: +32 494 44 33 16 
e-mail: andrea.renda@ceps.eu 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
General information 
 
Name of the institution 
What institution are you working for? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Role of the respondent in the institution  
Please briefly clarify what is your position in the institution 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Regulatory Offsetting (one-in-X-out) rules  
Q1. Does or did your government apply a one in one out rule or similar (OIXO)? 
If no:  
Q2. Are you considering the introduction of an OIXO rule? If yes, why? If no, why 
not? 
If yes: 
Description 
Q3. Please explain which rule you have in place (x = 1, x = 2, etc.)  
Q4. When was the OIXO rule introduced? Was it modified since then? 
Q5. Does the OIXO rule apply to primary legislation, secondary legislation, or both? 
Q6. Does the OIXO rule apply to independent agencies? 
Q7. Does the x in the OIXO rule refer to the number of legal rules? In other words, 
does the rule require that for every new regulation introduced, x existing 
regulations are removed? 
Q8. Or does the x in the OIXO rule refer to the volume of costs? In other words, does 
the rule require that for every new cost introduced, the same amount of cost to 
be removed elsewhere? 
Q9. Does the OIXO rule apply to: 
Q9.1. Administrative burdens for businesses 
Q9.2. Administrative burdens (all) 
Q9.3. Compliance costs for businesses 
Q9.4. Compliance costs (all) 
Q9.5. Enforcement costs for administrations 
Q9.6. Indirect costs, or opportunity costs 
 
Q10. Does the OIXO rule take into account the benefits introduced by new 
regulation? 
Q11. Does the OIXO rule take into account the benefits of the regulations that are 
repealed? 
Q12. Does the OIXO rule allow for offsetting to take place only by repealing existing 
regulations, or also by modifying/simplifying parts of existing regulations? 
Q13. Does the OIXO rule allow for banking of regulatory costs? In other words, can 
for instance regulatory cost reductions in the past be used for off-setting new costs 
in the future? 
Q14. Who chooses the regulations to be repealed, and on what basis? 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 140 of 143 
Q15. Should the repealed rules fall in the same policy area as the ones that are 
introduced? Or, does the OIXO rule allow for trading of regulatory costs? 
Q16. Where is the offsetting announced?  
Q16.1. In the Impact Assessment of the new regulation that adds costs?  
Q16.2. In the explanatory memorandum to the new regulation that adds costs? 
Q16.3. At a later stage, for instance at the end of the year or of the legislative cycle? 
Q16.4. Other (please explain) 
 
Q17. Do offsetting measures have to undergo a full impact assessment? 
Q18. How much time does the administration have to identify and repeal the rules? 
Q19. What are the consequences if an administration fails to adopt the offsetting 
measure?  
Q20. Are there exemptions to the OIXO rule? Please explain  
 
Lessons learnt 
Q21. Overall, how would your judge your government’s experience with OIXO rules? 
Q21.1. Very Negative  
Q21.2. Negative  
Q21.3. Positive 
Q21.4. Very positive 
 
Q22. What were the most important positive impacts? 
Q22.1. The administration became more attentive to costs 
Q22.2. The administration increased the quality of the ex ante impact assessments, for instance the 
level of quantification, to capture the amount of costs to be offset. 
Q22.3. The administration performed ex post evaluation more regularly to find offsetting measures 
Q22.4. Businesses reported relief from regulatory burdens 
Q22.5. The quality of regulation reportedly increased 
Q22.6. Other (please specify) 
 
Q23. Where there any negative effects? If yes, which? 
 
Q24. What were the biggest obstacles? 
Q24.1. Resistance in the administration 
Q24.2. Difficulty in finding offsetting measures 
Q24.3. Difficulties in quantifying and monetising costs 
Q24.4. Difficulties in communicating the added value of the OIXO rule 
Q24.5. Other (please specify) 
 
FEASIBILITY STUDY: INTRODUCING “ONE-IN-ONE-OUT” IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Page 141 of 143 
Views on a possible EU model 
Q25. Do you think the European Commission should adopt an OIXO rule? 
Q25.1. If yes, please describe the type of rule that you think could be adopted and 
implemented at the EU level  
Q25.2. If yes, please explain which positive impacts you expect 
Q25.3. If yes, please explain which obstacles you think would be most likely to emerge 
Q25.4. If no, please explain why not? 
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Cost reduction targets  
Q1. Does or did your government have a reduction target for regulatory costs? 
If no:  
Q2. Are you considering the introduction of a reduction target for regulatory costs? If 
yes, could you provide some information? If no, why not? 
If yes: 
Description 
Q3. Please explain which cost reduction target you have or had in place  
Q4. When was the target introduced? Were past targets (if any) achieved? 
Q5. Does the cost reduction target apply to all legislation, business-relevant 
legislation, or specific sectors/policy areas? 
Q6. Does the target apply to administrative burdens, or also compliance costs? 
Q7. Is the cost reduction target expressed in percentage, or in nominal value? 
Lessons learnt 
Q8. Overall, how do you judge your government’s experience with reduction targets? 
Q25.5. Very Negative  
Q25.6. Negative  
Q25.7. Positive 
Q25.8. Very positive 
 
Q9. What were the most important positive impacts? 
Q25.9. The administration became more attentive to costs 
Q25.10. The administration increased the quality of the ex ante impact assessments, for instance 
the level of quantification, to capture the amount of costs to be reduced. 
Q25.11. The administration performed ex post evaluation more regularly  
Q25.12. Businesses reported relief from regulatory costs 
Q25.13. The quality of regulation reportedly increased 
Q25.14. Other (please specify) 
 
Q10. Where there any negative effects? If yes, which? 
Q11. What were the biggest obstacles? 
Q25.15. Resistance in the administration 
Q25.16. Difficulties in quantifying and monetising costs 
Q25.17. Difficulties in communicating the added value of the target 
Q25.18. Other (please specify) 
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Views on a possible EU model 
Q12. Do you think the European Commission should adopt a cost reduction target? 
Q25.19. If yes, please describe the type of target that you think could be adopted and implemented 
at the EU level 
Q25.20. If yes, please explain which positive impacts you expect  
Q25.21. If yes, please explain which obstacles you think would be most likely to emerge 
Q25.22. If no, please explain why not? 
 
 
 
Follow-up interview 
I am available for a follow-up interview by phone or in person  Yes     No   
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